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ABSTRACT  
   
Arguing for the importance of decolonial pedagogy in human rights education, 
this research is located at the intersection of human rights education, pedagogy, and 
justice studies, and is situated in the context of a contested neoliberal university in order 
to learn about and understand some of the challenges in implementing pedagogical 
change inspired by decolonial theory. This research focuses on pedagogical approaches 
of human rights professors to understand how and to what extent they are aligned with 
and informed by, incorporate, or utilize decolonial theory. This is accomplished through a 
content analysis of their syllabi, including readings and pedagogical statements, and 
semi-structured interviews about their praxis to draw attention to the what and how of 
their pedagogical practices and the ways in which it aligns with a decolonial pedagogical 
approach. This research calls attention to the specific manner in which they include 
decolonial pedagogical methods in their human rights courses.  
The findings determined that a decolonial pedagogical approach is only just 
emerging, and there is a need to address the barriers that impede their further 
implementation. In addition, there is a need for research that will further investigate the 
pedagogical approaches professors are employing, particularly those in alignment with 
decolonial criteria; the impact of decolonial and non-decolonial approaches on students’ 
epistemologies, and how to overcome barriers to advance implementation of a 
decolonizing pedagogical approach. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Arguing for the importance of decolonial pedagogy in human rights education, 
this research is located at the intersection of human rights education, pedagogy, and 
justice studies, and is situated in the context of a contested neoliberal university in order 
to learn about and understand some of the challenges in implementing pedagogical 
change inspired by decolonial theory. This research focuses on pedagogical approaches 
of human rights professors to understand how and to what extent they are aligned with 
and informed by, incorporate, or utilize decolonial theory. This is accomplished through a 
content analysis of their syllabi, including readings and pedagogical statements, and 
semi-structured interviews about their praxis to draw attention to the what and how of 
their pedagogical practices and the ways in which they align with a decolonial 
pedagogical approach.  I call attention to the specific manner in which they include 
decolonial pedagogical methods in their human rights courses.  
Decolonial theory, as developed by Latin American theorists1, views colonialism 
as an ongoing process that did not end when colonies around the world successfully 
struggled for the right of self-determination. Instead, decolonial theorists contend that 
another form of colonialism continued – that of Eurocentric domination of culture and 
knowledge, ways of thinking and organizing that knowledge, which needs, creates, and 
reproduces hierarchies of race, gender, sex, ethnicity, economy that have resulted in 
                                                
1 This research focuses on Latin American decolonial theorists due to their work 
regarding coloniality, in particular, theorists Walter Mignolo, Aníbal Quijano, and 
Ramón Grosfoguel. 
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subjugation and exploitation (De Lissovoy, 2010; Grosfoguel, 2000; Maldonado-Torres, 
2011). 
Decolonial theorists have identified academia as an area in need of decolonization 
due to the lack of non-Eurocentric ways of knowing and understanding that guide the 
practices and production of knowledge in universities (Grosfoguel, 2012; Barreto, 2012; 
Calderon, 2014). This critique, which has ties to a larger theoretical framework calling 
for the deconstruction of academia (Bloland, 1995; Bloland, 2005; Clegg, Hudson & 
Steel, 2003; Peters and Biesta, 2009), has been applied to specific disciplines, mostly in 
the humanities and social sciences, which are seen as locations where non-Eurocentric 
knowledge “dies” (Grosfoguel, 2012, p. 84). I understand deconstructing the academy to 
mean the criticism of higher education due to its hierarchies, embeddedness in neoliberal 
ideology, capitalism, and corporatization. In particular, programs within these disciplines 
such as Ethnic Studies, Women’s Studies, and Queer Studies, which were created to 
bring life back to non-Eurocentric knowledge, have faced critique due to lack of 
evaluation of valid sources of knowledge (p. 85). These critiques have also extended to 
programs in human rights (Barreto, 2012; Al-Daraweesh and Snauwaert, 2013; Coysh, 
2014). With regard to this dissertation, I refer to the human rights programs situated 
within institutions of higher learning in the U.S.  
While international human rights law and mechanisms have often been criticized 
for having developed out of a Eurocentric liberal tradition and for excluding and 
suppressing people and knowledge, human rights education also faces those same 
critiques. However, the literature on decolonizing human rights, thus far, has not included 
research focused on whether a decolonial pedagogy has been adopted by human rights 
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professors, and how this inclusion or exclusion- or the complicated and layered process 
of transformation - is understood by the field. By decolonial pedagogy, I mean a 
pedagogy that confronts Eurocentric epistemologies and aims to “delink from the 
currently embedded colonial model” of pedagogy (Drinkwater, 2014, p.73). From this 
pedagogy a “new and authentic…solidarity” (De Lissovoy, 2010, p. 286) and 
transformative discourse and praxis can emerge.  
This research contributes to expanding our knowledge of the basis for a 
decolonial pedagogy of human rights and emerging ideas of how such a pedagogy can be 
implemented. The remainder of this chapter emphasizes the different timelines impacting 
that discussion which intersect and run parallel: 1) the arc of anti-colonial struggles post 
World War II and the work of contemporary anti- and de-colonial intellectuals that 
produced decolonizing knowledges and theories; 2) the emergence and development of 
human rights law, and human rights (law) education; 3) changes to disciplinary content, 
training, and pedagogy within graduate school programs; 4) the publication, in English, 
of theories of coloniality, critiques of human rights from a decolonial perspective, and 
decolonial critiques of human rights education; and 5) and the development of professors’ 
teaching histories, syllabi and pedagogical strategies post graduate school – which could 
also include continued pedagogical training. In other words, the establishment of HRE 
programs beginning in the late 1980s to early 1990s occurred during a period of time 
when anti- and de-colonial theorists writings in English begin to emerge. Although the 
emergence of these theorists’ writing does not imply or assume their incorporation into 
curriculums, the timeline is relevant with regard to when human rights professors were 
trained as graduate students as some of this literature had not yet been published. 
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Moreover, in cases where literature had been published, the disciplines and programs in 
which professors received their graduate training may not have prioritized examination of 
anti- and de-colonial critiques.   
It is also important to recognize the many genealogies of anti-colonial thought:  
central to anti-colonial political movements in the post WWII time period were 
intellectuals who dissected and interpreted colonial experiences, relations of power, 
institutions of authority, putting forth both cultural and psychological contestations 
(Césaire, 1950; Fanon, 1961; Achebe, 1958; Memmi, 1957). These political and 
intellectual trajectories inspired people all over the world, and including in the US, 
people, organizations, artists, and intellectuals that identified with the struggles of third 
world peoples and identified themselves as such (Young, 2005; Gómez, 2016), in turn 
producing new models of knowledge production. Many of these political movements 
across the globe had an impact on universities, in terms of admission, curriculum, 
pedagogies, and the politics of knowledge production. This resulted in the creation of 
programs, and academic journals, in Ethnic and Third World Studies, Women and 
Gender Studies, Queer studies, Africa/Afro/Black Studies, and Asian American studies 
(Ferguson, 2012). The emerging theories that were part of the creation of these programs 
were further developed and impacted the university as a knowledge-producing institution 
(Mignolo, 2009). In the following chapters, I expand on these topics at length.   
 This paper is organized into six additional chapters. Chapter 2 begins by 
establishing the impact that liberalism and neoliberalism have had on human rights law 
and discourse but also post-secondary education. I argue that the ideological impression 
of these two concepts on human rights and higher education has resulted in the 
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perpetuation of Eurocentric epistemologies that ignore and dismiss subaltern2 
epistemologies. Therefore, the university, which is a contested space of knowledge 
production related to economic, cultural, social, psychological, political and other spheres 
of life, should be a place where decolonial ideas and practices exist, are created and 
circulated. I assert that the implementation of a decolonial pedagogical approach is an 
important step in considering the implication of decolonial ideas for curriculum, graduate 
training, pedagogy and other elements of the university, while specifically 
acknowledging the relevance of barriers to pedagogical change for actualization of 
decolonial ideas.  
 Chapter 3 establishes the connections and differences between postcolonialism, 
anti-colonialism, and decolonialism and establishes the tenets of decolonial theory. The 
chapter then digresses to a brief discussion of the history of human rights education and 
the critiques that have emerged in contestation. Among the critiques of human rights, 
feminist and cultural relativist, which are found extensively in the literature, are 
introduced followed by the critique of human rights that has emerged from decolonial 
theorists. I posit that based upon a synthesis of the tenets of human rights from the 
writings of decolonial theorists, decolonial measures can be established that will analyze 
the extent to which efforts toward decolonization have been implemented.  
                                                2	Spivak writes of the subaltern as “everything that has limited or no access to the cultural 
imperialism” (p. 45); it is not just a “classy word for oppressed, for Other, for somebody 
who's not getting a piece of the pie” (p. 45). However, in this paper, “subaltern” is 
defined as groups of people whose voices have been silenced and do not adhere to 
Eurocentric and colonial epistemologies. Subaltern epistemic perspectives are knowledge 
coming from below that produces a critical perspective of hegemonic knowledge in the 
power relations involved.	
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 In Chapter 4, I lay out the methodology of this study. For transparency and to 
provide context to the research questions this study seeks to answer, I first highlight my 
own background, beliefs, and biases for transparency and to provide context to the 
research questions this study seeks to answer. The research design is then explained 
followed by details regarding the recruitment and backgrounds of the participants. Next, 
the procedure and method of data processing is revealed, and I conclude by addressing 
the steps taken to ensure the reliability and validity of the study.  
 Chapter 5 introduces the findings of the study and begins by reintroducing the 
participants and providing more background information revealed through the interviews. 
I then move on to address the research questions by first explaining what the findings 
reveal regarding professors’ engagement with and support of decolonial pedagogical 
approaches within their human rights courses. I then provide an analysis of the extent to 
which each of the decolonial measures was addressed based on the analysis of the 
interviews and syllabi provided by the professors.  
 Chapter 6 addresses the how of professors’ pedagogical approaches. I provide an 
analysis of the influence professors’ disciplinary training has had on their pedagogy, the 
pedagogical approaches they use in the classroom, and the objectives they seek to 
accomplish in their courses. The chapter concludes by identifying the challenges that 
exist at both the individual and institutional level to implement a decolonial approach 
within human rights courses. 
 Finally, in Chapter 7, the conclusion explains the implications of the research 
findings, the limitations of the research, and possible research for further study. I close 
with a discussion of how the findings augment our theoretical understanding of 
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decolonial pedagogy and human rights education, and I demonstrate how the adoption of 
decolonial pedagogy and curriculum can generate an epistemological shift in how human 
rights are understood, contextualized, and implemented.  
The chapters discussing academia and decolonial thinking emphasize the breadth 
of decolonial thinking regarding Western intellectual traditions to demonstrate the 1) 
significance of this intellectual genealogy that emerged alongside and in the aftermath of 
anti-colonial political struggles; 2) to highlight the challenges of incorporating these 
intellectual traditions and corresponding pedagogical practices into 3) curriculum and 
teaching practices in undergraduate graduate and programs as well as graduate student 
training.   
A further caveat to explain decolonial theory and my research questions, a binary 
was created between the colonial and the decolonial. Binaries are an imposition of the 
colonial and intended to destroy, but my use of a binary in this research is purposeful in 
that it is intended to expose contradictory colonial and decolonial goals and processes and 
how they are in opposition to each other. There is a need to introduce the binary in order 
for initial dialogue to occur and to reveal how the binary is a means of colonial ordering. 
However, this binary is later complicated by the findings, which demonstrate the 
limitations of a binary – that the decolonial allows for engagement with the colonial and 
for differences as the basis of agreement - and the ways in which a third element is 
produced by the relationship of the two, which is a space in which new questions and 
dialogue can emerge (Derrida, 1998). 
 This project also attempts to bring into discussion the anti-colonial intellectual 
tradition, which targeted the knowledge, including parameters, methods, ontologies, and 
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epistemologies, that rationalized and explained colonial relations of power with theories 
and approaches to human rights education, curriculum, and pedagogy.   
 This work should be seen in the context of my own experience with human rights 
education as a student in a Ph.D. program and as a professor teaching human rights 
education (HRE) to English as a Second Language (ESL) students. Thus, my inquiry is 
three-fold: from my perspective as student, as researcher, and as teacher. As a student, I 
have taken classes within different disciplines that have introduced me to human rights, 
the ideas of critical theories and critiques of human rights, and human rights law. So this 
research is not only about understanding how human rights is taught within different 
disciplines, particularly those I am being trained in, but also my own process of applying 
HRE and decolonial pedagogical practices to my teaching as I navigate the weaknesses of 
my training in decolonial pedagogical practices.  
 This project is slightly unconventional in the sense that this dissertation is layered 
and incorporates my own voice, emanating from these three positions of teacher, student, 
and researcher. It is also purposefully unconventional in its organization of the chapters. 
The structure of the narrative is such that understanding both the content and the context 
of the research is important to help the reader contextualize the project, especially the 
research questions that I am asking. For that reason, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 precede a 
full discussion of the methodology of the project. Given this organization and the 
intention of this dissertation to serve as an invitation to dialogue, I want to introduce 
some of the methodology here so that readers can begin to formulate their own responses 
to the research questions but also join in the discussion, but I will return in much greater 
detail to the methodology in Chapter 4.  
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 My research questions were three-fold: 1) How do human rights professors’ 
engage with decolonial pedagogical approaches in their human rights courses?; 2) How 
do professors’ pedagogical approaches support a decolonial perspective of human rights?; 
and 3) Why do challenges to approaches supporting a decolonial perspective on human 
rights exist, and how can pedagogical barriers to implementation of a decolonial 
approach be overcome? In order to address these questions, I interviewed twenty-two 
professors who teach human rights and I conducted a content analysis of their syllabi. In 
each interview, I asked the professors three sets of questions. The first set were 
background questions that established how long professors had been teaching human 
rights, the courses they teach, what their motivation was in teaching human rights, how 
well prepared they were to teach human rights, and how their training has influenced 
their presentation of human rights in their courses. The second set of questions asked 
professors about their curricular content and included questions about how they choose 
their course materials, the extent to which they incorporate UN treaties, conventions, and 
case law, whether they incorporate critiques of the human rights framework, and which 
course materials they believe demonstrate non-Eurocentric contributions to human rights. 
The third and final set of questions were pedagogical in nature and asked professors 
whether they emphasize a universal or pluriversal epistemology of human rights, if they 
engage students in questions of hierarchies of human rights knowledge and the impact of 
power relations on human rights discourse, and to explain their pedagogical approach to 
teaching human rights. In asking these questions, I wanted to understand the extent to 
which decolonial pedagogical criteria were met and the location of each professor in the 
process of decolonizing their human rights courses. Likewise, through this brief 
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introduction to the research methods, I hope readers might engage in a similar dialogue 
based on this study’s questions.   
 I approach this topic with humility and intellectual curiosity to understand how to 
better incorporate voices, experiences, dialogues that have been excluded to promote 
genuine solidarity that can lead to individual and societal transformations. I point to 
absences within human rights education and pedagogy not to critique the absence but 
rather to understand why pedagogical training is not common in human rights programs, 
and particularly, pedagogical training that does not reproduce the rationale and 
parameters for excluding and silencing particular ways of knowing and understanding 
human rights. Along the same line, when writing about assumptions, particularly in the 
methodological section, I am aware of making transparent my own assumptions and 
expectations stemming from my own experiences about how a program in human rights 
should or could be. Finally, when thinking about decolonizing epistemologies, 
pedagogies, and institutions, I consider Ashis Nandy’s reflection on the secular 
hierarchies established through the “second form of colonialism”:  
This colonialism colonizes minds in addition to bodies and it releases forces 
within the colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once for all. In the 
process, it helps generalize the concept of the modern West from a geographical 
and temporal entity to a psychological category. The West is now everywhere, 
within the West and outside; in structures and in minds. (1983, p.11) 
 
With regards to this project, the secular hierarchies include hierarchies of knowledge and 
knowledge production, their transmission, and reproduction of ideologies.  
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CHAPTER 2 
A ECOLOGY OF DECONSTRUCTING ACADEMIA 
 Much of the current need to deconstruct academia and specifically human rights 
education can be traced to colonization as well as the hegemonic discourse of liberalism 
and, later, neoliberalism that have influenced academia since its formal origination in the 
United States. This chapter will begin by briefly exploring the contentious relationship 
liberalism has with human rights and justice theorist Charles Mills’ critique of liberalism 
as a gendered and racialized philosophy. This discussion is followed by defining 
neoliberalism and investigating the impact it has had on human rights law and discourse. 
In the final sections of this chapter, an examination of the relationship between 
neoliberalism and higher education provides additional context to the need to deconstruct 
academia and the barriers to implementing pedagogical change within academia are 
underscored.  
Liberalism and Human Rights 
 Liberalism and human rights have had an enduring antagonistic relationship that 
preceded the current contentious relationship between neoliberalism and human rights. 
This history is important and complex, but for the purposes of this paper and its focus, I’ll 
keep my comments on liberalism brief to better understand the ways in which 
neoliberalism has impacted human rights.  
 Liberalism is associated with many theorists, perhaps most often with John 
Locke, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Adam Smith, but “liberalism” has varied 
over time and theorists are not wholly in agreement with each other as to what constitutes 
liberalism. Evan so, as a philosophy, it has faced harsh critique. To begin, for theorists 
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concerned with the idea of justice, such as Charles Mills, liberalism is an “exclusionary 
hierarchical ideology of the racial-gendered system established by modernity: racial 
patriarchy” (Mills, 2011, p. 32). In his book chapter, “Liberalism and the Racial State”, 
Charles Mills (2011) presents his argument that liberalism has, from the beginning of its 
development as a political philosophy, been gendered and racialized (p. 31). For Mills, 
liberalism has been racialized due to society’s failure to examine this race-gendered 
system while perpetuating a false, yet standardized, historical narrative in modernity (p. 
43). Mills believes that the standard narrative built around the concept of liberalism is 
incorrectly connected to concepts such as moral egalitarianism, equal rights, and an open 
democracy where equality is actualized. In fact, Mills believes that liberalism has been 
built upon quite the opposite: white patriarchy and racism (Mills, 2008, p. 1381). The 
narrative Mills writes of has been accepted and legitimized through what he terms 
“discursive shifts and conceptual framings” (p. 1381).  
 These discursive shifts and conceptual framings Mills writes of have been 
achieved through racial opacity or the white-washing of history, including human rights 
history. In accepting the idea of egalitarianism, society has forgotten how it arrived in its 
current stage. The narrative has been adjusted such that the atrocities of the past and 
present have been accepted and silenced so that any discussion of racism has become 
inappropriate. Mills (2011) argues that liberalism has been complicit with racism 
requiring whiteness as a “prerequisite for individuality” (p. 28). Due to the liberal ideal of 
individual rights and freedoms, the reduction of people to chattel and genocide based on 
race should have been viewed as a gross transgression and that racial injustice and 
oppression should have been condemned. However, this has not been the case (p. 28). 
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White men were deemed moral while all others, including white women, were judged 
morally inferior, and as such, order could only come from a system of domination in 
which white men ruled over all (p. 30). Thus, the liberal state equated to the racial state 
(p. 28) and the role of the racial state is to privilege white males, the minority, while 
subordinating the majority (p. 32). Mills argues that the social contract of the racial state 
is structured upon disrespect and exclusion of nonwhites (p. 33) rather than a “colorless, 
egalitarian, and inclusive sociopolitical system (Mills, 2009, p. 163).  
 Mills believes that we need to make racial oppression central to our understanding 
of liberalism.  It is only by examining the mechanisms of racial liberalism that continue 
to help “maintain [the world’s] topography of illicit racialized privilege and 
disadvantage” (Yancy and Mills, 2014, para. 21) that liberalism can be saved. Mills 
maintains that liberalism could be reconstituted through a “domination contract” which 
sees “social domination rather than social equity as the actual norm”. As the starting 
point, the actual mechanisms of the state can be then be understood as well as how to 
make it just (Mills, 2011, p. 45). A domination contract acknowledges the racism and 
lack of egalitarianism of liberalism in modernity, end the white-washing of historical 
racially-charged tragedies, and expose the truth of racial liberalism (p. 46).3 
 In addition to the critique that liberalism is a racialized and gendered philosophy, 
liberalism’s antagonistic relationship with human rights also stems from two general 
                                                
3 Mills’ theory of racial justice aligns in many ways with other theories of justice 
including anti-colonial, post-colonial, and decolonial theories. In particular, they align in 
their understanding of a racial and gendered system, which has been sustained and 
utilized to colonize bodies and lands. In the next chapter, these three theories of justice 
will be examined and the differences between them explored in order to better understand 
the importance of using decolonial theory as a means of decolonizing human rights 
education. 
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beliefs held by human rights theorists. Although liberal theorists would state that people 
have rights because they are human and that these rights are universal and inalienable, 
most would argue that those rights are limited to what is required to safeguard life and 
liberty. Generally, social and economic rights are not included. Additionally, they would 
argue that the state’s responsibility in protecting rights should be constrained so as to 
limit interference in citizens’ privacy and freedoms (Douzinas, 2014; Renshaw, 2014). 
This has been referred to as a negative constitution by Susan Bandes, meaning that a state 
does not have the affirmative duties to help its citizens. This minimal model of liberalism 
does not align with human right discourse that argues for the centrality and importance of 
social and economic rights in addition to political and civil rights. Furthermore, from a 
justice theory standpoint the absence of or indifference to social and economic rights 
perpetuates the subordination of the poor and oppressed by not meeting their needs.  
 Stemming from this antagonism toward liberalism, precursors to decolonialism 
emerged including liberation theology. Liberation theology has its roots in the Roman 
Catholicism of Latin America and is primarily linked to Friar Gustavo Gutiérrez, author 
of A Theology of Liberation. Gutiérrez, a Quechua Indian priest and theologian, came 
from an oppressed class, but his success as a student provided him with the opportunity to 
pursue graduate studies in Europe. His time studying in Europe led him to realize that the 
theories embraced by many voters in Europe were not applicable to impoverished Latin 
America and especially the poor of the region. The liberation theology Gutiérrez 
emphasized sought to bring greater justice to the poor and marginalized whose rights, in 
particular social and economic, had been deprived in part due to liberal ideology. From 
liberation theology emerged other forms of anti-oppression theories, including black 
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liberation and feminist liberation. Black liberation theology, often traced intellectually to 
James Cone who wrote A Black Theology of Liberation, which focused on the social, 
political, economic, and religious injustices and inequality experienced by people of color 
(Krattenmaker, 2017). Feminist liberation theology, likewise, asserts the need to examine 
the ways in which women have been oppressed and the need for theological praxis that 
considers the knowledge of women (Russell, 1974). These liberation movements, which 
preceded and have emerged along with decolonization, share in the ideology that certain 
groups of people have experienced the oppression of their rights in response to the global 
hegemony of liberalism.  
 Of particular contention has been an aspect of liberalism known as liberal 
internationalism, which asserts that liberal states should intervene in the affairs of 
sovereign states for the purpose of pursuing liberal objectives - such as global free trade, 
liberal economics and political systems – and democracy. Human rights has been 
criticized as a (neo)liberal enterprise for perpetuating those objectives and being co-opted 
by them. In particular, development measures purported to be based on establishing and 
ensuring human rights have faced harsh criticism. Gustavo Esteva (2010) has written 
extensively of the conceptual inflation of the terms “development” and “economic 
growth” and the ways in which “economization and colonialism were synonymous” (p. 
14). In addition, he writes of how in many countries the quest for rapid economic growth 
(development) has resulted in increased inequality. Esteva cites a relatively early UN 
report (1971) that stated: “The fact that development either leaves behind, or in some 
ways even creates, large areas of poverty, stagnation, marginality and actual exclusion 
from social and economic progress is too obvious and too urgent to be overlooked” (p. 
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10). The impact of liberalism then has not only decentralized the importance of social and 
economic rights but has also resulted in their demise through measures connected to 
liberal internationalism.  
 Also worth mention in the discussion of liberal development efforts is the critique 
of NGO-ization, or the proliferation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
throughout the developing world and Global South (Jad, 2004). In response to the 
findings that development efforts have resulted in increased inequality, many NGOs have 
emerged bringing with them the criticism that they are “the products of neoliberal 
policies expressed in privatization and decentralization of state institutions” (Yachobi, 
2007, p. 745) as well as a form of neocolonialism (Jad, 2004; Hanafi and Tabar, 2002). 
Whereas many liberals have applauded NGO efforts in countries with ineffective 
governments and their ability to work toward a society that is not dependent on the state 
or market, others have criticized the top-down approach of many NGOs and the lack of 
accountability they have to the often-marginalized recipients of their efforts (O’Loughlin, 
2014).  
 As previously stated, neoliberalism is a current component of an on-going 
contentious relationship between liberal theory and human rights. The values of 
liberalism have contrasted directly with theories of human rights that view social and 
economic rights as intrinsic and fundamental. In addition, the hegemonic proliferation of 
liberal policies has resulted in movements, including decolonialization, that aim to 
address the continued colonization and oppression of marginalized people that these 
liberal policies perpetuate. Human rights have been directly and negatively impacted 
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under liberalism. In the following paragraphs, I wish to bring attention to the ways in 
which neoliberalism has served to detriment human rights.  
 
Neoliberalism and Human Rights  
 Saunders (2004) describes neoliberalism as a “varied collection of ideas, 
practices, policies, and discursive representations”, but explains that “this collection is 
united by three broad beliefs: the benevolence of the free market, minimal state 
intervention and regulation of the economy, and the individual as a rational economic 
actor” (p. 45). Fundamentally, neoliberalism is guided by the concept of a self-regulating 
market in which free trade and competition leads to economic advancement and wealth 
for most. In cases where they do not occur, it is due to external meddling (Saunders, 
2004, p. 46). McChesney adds that “neoliberalism is the defining political economic 
paradigm of our time — it refers to the policies and processes whereby a relative handful 
of private interests are permitted to control as much as possible of social life in order to 
maximize their personal profit” (as quoted in Giroux, 2002, p. 425). 
 Neoliberalism has left a mark on our understanding of what counts as human 
rights, both human rights law and human rights discourse, which are major components 
of any human rights curriculum.  MacNaughton and Frey (2015) argue that at both 
international and national levels, neoliberalism has become so normalized that many fail 
to understand the impact of neoliberal policies on human rights law (p. 18). They explain 
that in the U.S. there is a belief that human rights are not relevant to the U.S., and where 
rights are concerned, the emphasis is on civil rights rather than human rights. Human 
rights abuses do not extend to their thinking beyond gross violations such as war crimes 
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or genocide. As for civil rights, these are very rarely reflected upon as a component of 
human rights and other components such as economic, social, and cultural rights go 
unacknowledged. MacNaughton and Frey argue that the myopic focus on civil rights is 
due to neoliberal governing. After the Cold War ended, neoliberalism gained a foothold 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) was 
forgotten despite the significant attention given to those rights during the drafting of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (p. 20). The authors point to specific 
rights within the UDHR that have been negatively impacted by neoliberalism such as 
Articles 23, 26, and 27 - the rights to full employment and decent work, progressive 
realization of free higher education, and the benefits of science respectively. 
Interestingly, the substance of each of these articles was echoed in the negative impact 
neoliberalism has on the university.  
 Neoliberalism has also impacted human rights discourse. Evans (2005) argues 
that human rights discourse is a legal discourse of human rights (p. 1046-1047) but that 
this discourse has lacked a “reflection on authority, relevance, and hegemony of 
international human rights law” (p. 1048). While he admits that the discourse has 
included extensive criticism pertaining to some theories and ideologies, he argues that the 
discourse has lacked critique (p. 1048). Evans differentiates criticism and critique by 
explaining that criticism is confined to arguments while critique investigates how the 
claims that “human rights represent a universal and eternal truth” (p. 1048) are “achieved, 
legitimated, and presented as the authoritative guide for action” (p. 1049). Evans 
maintains that “critique is concerned to expose the interests served by the production and 
maintenance of particular truths, and the processes that enable some forms of knowledge 
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to be accepted as complete and legitimate while other forms are labeled partial and 
suspect” (p. 1049). Evans believes that as discourse is privatized and institutionalized, 
assumed experts gain authority while other voices whose discourse differs are discounted 
(p. 1050). Thus, “discourses...act as the meeting place for power and knowledge” (p. 
1050), and power, whether legitimate or illegitimate, can exclude and marginalize. Evans 
cites Mutua’s argument that human rights discourse often highlights the idea of a savior 
overthrowing the savages in order to reinstate the victim’s rights, yet ignores that the 
victim may have a vision of an ideal life that differs from the savior (Evans, 2005, p. 
1050). Evans argues that the processes of domination that underlie human rights 
discourse are a result of what he refers to as ‘market discipline’, which he explains 
emphasizes economic growth, the free market, and privatization. Within the bounds of 
market discipline, human rights are conceptualized differently than they would be within 
international law. They are envisaged as “freedoms necessary to maintain and legitimate 
particular forms of production and exchange,” and are only important so as to affirm 
neoliberal freedom (p. 1057). Because human rights discourse is presented as the 
undisputed and yet remains reticent on issues of power and dominant concepts of human 
rights, many human rights abuses experienced by subaltern4 voices remain suppressed. 
Additionally, Evans explains that because market discipline underlies human rights 
discourse, “human life is valued as a means to an end rather than as an end in itself. This 
is seen in the greater attention given to trade, property, and finance, compared to that 
                                                
4 Spivak writes of the subaltern as “everything that has limited or no access to the cultural 
imperialism” (p. 45); it is not just a “classy word for oppressed, for Other, for somebody 
who's not getting a piece of the pie” (p. 45). However, in this paper, “subaltern” is 
defined as groups of people whose voices have been silenced and do not adhere to 
Eurocentric and colonial epistemologies. 
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concerned with humanitarian issues, for example, poverty, the environment, and socio-
economic rights” (p. 1057). Given the influence of neoliberalism on human rights law 
and discourse, a significant critique must be a component of any effort to decolonize how 
human rights is taught within the university.  
 The following section explores the reasons the university is viewed as a contested 
space. I highlight how colonialism, Eurocentrism, liberalism, and specifically 
neoliberalism have contributed to its contestation in an effort to demonstrate not only the 
difficulty but also the importance of a decolonial approach to human rights within higher 
education.   
Universities as Contested Spaces- Historical Analysis 
 Ecologies are complicated systems that are always in flux, transition, and change, 
with different elements vying for attention and prominence (Weaver-Hightower, 2008). 
Similarly, U.S. universities are contested spaces and sites, that according to Pillay (2015), 
are characterized by “constant invention, contestation, negotiation, subversion and 
potentially, reinvention” of ideas, possibilities, methodology, and power and politics. It is 
a contested space in which there is a “struggle for social control” (Reyes, 2016, p. 201) 
and in the context of universities, this struggle for social control often stems from 
divergent ideas with regards to the purpose of and differences between education and 
learning, as well as what defines a university. As argued below, the university serves as a 
contested space especially because it is a colonized space in which Eurocentrism has 
maintained power and control through liberal and neoliberal policies, the silencing of 
non-Eurocentric epistemologies, and the Eurocentric universalism of knowledge.  
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 U.S. and Latin American universities were established as a direct consequence of 
European colonization and served as a contested and colonized space in its mission and 
purpose. When the Europeans first began to colonize the Americas, British and Spanish 
settlers used universities as a device to create, implement and maintain a white 
Eurocentric system of power (Sui, 2015). These universities were created and run by 
these settlers establishing them as they colonized the continent. Siu (2015) provides the 
location and year of establishment of these universities to illustrate the historical 
connection between colonization and universities: the Universidad Autónoma de Santo 
Domingo (1538), Universidad de San Marcos of Perú (1551), Real y Pontificia 
Universidad de México, today the UNAM (1551), and Harvard University (1636). From 
its function as colonial institution, and accounting for the different colonial/intellectual 
histories with regards to Spain, France, and Great Britain, for example, the university has 
been and continues to be a contested and colonized space in its mission and purpose. Siu 
contends that each of these universities served “as spaces for the creation and retention of 
systems of thought…[that] contributed to the eradication of indigenous educational 
institutions and to the displacement, invalidation, destruction, and subalternization of 
indigenous and African ways of knowing” (para. 4). She explains that indigenous 
knowledge and epistemologies did not match the imposed history of the colonizers and 
were not favorable to the system of colonization being enforced: “Native knowledges did 
not support racial, class nor gender hierarchies –all organizing principles of colonial 
America” (para. 4). Thus, universities were spaces in which Eurocentric ideology was 
developed and preserved creating a lens through which all academic disciplines were 
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directed and allowing for the rationalization of the white Eurocentric system of power 
(Quijano, 2000).  
 After WWII, when the US university systems (public and private – with public 
money), expanded their reach to possible students, as well as expanding areas of research 
in the social sciences, humanities, and hard sciences (Giroux, 2015; Gilmore, 1991), the 
framework of human rights law was emerging. A Cold War project, meaning a bulwark 
for capitalism against communism, of education, the expansion of (public) universities 
increased influence and impact on policy, politics, culture, science and other areas of life 
also created the conditions for contesting the impact of knowledge production that often 
made certain epistemological assumptions. The discussion of the role of US universities 
in reproducing certain ideologies or methods of social control for creating a docile labor 
force, for example as introduced by the work of Herbert Marcuse’s One Dimensional 
Man, is beyond this research project, but it is important to continue to point out that the 
university is a contested space of knowledge production (subject and method) that people 
– students, administrators, academics – reproduce, challenge, and remake. I mention 
these characteristics intentionally to link the time period of the expansion of higher 
education, and thus the mechanisms and apparatuses of producing, reproducing, 
circulating and transmitting knowledge – to students, policy makers, captains of industry, 
and social justice activists - to the emergence, post WWII, of international agreements 
and documents outlining, defining the parameters of, and creating institutions of political 
authority for this new regime of rights. 
 Suarez-Krabbe’s (2012) research demonstrates Eurocentric perspectives are 
prioritized within academia ontologically, epistemologically, and theoretically and are 
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often an implied requirement for obtaining funding, publishing, or climbing the academic 
ladder. Other perspectives are silenced, and non-Eurocentric theories, in particular, are 
categorized as “lay criticism, political manifestos, ideology, polemics or empirical 
material” in an effort to lessen their significance (p. 39). In addition, Progler (2014) 
identifies Eurocentrism within the curriculum, including its textbooks, methods, and 
theories, as oriented toward white Eurocentric knowledge at the expense of other forms 
of knowledge. Progler also argues that universities are contested spaces as a result of 
maintaining and imposing a Eurocentric knowledge system. This epistemic violence 
enables political and economic violence, and the violence of sanctioned ignorance (the 
established institutional intellectual boundaries of who can know, and how that knowing 
is recognized), that in turn further sustains a hierarchy based on social class by using 
education to limit mobility. Thus, the desire for social control via the maintenance of an 
education regime of power (Foucault, 1977) has resulted in the university being a 
contested and colonized space in which the social hierarchies attempt to exclude 
marginalized and peripheral voices contributing to the perpetuation of relations of 
oppression and exploitation.  Arguably, higher education is the location in which the 
liberal racial state is ideologically, materially, economically, psychologically, and 
culturally reproduced. Thus, the university serves as one of the mechanisms of racial 
liberalism that Mills writes of. From the standpoint of Mills’ theory of justice, in order to 
dismantle the discursive shifts and conceptual framings that have allowed for racial 
opacity and the white-washing of history, the university as mechanism must be carefully 
dissected so as to move toward justice and allow for the adoption of a domination 
contract as well as the uprooting of neoliberal thought which has perpetuated this false 
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narrative and served as a conduit of Eurocentrism’s continued expansion. Drawing on an 
array of additional theorists, I understand this contestation as the politics of knowledge 
production, the contested foundational intellectual dynamics and parameters of an 
ongoing project of coloniality,5 that continues in and has been exacerbated by the process 
of neoliberalism. 
Neoliberalism and Higher Education 
 In Higher Education in America, former President of Harvard University, Derek 
Bok (2013) writes comprehensively about the system of higher education (HE) in the 
United States and tackles many of the criticisms of the system of HE. Bok claims that 
while universities in the U.S. have not had a singular purpose for more than one hundred 
                                                
5 The university, for example, as a contested space (of knowledge production, 
organization, and circulation) is part of a colonization process in that contestation is 
always about reproducing the institution on new terms of order (Robinson, 1983) that 
draw from a previous set of knowledges before whatever crisis occurred that precipitated 
the need to re-organize power relations – between administrators and students or faculty, 
between the university and society, and between departments. Contesting the terms of 
order can include putting forward an analysis that	emphasizes the paradigmatic processes 
of colonialism, i.e. that it is the entire structure, including the critique to reform the 
structure that contestation often assumes. This is not the same as a total paradigmatic re-
organization of knowledge production, the parameters of what is considered knowledge, 
and the imaginary of how knowledge can be put to work for human dignity. Its worth 
remembering the words of Franz Fanon (1961): “The violence which has ruled over the 
ordering of the colonial world, which has ceaselessly drummed the rhythm for the 
destruction of native social forms and broken up without reserve the systems of reference 
of the economy, the customs of dress and external life, that same violence will be claimed 
and taken over by the native at the moment when, deciding to embody history in his own 
person, he surges into the forbidden quarters. To wreck the colonial world is 
henceforward a mental picture of action, which is very clear, very easy to understand and 
which may be assumed by each one of the individuals which constitute the colonized 
people. To break up the colonial world does not mean that after the frontiers have been 
abolished lines of communication will be set up between the two zones. The destruction 
of the colonial world is no more and no less that the abolition of one zone, its burial in the 
depths of the earth or its expulsion from the country (p. 40-41).”		
   25 
years, specific aims can be identified, which developed from three separate movements. 
The first movement developed the aim of preparing students to work in a beneficial 
occupation and aligned with the growth of the economy during the industrialization 
period. The second movement resulted in a focus on research and scientific inquiry. The 
third movement focused on educating the elite through the cultivation of a liberal 
education (p. 29). In some institutions, performing service activities and the production of 
economic development have also become objectives (p. 30). Bok concedes that there are 
advantages and disadvantages to each of these aims. As to the disadvantages, he 
highlights the mounting costs of providing and obtaining higher education, students who 
are wholly unprepared for college-level education, and the disrupted economic 
relationship between institutes of higher education and the government. Bok also 
discusses universities’ emphases on tangible goals rather than more nuanced goals and 
competition between universities that has led to dubious outcomes.  
 The pressure to raise increasing amounts of money has, in some cases, led to 
improper influence of those providing the funds as private donors (Korn, 2017).  Bok also 
believes that there is a very limited pool of people who can provide the kind of competent 
leadership universities require. Bok’s last concern is the number of low performing 
universities that are allowed to continue operating in absence of minimum standards of 
quality. What is interesting is that Bok never once addresses neoliberalism in his entire 
book despite many of the issues arguably having stemmed from neoliberal ideology. 
While Bok’s criticisms ring true, the absence of discussion of neoliberalism, and 
furthermore, the impact of Eurocentric colonialism on higher education in his book are 
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indicative of the work required to create an environment in which decolonization is 
possible. 
 There are, however, many other scholars who are in agreement that neoliberalism 
has had significant negative impact on the institution of education. Henry Giroux (2002) 
has made the bold statement that “neoliberalism has become the most dangerous ideology 
of the current historical moment” (p. 428).  In a similar vein, Mark Ferrara (2015), author 
of Palace of Ashes, begins his book by declaring neoliberal ideology to be “pernicious” 
to education and argues that the U.S. has thoughtlessly embraced this model of education. 
Unimpeded, neoliberalism “threatens to transform global higher education into an adjunct 
of corporate power and values” (p. 5). The repercussions of neoliberalism include a move 
in higher education toward restriction of knowledge rather than expansion demonstrated 
by the lack of public discourse, the justification of the transformation of the university to 
enterprises that mimic corporate structures, a push to ensure that research is market-
friendly, the reduction of the intellectual capital, and the reduction of academic freedom.  
 First, the demands of the marketplace have caused public discourse to wane and 
have limited the ability of higher education to instruct for the purpose of “sustain[ing] 
and developing[ing] inclusive democratic spheres” (Giroux, 2002, p. 432). Additionally, 
as universities have become more impacted by corporate culture, it has also become more 
difficult to distinguish between higher education and business (p. 433).  Educational 
programs that have not produced significant profit are often sidelined if not completely 
eradicated from the university. In particular, the humanities have suffered this fate in 
recent years (p. 434). University programs often make a profit by downsizing, becoming 
more efficient, and employing cost accounting. In other cases, corporations and corporate 
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donors like LEGO and Nike’s Phil Knight are funding endowed chairs at universities 
such as MIT and the University of Oregon respectively (p. 435). In establishing the 
endowed chair, corporations and donors can gain a voice in deciding what is researched 
and who is hired or appointed for the endowments. Corporate donors have also used their 
financial gifts to influence academic freedom and faculty recruits. Western Carolina 
University has experienced two cases in which donors have made specific requests 
relating to academic content. BB&T offered a $1 million gift for the purpose of business 
education but only on the condition that a novel by Ayn Rand was incorporated as 
required reading for students in their junior year. Additionally, the university sought a $2 
million donation from the Charles Koch Foundation, whose namesake is well known for 
funding conservative organizations and causes. Florida State University took donations 
from the Koch Foundation in 2011, and as part of the agreement, was required to utilize 
an advisory committee selected by the Foundation to review job candidates (Ball, 2016). 
Overall, closer ties to the business community have been established due to concerns of 
ensuring a revenue stream, increasing the student body numbers, and cutting overall costs 
(p. 442).  
 Another consequence is that the role of faculty and administrators has shifted. 
There has been a reduction in the number of faculty who participate in the governance of 
the university as administrators are now tasked with deciding the majority of university 
issues (Ferrara, 2015, p. 12). Additionally, even as administrative roles continue to 
increase, today, only 23% of faculty positions are tenured whereas in the 1960s, the 
percentage was closer to 70%. Full-time faculty members have been replaced by an ever-
growing population of adjunct faculty who are generally over-worked and under-paid (p. 
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126). The demand for economic efficiency has resulted in the rationalization of providing 
fewer full-time positions for faculty and more adjunct positions (Ferrara, 2015; Saunders, 
2004; Giroux, 2005). The tenuousness of faculty also then limits academic freedom and 
shared governance. 
 Furthermore, the pedagogy of faculty has changed. Professors are often required 
to teach large class sizes giving them little time for feedback and advising and conducting 
collaborative research with students and other faculty (p. 434). Faculty members are also 
often limited in what they can teach but also their delivery mode (p. 434), i.e. their 
pedagogical choices. In the neoliberal university, conducting research is important for 
professors, but it is highly influenced by the neoliberal ideology. Research is prioritized 
over teaching due to the academic capital afforded to it, meaning that quality research can 
significantly elevate a professor’s career while excellent teaching is much less of a factor. 
However, even though research is greatly valued, not all forms of research are valued 
equally. Of course, research that leads to more funding, patents, and possible spinoffs are 
prioritized over the humanities, arts, and most social sciences. But additionally, research 
on pedagogy is not valued. Cartney and Cartney (2016) argue that this is because it is 
aligned more closely with teaching than research. Finally, corporations often fund 
research and can influence how their money is used and ultimately may compromise the 
integrity of the research. Thus, professors in the neoliberal university may be limited in 
their freedom to focus on teaching and fully control their pedagogy or conduct their 
research without significant constraints.   
 Lastly, these changes in governance and pedagogy effect how students now see 
more explicitly the purpose of attending an institution of higher education: getting a 
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better job rather than increasing one’s knowledge. Attending college or university is now 
a consumer activity not simply an educational activity (Giroux, 2002; Molesworth et al., 
2009).  Thus, students experience the conflicting pull of being a critical and analytical 
student versus the pull of neoliberalism which demands subordination to the directives of 
the market (Jay, 2011, p. 169). According to Giroux (2004), higher education is now a 
“financial investment and learning is a form of training for the workforce” (p. 494).6
 In their article “Resisting Neoliberalism from within the Academy”, Preston and 
Aslett (2014) elucidate one other major strength of neoliberalism reproducing itself in 
models of governance, pedagogical cultures and curricular offerings within higher 
education: failure to engage critique (p. 503). Practices that encourage productivity, 
efficiency, and profit are seldom questioned and are perhaps characteristic of a neoliberal 
pedagogy. Additionally, in an effort to achieve these three goals, the quality of education 
suffers due to neoliberal logic in which students are put into larger, impersonal, and 
isolating classes and faculty are left with impersonal interactions and a reduced ability to 
engage critically with both the students and the subject. Particular to this paper, 
neoliberal ideology fails to engage in critique of what is being taught and how it is being 
taught: curricular choices and pedagogical practices. Neoliberalism, or neoliberal ideas, 
have a dominant influence within academia, and so while “scholarship that supports the 
value of capital is rewarded,” scholarship that detours from a capitalist-centric ideology 
has no place and cannot be justified (p. 505). Furthermore, any research that questions or 
                                                
6 Nevertheless, Giroux (2002) believes that “many students reject this model of the 
university as a business, which increasingly views students as consumers, the classroom 
as a marketplace, and the public space of the university as an investment opportunity” (p. 
454). 	
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criticizes neoliberalism’s processes is not valued because it “creates ‘inefficiency’ in the 
market (Jay, 2011, p. 169). In addition, pedagogical outcomes that do not follow a model 
of efficiency – tests, quizzes, memorizations…must struggle to exist, and to justify that 
existence. “Inefficient” research can be re-valued and purposed by the university as an 
example of how it is an institution that allows for, cultivates and offers “diverse” 
perspectives (Ferguson, 2012).  
 As has been established, the impact of neoliberalism can be seen in the issues of 
academic capitalism, the corporatization of higher education, and in the deterioration of 
academic labor environments. These issues are seen as part of a “larger effort to 
undermine the progressive social development and egalitarian ideals of higher education 
in a democratic society” (Jay, 2011, p. 165) and a reason for which the deconstruction of 
academia is necessary. Boidin, Cohen, and Grosfoguel (2012) also argue that the need to 
deconstruct American and European universities stems from neoliberalism, capitalism, 
and the continued use of an academic model stemming from a type of universalism, 
which has been “complicit with processes of not only class exploitation but also 
processes of racial, gender, and sexual dehumanization” (p. 2).  This academic model has 
been criticized and questioned globally by intellectuals who believe there is a need for 
decolonization within Westernized universities (p. 2). 
 The concept of deconstructing academia provides not only a critique of the spread 
of Eurocentrism through the neoliberalism system of higher education but also 
Eurocentric colonization via the universalism of knowledge (Boidin et al., 2012; 
Shahjahan, 2011).  Shahjahan (2011) argues that colonial discourse in higher education is 
expressed in three ways: (1) through discussions of how to civilize the field of education; 
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(2) through the preferment of hierarchies of knowledge; and (3) through the connection 
between colonialism and educational policies based in neoliberalism (p. 182). Higher 
education has adopted and adhered to theories that are  
 based on European traditions and produced nearly always by European or Euro-
 American men who are the only ones accepted as capable of reaching 
 universality, and truly foundational to the canon of disciplines in the Westernized 
 university’s institutions of social sciences and the humanities. (p. 2)  
 
The Eurocentric colonization of higher education extends beyond U.S. universities to 
global higher education and is deeply ingrained within courses, course material, research, 
and policies. In  2011, the International Conference on Decolonising Our Universities 
was held in Malaysia. From this conference, a statement in the form of a memorandum 
was sent to UNESCO in which the attendees from countries across the world echoed 
Shahjahan’s argument of the insidiousness of Eurocentrism within their countries’ 
universities and the extent to which colonization has impacted the universities. The 
attendees also prioritized “the recovery of indigenous intellectual traditions and 
resources” explaining that “course structures, syllabi, books, reading materials, research 
models and research areas must reflect the treasury of our thoughts, the riches of our 
indigenous traditions and the felt necessities of our societies” (GlobalHigherEd, 2011, 
para. 6).  The universalism of knowledge must extend to the inclusion of subaltern 
knowledge in every aspect of higher education courses in order to stem Eurocentrism’s 
colonization.  
 Colonialism and Eurocentrism maintain strong roots within the system of higher 
education in the university system.  Giroux’s (2000) quote below explains how the 
corporatization of higher education has continued to uphold a system in which 
   32 
“knowledge” is narrowly defined so as to be devoid of the critique necessary to push 
against the oppressiveness of the colonial and Eurocentric ideology rooted in that system: 
Knowledge as capital in the corporate model is privileged as a form of investment 
in the economy, but appears to have little value when linked to the power of self-
definition, social responsibility, or the capacities of individuals to expand the 
scope of freedom, justice, and the operations of democracy. Knowledge stripped 
of ethical and political considerations offers limited, if any, insights into how 
universities should educate students to push against the oppressive boundaries of 
gender, class, race, and age domination. Nor does such a language provide the 
pedagogical conditions for students to critically engage knowledge as an ideology 
deeply implicated in issues and struggles concerning the production of identities, 
culture, power, and history. (p. 441)  
 
 The weave between neoliberalism, colonialism and the university is intricate. 
Knowledge has been defined by neoliberalism whose foundations rest in the concept of 
colonialism. Thus, without recognizing the problematic definition of knowledge and 
addressing the need to separate knowledge from these two ideologies, there is little need 
to deconstruct the university. In its present form, the university does what it was intended 
to do: provide a space in which Eurocentric power and social control are retained. To 
decolonize the university is to repurpose it  (reform its purpose) - to condition the 
possibility of universities in which the ideology of knowledge is not interwoven with 
capital, in which knowledge production that occurs outside the university is seen as valid, 
and in which knowledge is not linked to the maintenance of white Eurocentered social 
control, to the perpetuation of “isms”, and to epistemic violence.  
 Although Eurocentric colonization is embedded within higher education, 
decolonial theorists point to decolonization as reform rather than destruction. While the 
concept of “reformation” stems from European historical contexts and is arguably a 
Eurocentric construct, total destruction, though ideal, may not be realistic or 
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plausible.  Instead, Boidin et al. (2012) argue for the deconstruction of these Eurocentric 
theories adopted by higher education and suggest it could begin through “inter-epistemic 
dialogues” - the purpose of which would be reforming the university (p. 2). Reformation 
as defined by the authors would involve “creating a less provincial and more open critical 
cosmopolitan pluriversalism,” which would result in “a radical re-founding of our ways 
of thinking and a transcendence of our disciplinary divisions”. In dialoguing with 
different traditions of thought that are often silenced, ignored, or inferiorized, a more 
critical pluriversalism could challenge the current universalism. Nelson Maldonado-
Torres (2006) refers to the introduction of different traditions of thought or theories and 
ideas that are banned or excluded from the halls of academia into the universities and 
formal centers of learning” as ‘epistemic coyotismo’7 (p. 16).  Undertaking the reform 
and repurposing of universities will undoubtedly be difficult, but a possible starting point 
is recognizing the interconnections between neoliberalism, colonialism, and higher 
education as seen in curriculum content and pedagogical practices.   
 What would a decolonial curriculum and pedagogy would look like? This will be 
discussed in more detail below, but for now, decolonizing curriculum perpetuates 
“resistance” knowledge that probes the concepts of indigeneity, agency, resistance, and 
subjectivity, pushing against Eurocentric epistemology and coloniality (Kanu, 2006; Dei 
and Asgharzadeh, 2001). The product of the probing is the development of spirituality, 
agency, and critical consciousness amongst students and faculty. Furthermore, Dei and 
Asgharzadeh contend that decolonial curriculum must critically examine all types of 
                                                
7 Meaning “to introduce theories and ontologies that are otherwise excluded from 
academia” (Suárez-Krabbe, 2012). 	
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relationships that dominate and oppress from institutions of power and privilege (Dei and 
Asgharzadeh, 2001). Specifically, it must interrogate the varied locations of power within 
“ideas, cultures, and histories of knowledge production, validation, and use” (as cited in 
Kanu, 2006, p. 176). A new pedagogy would acknowledge “institutions and their 
structures of power are sanctioned by the state to serve the material, political, and 
ideological interests of the state and economic/social formation” (as cited in Kanu, 2006, 
p. 177). This pedagogy must also discern the power that comes with confronting 
colonialism. Much more discussion on the topic of decolonial pedagogy and curriculum 
will follow in the next chapter, but before delving into more specifics, it is important to 
name and address some challenges that must be overcome in order to implement 
decolonial curriculum and pedagogy within human rights higher education programs and 
courses.  
Barriers to Implementing Pedagogical Change 
 Implementing pedagogical change within a nascent discipline is certain to be 
challenging. Any effort to decolonize human rights pedagogy will require the discipline 
as well as individuals to adopt new assumptions and re-evaluate prior facts. Thomas 
Kuhn’s seminal book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions addresses the difficulties of 
creating shifts in our thinking and pedagogy. Kuhn acknowledges how difficult and time 
consuming this is and writes of the process within the scientific field. Kuhn identified 
two main phases occurring repetitiously throughout scientific history.  The “normal” 
phase is the period of time during which a central set of beliefs (paradigms) are 
established and accepted. In addition, during this normal phase, “deep commitments to a 
particular way of looking at the world [are created], and…fundamental novelties which 
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conflict with received theories [are suppressed]” (Zaman, 2015, para. 3). A main effort 
for scientists during this period is trying to make conflicting observations fit into the 
central set of beliefs. At some point though there are enough conflicting observations that 
some scientists break away from the core beliefs of the paradigm. This is the second 
phase referred to as the “revolution” phase. The revolution phase is not complete until a 
new generation is able to push forward with change and with new research emerging out 
of the new paradigm (Zaman, 2015). Kuhn’s process has been applied to many other 
fields, and we might consider its relevance to the fields of human rights and human rights 
education. If Kuhn’s argument holds true, then implementing pedagogical change with 
these fields will take significant effort, and we must be mindful of where the field stands 
amidst these two phases.  
 Furthermore, at the individual level, the challenges that faculty face in light of the 
impact of neoliberalism’s clutch on higher education are many, and for those who wish to 
experiment with new ideas, there can be significant consequences. The precariousness of 
employment positions due to the limited hiring of full-time faculty and the difficulty of 
the tenure process create a situation in which faculty fear putting their jobs at risk, 
particularly if they are working alone, by introducing controversial ideas or pedagogical 
practices.  The market restricts academic freedom and the push to engage in research that 
will make a profit limits the ability of faculty to make impactful changes to their 
pedagogy. These barriers are complicated by additional obstacles including: decision-
making processes; the impact of perceptions of risk; limitations in training and support; 
lack of time and confidence; the absence of a culture of thinking collectively in an 
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individualized labor sector; and few enticements. Although many barriers do exist, 
research has shown that they can be overcome.   
 According to Tagg (2012), author of Why does Faculty Resist Change?,  much of 
the resistance can be traced back to how people make decisions. Citing experiments 
conducted by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, most people do not choose what we 
believe to be the best option. Instead, we subjectively choose what we believe will be of 
greater value to us (p. 9). What we think will be of greater value is influenced by how the 
potential outcomes are presented. Outcomes that are presented in terms of how much can 
be gained result in less risky decision whereas outcomes presented in terms of how much 
can be lost result in more risky decisions (p. 10). Additionally, when making decisions, 
research supports the endowment effect in which we put more value on items we consider 
our own (see Ziv Carmon and Dan Ariely). This could include training in graduate school 
with regards to pedagogical practices. 
 The endowment effect applies not only to tangible items but also ideas. According 
to Tagg (2012), this research in decision-making results in the ultimate consequence of 
maintaining the status quo. He cites a study conducted by Thaler and Cass Sunstein in 
which faculty did not change anything about their retirement plans over their entire 
teaching career. Likewise, Samuelson and Zeckhauser’s study demonstrated that faculty 
would not change their retirement plans even when the new plans may have benefitted 
the faculty more (p. 11). Tagg (2012) explains how all of this research pertains to 
pedagogy and curriculum: “Changes in pedagogy and curriculum are offered as a way of 
making gains in student learning. But if it comes, and it always does, to a weighing of 
gains versus losses, loss aversion and the endowment effect will keep a thumb on the 
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scale, leading losses to outweigh gains” (p. 11). Faculty members see monetary rewards 
in the form of increases in salary, grants, and stipends as a potential loss. For faculty, 
engaging primarily in research rather than in teaching can produce monetary gains, while 
also colonizing the time that could be put to learning new ways of teaching post-Ph.D. 
Another potential loss is tenure, which is also closely connected to research by way of 
producing scholarly journal articles and books.  Tagg (2012) argues that, ultimately, 
teaching is then regarded as a loss not a gain. Adjusting one’s pedagogy will not only 
produce no gains but will result in the loss of time, energy, and income.  
 Deidre Le Fevre’s (2014) article, Barriers to Implementing Pedagogy, focuses on 
the impact of perceptions of risk on faculty’s willingness to achieve sustained 
pedagogical change. She agrees with Tagg’s (2012) research demonstrating faculty 
perceive greater risk if they also perceive that the potential loss to be great. She adds that 
perceived risk is influenced by physiological, psychological, and physical factors.  When 
deciding to adopt a decolonial approach, perceived risk may currently be or will become 
a factor.  
 One of the psychological factors is cognitive bias. People tend to try to fit new 
information into their current viewpoints. When the new information does not fit, their 
current beliefs have to be re-evaluated; however, with that re-evaluation comes 
vulnerability, and ultimately, often the rejection of the new information. This is true of 
both students and professors. Altering beliefs or practices is risky and the potential of 
failure is unacceptable. Sinclair and Osborn’s research (2014) on pedagogical change also 
concluded that fear and anxiety serve as significant barriers. In addition, Le Fevre cites as 
a barrier the negative impact of too much change known as initiativitis. The more 
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changes or adjustments faculty feel they must make, the less likely they are to make any 
changes. From disciplines to departments and classes, these fears must be addressed. 
 With regard to human rights educators, we must consider the added pressure all 
educators face in light of the “transformative” nature of teaching human rights, which 
hopefully anticipates that in learning about human rights students will affect change 
within themselves, their communities, or globally, which are also outcomes of a 
decolonial pedagogy. Given the aforementioned factors that faculty generally face and 
compounding them with these added expectations, strong consideration must be given to 
the feasibility of achieving changes to human rights pedagogy. The fears and anxiety 
associated with altering pedagogy may exacerbate any initial reluctance faculty may have 
or could be used as a means of establishing legitimate reasons to reject pedagogical 
changes. A final barrier Le Fevre addresses is the faculty’s relationships with key 
stakeholders such as administration, fellow faculty, and students. Pedagogical changes 
that carry the risk of negatively influencing these relationships are rejected in favor of 
maintaining the status quo (Le Fevre, 2014; Sinclair and Osborn, 2014). 
 Brownell and Tanner’s (2012) research revealed additional barriers citing three 
main impediments: lack of training, time, and enticements. Due to a focus in higher 
education on efficiency and productivity, faculty are limited in terms of the resources 
available to them (Preston and Aslett, 2014, p. 508). Deficiency in training can lead 
faculty to feel ill-equipped to make changes to their pedagogy (Sinclair and Osborn, 
2014). However, even with training, faculty are often not convinced that a change to 
pedagogy will be more beneficial to students than their current form of instruction. 
Furthermore, faculty who do not feel as though their institution or colleagues are not 
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firmly supportive of pedagogical change are unlikely to put into place enduring 
pedagogical changes (Brownell and Tanner, 2012, p. 340). Another issue to consider is 
that often times in research universities, where the goal is to train researchers, graduate 
students are teaching more core classes but without any training. Professional 
development is a substitute for pedagogical training, and the focus is on content changes 
rather than training on how to engage a pedagogy that can lead to personal and social 
transformation. My experience, for example, has been that in my six years in an R1 
program, I have not received any training in how to teach outside of a workshop on 
teaching online courses. Likewise, the sample interviewees’ demographics and the 
timeframe in which they attended graduate school not only impacts if they had access to 
decolonial literature, but also when and what type of pedagogical training was received. 
 Time can also be a hindrance to change because many faculty members are 
already overworked. Requirements of teaching, researching, and obtaining grant funding 
leave faculty short on the time necessary to implement pedagogical change. Those that do 
find the time, may abandon new techniques due to the time required to create lesson plans 
based on the new pedagogy (p. 340). Brownell and Tanner also concluded that when 
faculty do not feel incentivized to change their pedagogy, they are unlikely to do so. For 
many, intrinsic motivation is not sufficient enough to spur pedagogical change. However, 
across the board, faculty members are rarely compensated for making pedagogical 
changes and, in some cases, are penalized via negative student evaluations, which can 
impact their performance reviews and advancement (p. 340).  
 Overcoming all of these barriers is surely a significant challenge whether the 
pedagogical change is imposed or personally undertaken.  Yet, research has shown that 
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certain strategies may reduce or remove some of the barriers. In some cases, the steps 
require an effort to be made on behalf of the university administration and other faculty 
while in other cases faculty members must undertake measures to break down those 
barriers. There has to be political, not only intellectual, desire to make these changes 
possible, which is in an of itself a question of ideology, i.e., the definition of change and 
the process by which decisions are made to enact change. Tagg (2012) and Le Fevre 
(2014) conclude that in order to overcome many of the barriers, the willingness of faculty 
to take the risks needed to implement change must be cultivated. Le Fevre (2014) 
believes that more education on the social construction of risk is needed and that 
identifying and exposing erroneous potential repercussions should be exposed. In 
addition, faculty should be made aware of how risk impacts educational practices (p. 64). 
Tagg (2012) also believes that endowments connected to monetary gains should be 
provided when an institution requires or supports pedagogical change. Further, faculty 
should be provided the tools and encouragement needed to gain the knowledge and skills 
needed to implement pedagogical change (Rodriguez, 2004; Sinclair and Osborn, 2014). 
Henderson (2009) concurs with Rodriguez and Sinclair and has identified four strategies 
for helping faculty alter their pedagogy. In combination, these strategies are useful for 
changing both the faculty and the university environment. The first strategy is teaching 
faculty “about new teaching conceptions and/or practices”. The second strategy is to 
“encourage/support individuals to develop new teaching conceptions and/or practices”. 
The third strategy is to develop new environmental features that require/encourage new 
teaching conceptions and/or practice. The final strategy is to empower collective 
development of environmental features that support new teaching conceptions and/or 
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practices (p. 20). Despite the positive impact these efforts can have on reducing barriers, 
the continuous push of neoliberal ideology within the university will pose as a very 
impermeable impediment to pedagogical change. Until universities engage in a critical 
evaluation of neoliberalism’s impact on the educational institution, faculty, and students, 
some barriers will remain.  
Conclusion 
 Liberal and neoliberal policies have negatively impacted human rights law and 
discourse. As a result, human rights education within higher education suffers from 
approaches to education that prioritize capital-producing endeavors and limit knowledge 
outside of colonial and Eurocentric ideologies. Decolonial theorists argue for 
decolonization in order to address these ideologies and begin the repurposing of the 
university. One of the first steps in repurposing the university is the implementation of  
decolonial curriculum and pedagogy. However, there are many barriers that must be 
addressed in order to implement pedagogical change. In the following chapter, I explore 
the theory behind efforts make a pedagogical change to human rights education. I begin 
by describing the foundations of decolonial theory differentiating decolonial theory from 
postcolonialism and anti-colonialism. I then go on to define and explain the tenets of 
decolonial theory and its critique of human rights education. I end the chapter by 
establishing the key criteria needed for the development of a decolonial pedagogical 
approach.  
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CHAPTER 3 
DECOLONIAL THINKING 
 Decolonial thinking emerged along side and in opposition to the intellectual, 
economic and political institutions of colonization and developed into a theory through 
the efforts and works of Latin American theorists such as Ramon Grosfoguel, José-
Manuel Barreto, Walter Mignolo, Enrique Dussel, Anibal Quijano, Arturo Escobar, and 
Nelson Maldonado-Torres. However, the genealogy of decolonial theory is often traced 
to the influential thinking and writing of Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon. Both Césaire 
and Fanon were instrumental founding fathers of the literary Négritude Movement, which 
sought to assert pride in African cultural identity as a means of offsetting the subaltern 
status imposed by Eurocentric colonialism. Césaire and Fanon’s seminal writings were 
followed by writings from other influential decolonial thinkers, Albert Memmi and 
Edward Said. Memmi’s The Colonizer and the Colonized was written in response to the 
political decolonization of Algeria and Tunisia from the French and explored 
colonialism’s psychological effects. Said’s Orientalism is often regarded as the origin of 
postcolonial studies and addressed the ways in which orientalism was used as a means of 
exoticizing and ‘othering’ Arabs for the purpose of justifying colonialism. Homi Bhaba 
and Gayatri Spivak, considered post-colonial theorists, are also considered instrumental 
to current decolonial theory. In addition to the writings of these anti- and post- colonial 
theorists, decolonial theory is also grounded in the writings of post-colonial feminist 
critics such as Chicanas Gloria Anzaldúa (1981), Chela Sandoval (1990), and Emma 
Pérez (1999) as well as scholars of Subaltern Studies like Chandra Mohanty (1991), 
Ashis Nandy (1980) and Ranajit Guha (1988), to name but a few. These authors’ first 
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major publications were released between the years of 1980 to 1999. It is important to 
also locate the emergence of human rights discourse at an international level, and the 
timeline in relation to anti-colonial thought, and HRE programs. 
Thus, postcolonialism and anti-colonialism are significant to the field of 
decolonial studies. Acknowledging the distinction between these terms and theories is 
important to obtain a clearer picture of how decolonial studies developed. The following 
sections provide brief descriptions of postcolonialism and anti-colonialism as a means of 
both differentiating these terms from decolonialism, and demonstrating their relationship 
to HRE. Following these sections, critiques of human rights education, including the 
decolonial critique are detailed, and finally, a decolonial approach to human rights is 
described.   
Postcolonialism 
 
 Postcolonialism’s8 origins are located within the theories grounding anti-colonial 
movements within Africa and Asia that incorporated political organization, cultural 
empowerment and physical resistance (Young, 2016, p. 11). Those theories focus on 
racial differences exemplified in the politics and economics as well as the social and 
cultural structures of the West and the East.  
 Defining postcolonialism is difficult because the concept is somewhat abstruse 
and diffuse. Thus, there is little agreement in the literature as to a common description.  
In a very general sense, postcolonialism reflects on the effects of colonialism, with 
regards to cultural constructs, economic ideas, political formations and authority, and 
                                                8	Postcolonialism	should	not	be	confused	with	post-colonialism.	Post-colonialism	refers	to	a	distinct	period	of	time	after	political-juridical	colonial	rule.	
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institutionalized bureaucracies that have their own relationship to state-building and 
colonialism, but also engages in self-reflexivity aimed at examining defects in subaltern 
thought, theories, and realities. Self-reflexivity is also a pedagogical practice at the heart 
of solidarity and social transformations, goals of both human rights education but also 
decolonial pedagogy. As part of self-reflexivity and with regards to pedagogy, we might 
consider the importance of Mignolo’s call for “epistemic disobedience” as a curricular 
and practical goal, where listening to, learning from and learning with implies the 
question not only of what is read, but who is in the room, and who is not. While at the 
same time, not assuming an a priori relationship between bodies and ways of knowing 
and being as based on racial or geographic origins. 
 Jane Hiddleston (2014) in Understanding Postcolonialism explains 
postcolonialism as an analysis of colonialism’s effects “both in its heyday and during the 
period that followed the end of the literal, concrete colonial presence. The movement is 
associated with the examination and critique of colonial power both before and after 
decolonization” (p. 4). Both of these definitions vary slightly from the other but each 
describes postcolonialism as a critical analysis of colonialism. McLeod (2000) details a 
three-pronged explanation of what he believes this critical analysis should involve:  
Reading [critical scrutiny of] the cultural endeavors produced by people from 
countries with a history of colonialism, primarily those concerned with the 
workings and legacy of colonialism, and resistance to it, in either the past or the 
present. Reading cultural texts produced by those that have migrated from 
countries with a history of colonialism, or those descended from migrant families, 
which deal in the main with diaspora experience and its many consequences. In 
the light of theories of colonial discourses, re-reading texts produced during the 
colonial period often by members of the colonizing nations; both those that 
directly address the experiences of Empire, and those that seem not to. (n.p.)  
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Reading of cultural endeavors and cultural texts foment opportunities to make 
connections between the present and the past, to see power relationships, and to engage in 
the re-mapping of historical moments in time. These readings provide a starting place for 
the emergence of a new epistemology of colonialism.  
 In Postcolonialism, Pramod Nayar (1981) expounds upon the definition of 
postcolonialism as critical analysis providing a more thorough understanding of the 
purpose of postcolonialism: postcolonialism is “the theoretical and intellectual arm of the 
postcolonial condition” that “refers to a mode of reading, political analysis and cultural 
resistance that negotiates with the native’s colonial history and neocolonial present” (p. 
4). He goes on to state that postcolonial theory is an “analytical-critical approach that 
treats colonial writing, arts, legal systems, science and other socio-cultural practices as 
racialized and unequal where the colonial does the representation and the native is 
represented” (p. 25).  
 Thus, to distinguish between postcolonialism and anti-colonialism, it is valuable 
to consider that the purpose of postcolonialism is to reflect on the effects of colonialism 
but also to engage in self-reflexivity aimed at examining defects in subaltern thought, 
theories and realities. With regards to HRE pedagogy and curriculum, the following 
would be examples that are inspired by the above as practices. These practices might 
include incorporating readings by postcolonialists, such as Edward Said, and mapping the 
trajectories of colonialism’s impact on bodies, geographies, knowledge, and human 
rights.  
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Anti-colonialism 
 
 While postcolonialism in a simplistic sense is focused on the mental or a 
psychological effects of colonialism, anti-colonialism marks a move beyond the 
theoretical and psychological to active resistance to colonialism. Anti-colonialism offers 
the methods and means of struggling against colonialism’s formal and informal control 
through expansion and conquest. According to Young (2016), anti-colonialism is often 
concomitant with regional nationalism but was actually a 
diasporic production, a revolutionary mixture of the indigenous and the 
cosmopolitan, a complex constellation of situated local knowledges combined 
with radical, universal, political principles, constructed and facilitated through 
international networks of party cells and organization, and widespread political 
contacts between different revolutionary organizations that generated common 
practical information and material support as well as spreading radical political 
and intellectual ideas. (p. 4). 
 
Thus, anti-colonialism was an intricate effort of not only the subaltern but also dissenting 
Western intellectuals who engaged in uprisings and political movements. Young argues 
that anti-colonialism efforts varied due to conditions that were not homogenous and took 
the forms of participatory government, forceful military takeover, reform movements, 
and forceful resistance. The effort also used the production and reproduction of 
knowledge pedagogically and epistemologically to acknowledge and abrogate power 
imbalances (Kempf, 2006, p. 130). Yet, in any case, the common project of anti-
colonialism was the undoing of the current power dynamics (Young, 2016, p. 164). 
Taking from postcolonialism and anti-colonialism, a decolonial approach to human rights 
education would need to teach not only about the history of colonialism and the 
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decolonial struggles it produced, but also ways to engage in active resistance against 
colonialism and coloniality.  
 In the following sections, the relationship between decolonial theory and the 
concepts of Eurocentrism, coloniality, and epistemology are further explored to provide a 
more complex understanding of decolonial theory. Additionally, the connection between 
decolonial theory and human rights is developed to establish the basis for this research 
project.  
Decolonial Theory 
 
 Decolonial theory differs from anticolonialism and postcolonialism in many ways, 
but I highlight two specific ways that demonstrate unique aspects of decolonial theory.  
First, each of these theories/critiques emerged in different socio-historical contexts, and 
second, decolonial theory emphasizes dialogical approaches to the resistance of 
coloniality. Whereas anti-colonialism is often traced to North African theoriests and 
postcolonialism to subaltern groups in India, decolonial theory is most often linked to 
Latin American theorists. Anti-colonialism emerged prior to theories of postcolonialism 
and decolonialism. In addition, decolonialism emphasizes resistance but to coloniality 
rather than just colonialism. Furthermore, the resistance that decolonial theory 
emphasizes pertains to altering epistemologies through dialogic means. These aspects of 
decolonial theory are explored more extensively in what follows.  
 Decolonial theory in Latin America emerged in response to the hegemonic 
influence of Eurocentric conceptualization of modernity that rationalizes coloniality. 
Coloniality describes the ways in which Western European and U.S. colonial domination 
continued after formal political colonization ended. This domination continued through a 
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model of power, coined the “coloniality of power” by Anibal Quijano, which maintained 
colonial hierarchies of race, class and gender. Quijano (2000) defines the coloniality of 
power in his article, Coloniality of Power and Eurocentrism in Latin America: 
 That specific basic element of the new pattern of world power that was based 
 on the idea of ‘race’9 and in the ‘racial’ social classification of world population 
 – expressed in the ‘racial’ distribution of work, in the imposition of new ‘racial’ 
 geocultural identities, in the concentration of the control of  productive resources 
 and capital, as social relations, including salary, as a privilege of ‘Whiteness’ – is 
 what basically is referred to in the category of coloniality of power. (p. 218) 
 
Grosfoguel and Escobar offer their own definitions of the coloniality of power. 
Grosfoguel defines it as “a structuring process in the modern/coloniality world-system 
that articulates peripheral locations in the international division of labor with the global 
racial/ethnic hierarchy and Third World migrants’ inscription in the racial/ethnic 
hierarchy of metropolitan global cities” (p. 220). Likewise, Escobar (2004) explains 
coloniality of power as a hegemonic model of power that operates upon capitalistic and 
white European needs impacting the definition of space, people, labor, and race (p. 218).  
 The concept of coloniality of power emphasizes how the world has not 
decolonized completely despite juridico-political decolonization that were the result of 
anti-colonial self-determination struggles across Asia and Africa, for example, and anti-
US imperialism in Latin America. These political movements and cultures, in turn, 
                                                
9 Quijano explains his term ‘race’ in this way: “As American emerged…in the same 
historical movement…there was produced a new mental category to codify the relations 
between conquering and conquered populations: the idea of ‘race’, as biologically 
structural and hierarchical differences between the dominant and dominated. So those 
relations of domination came to be considered as ‘natural’. And such an ideas was not 
meant to explain just the external or physiognomic differences between dominants and 
dominated, but also the mental and cultural differences. And since both terms of such a 
relationship were considered, by definition, superior and inferior, the associated cultural 
differences were codified as well, respectively, as superior and inferior by definition” (p. 
216).  
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influenced US activists and intellectuals who were inspired by these anti-imperial third 
world struggles (Pulido, 2006; Young, 2006; Gómez, 2016). Juridico-political 
decolonization refers to the formal end of political and judicial rule of colonial powers 
from Europe and the U.S. - most notably, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the 
U.S. As examples of juridico-political decolonization, Laos gained political and judicial 
independence from French colonial rule in 1949 and Ghana from the United Kingdom in 
the 1957.10 Guyana gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1966 as did Belize 
in 1981 while Suriname gained independence from the Netherlands in 1975. Despite 
juridico-political decolonization, these countries were still entrenched in the coloniality 
of power and many former colonies were not able to end the economic, cultural, or 
epistemological imposition and influence of the colonizing nations. As a result, there still 
remains a need for a second decolonization to address the economic, racial, cultural, and 
epistemic hierarchies that endure (Grosfoguel, 2000, p. 368).  
 Coloniality of power recognizes that colonial domination is not solely a matter of 
physical domination and exploitation, but it also involves epistemological domination, 
such as the privileging of Western knowledge as universal (Taylor, 2012, p. 388), or the 
centering of the written text, institutional training, pedagogical practices, i.e., the intimate 
enemy of the mind and imagination (Nandy, 2010). This new form of colonialism - 
coloniality - is fundamental to modernity and represents the “normalization of the 
specific concepts and forms of theoretical knowledge which supports relationships of 
subordination” (Richardson, 2012, p. 540). Coloniality is a means by which the West has 
                                                
10 For additional examples of former colonies see: 
http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/selfdet.shtml 
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expanded its epistemology as a universal truth (Escobar, 2004, p. 217). According to 
Quijano, Mignolo, and Maldonado-Torres, as an analytical tool, decolonial theory allows 
us to recognize the Eurocentric construction of modernity as requiring coloniality for its 
survival (Andreotti, 2010, p. 6) and then construct an oppositional ideology to the 
coloniality of power. This oppositional ideology and the total destruction of coloniality 
will only be achieved by means of epistemological decolonization, which will allow for 
the intercultural communication and exchange of experiences that is needed to produce 
different conceptions of rationality and universality (Quijano, 2000).   
 Decolonial theory critiques the Eurocentric view of modernity and aims to 
remove the Eurocentric lens through which knowledge has been and continues to be 
constructed. Escobar (2004) explains that decolonial theory employs subalternized non-
Eurocentric epistemologies in order to engage Western colonial epistemologies and 
expose how they are used to subjugate others (p. 219). It antagonizes the Western culture 
and epistemology that insured the domination of colonial powers into modernity (De 
Lissovoy, 2010, p. 280). It seeks to transform Western colonial epistemologies and 
stresses the importance of and the need to make space for cultural, political and social 
memories and epistemologies from different geopolitical contexts (Richardson, 2012, p. 
548-549). Its importance lies in exposing and rejecting the political, economic, cultural, 
and epistemological exploitation and domination of Eurocentrism11 (Grosfoguel, 2007; 
De Lissovoy 2010).  
                                                
11 The perspective and concrete mode of producing knowledge that provides a very 
narrow understanding of the characteristics of the global model of power which is 
colonial, capitalist and Eurocentered. It does not refer to the knowledge of all of Europe 
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 Decolonial theory critiques worldviews related to modernity, colonialism, 
capitalism and patriarchy as well as their interconnectedness, and it examines the ways in 
which the classification and depictions of gender, class, and race maintain colonial power 
relations. Decolonial theory also addresses the Eurocentric version of modernity and how 
modernity is organized within coloniality (Richardson, 2012, p. 541). Decolonial theory 
views coloniality as a past and present enterprise that is problematic and decolonization 
as an unfinished task (Maldonado-Torres, 2011, p. 3).  This is directly related to 
understanding how human rights as a contested discourse in international law, and in 
university departments, and a set of methods, policies, and pedagogies that, as Zembylas 
argues can be critically transformed precisely because decolonization, like coloniality, is 
an ongoing process and struggle. Because decolonization, like coloniality, is an ongoing 
process and struggle, it can critically transform human rights, which is a contested 
discourse in international law and university departments but also a set of methods, 
policies, and pedagogies (Zembylas, 2017).  
 Grosfoguel (2007) contends that colonialism remains but has changed form; we 
have moved out of a period of “global colonialism” involving political control and are 
now situated within a period of global coloniality in which Eurocentric social, cultural, 
and economic hierarchies continue the oppression of colonialism (Richardson, 2012, p. 
541). Those not living in the West continue to live under Western exploitation and 
domination, which are intertwined with Western economic development (p. 219). He 
writes,  
                                                                                                                                            
but to a perspective of knowledge that became hegemonic and replaced other ways of 
knowing (Quijano, 2000, p. 549). 
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The mythology about the ‘decolonization of the world’ obscures the continuities 
between the colonial past and current global colonial/racial hierarchies and 
contributes to the invisibility of ‘coloniality’ today … peripheral 
states…following dominant Eurocentric liberal discourses … constructed 
Eurocentric ideologies …their economic and political systems were shaped by 
their subordinate position in a capitalist world- system organized around a 
hierarchical international division of labor. (p. 220-221) 
 
Eurocentric discourses were able to infiltrate “peripheral states”12 because their economic 
and political systems were structured around a hierarchical international division of labor, 
resources, and products (p. 200-221). De Lissovoy (2010) adds that coloniality has 
reached past “the domain of politics and economics even to the level of language, logic, 
and spirit, as colonized cultures (and their histories) are constructed as lesser or partial 
versions of an authoritative [Western] modernity” (p. 282). Coloniality has involved the 
concealment and exclusion of the ontology, epistemology, and practices of the subaltern, 
a process and product of Nandy’s “second colonization” that have existed alongside 
Eurocentric version of modernity for the benefit of the coloniality of power (Richardson, 
2012; Escobar, 2011). For example, coloniality has subalternized traditional, folkloric, 
religious and emotional forms of knowledge (Escobar, 2011, p. 219). By subalternized, I 
mean that coloniality has deemed specific forms of knowledge as less-than, ‘othering’ 
this knowledge in an attempt to silence it and deem it insignificant.  
 Eurocentrism grew out of Western colonialism and has continued through 
Western imperialism and coloniality. Escobar (2004) has defined Eurocentrism as a 
globally hegemonic model of knowledge of the European historical experience (p. 218), 
                                                12	Raúl Prebisch coined the image of Center and Periphery to describe the configuration 
of global capitalism since the end of World War II (Quijano, 2000, p. 539)	
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which is assumed to be universalistic, neutral and objective (Grosfoguel, 2007, p. 213).13 
Quijano (2000) clarifies that this model of knowledge does not refer to all of the 
knowledge of Europe but rather a perspective of knowledge that became hegemonic (p. 
549). The global infiltration of this model of knowledge exalted and validated specific 
Western practices and views (Imani, 2008, p. 276) and resulted in the imposition of law, 
personal and cultural identities, and epistemologies that were acceptable within a 
Eurocentric worldview (Samson, 2001; Mignolo, 2011). According to Quijano (2007), 
the West’s need for and to maintain power is articulated through varying forms of 
discrimination from racial to ethnic and national (p.168). Colonial domination has not 
only been a matter of subordination but also the colonization of other cultures (p. 169), of 
the imagination, ways of being and conceptualizing what is considered possible and what 
is not, who is considered human, and who is not. Social, political, economic, cultural, and 
psychological life has all been molded to reflect Western worldviews (Imani, 2008, p. 
274). 
 Many non-European populations have been and continue to be alienated by 
Eurocentric traditions and practices as well as by systems of subjectivity that exploit and 
dominate (De Lissovoy, 2010) in terms of economic conditions and opportunities, access 
to political power, and cultural forms of change and continuity that are respected and 
protected. Eurocentric global structures of power and hierarchy have not disappeared 
(Grosfoguel, 2006, p. 174), and these structures and hierarchies continue to be used by 
the West to exclude marginalized peripheral voices in institutions of higher education, 
                                                
13 Within this paper, I will use Escobar’s definition of “Eurocentrism” rather than any 
other common usages of the term. Additionally, the terms “Eurocentric” and “Western” 
also follow this definition as synonyms in adjective form. 
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particularly with regards to curriculum and pedagogical practices. These structures and 
hierarchies determine the parameters of who can speak, how one can speak, what can be 
spoken about, and who/what is to be excluded from having a voice (Baxi, 2002, p. 13). 
Globally, many different structural hierarchies exist that privilege Western worldviews. 
Grosfoguel (2006) identifies these as 1) “an international division of labor where… the 
periphery” is coerced into labor; 2) “an interstate system of politico-military 
organizations controlled by European males and institutionalized during” colonialism; 3) 
“a global racial/ethic hierarchy that privileged European people”; 4) “a sexual hierarchy 
the privileges heterosexuals”; 5) a spiritual hierarchy privileging Christianity; 6) “an 
epistemic hierarchy that privileged Western knowledge”; 7) and a linguistic hierarchy 
that privileged European languages and language theory (p. 171). De Lissovoy (2010) 
concurs stating, “The dominative force of colonial logic is multidimensional and 
opportunistic. Its violent cartographies of center and periphery reach beyond the domain 
of politics and economics even to the level of language, logic, and spirit as colonized 
cultures (and their histories) are constructed as lesser or partial versions of an 
authoritative European modernity (p. 282).” Mignolo (2011) has coined the diverse 
impacts of colonial power as the “colonial matrix of power” (p. 9). 
 Decolonial theory attempts to remove the Eurocentric lens through which 
knowledge has been and continues to be constructed. It also antagonizes the Western 
culture and epistemology that insured the coloniality of power in the present (De 
Lissovoy, 2010, p. 280). Decolonial theory is focused on moving away from the 
emphasis on Western knowledge and ways of understanding the world as it critiques 
Eurocentrism from silenced and oppressed perspectives.  It seeks to transform Western 
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colonial epistemologies and stresses the importance of and the need to make space for 
cultural, political and social memories and epistemologies from different geopolitical 
contexts (Richardson, 2012, p. 548-549). 
 Moving on to another element of Eurocentric-thought that organizes knowledge 
and knowledge production, epistemology encompasses what is known and how it is 
known, and it is always positioned within structures of power that include hierarchies of 
class, race, sex, gender, spiritualism, linguistics, and geography. With regards to Human 
Rights Education, epistemologies are always “situated” meaning that they come from 
specific bodies, spaces, and places (Grosfoguel, 2007, p. 213). Epistemological 
perspectives can also impact graduate training, methodologies, curriculum, pedagogical 
approaches, and possibilities for collective knowledge production, for example.  
 Mignolo (2009) explains that decolonial theory is situated within in geo- and body 
politics of knowledge.14 Decolonial theory aims to decolonize knowledge and the 
creation of knowledge as well as separate knowledge from its embeddedness in the 
colonial matrix of power (p. 178).  This is in direct response to an objective of 
Eurocentrism, which has attempted to delink voice from hierarchy in order to present the 
myth of universal truth. Grosfoguel explains:  
                                                
14 The concept of the geopolitics of knowledge is a materialist and contextualist 
epistemology that looks at history and politics in order to understand where knowledge 
comes from (Barreto, 2013, p. 3) and has helped to reveal the privilege of Eurocentric 
epistemologies (Mignolo, 2009, p. 166-167).This body-politics of knowledge captures 
the ontological dimension of coloniality and according to Escobar (2004) “points to the 
‘ontological excess’ that occurs when particular beings impose on others and critically 
addresses the effectiveness of the discourses with which the other responds to the 
suppression as a result of the encounter (p. 218). 	
   56 
By delinking ethnic/racial/gender/ sexual epistemic location from the subject that 
speaks, Western philosophy and sciences are able to produce a myth about a 
Truthful universal knowledge that covers up, that is, conceals who is speaking as 
well as the geo-political and body-political epistemic location in the structures of 
colonial power/knowledge from which the subject speaks. (p. 213) 
 
Grosfoguel (2006) has named this geo-political and body-political location of the subject 
who is speaking the “locus of enunciation”, and he claims that while the geo-political and 
body-political locations are important within Western philosophy, they are not as 
important as the “ego politics of knowledge” (p.169).  
The ego politics of knowledge, which references Freud, pertains to the myth that 
Western knowledge is universal and as such it is not situated. Instead, it is disembodied, 
neutral, and objective while non-Western knowledge is “particularistic” and not capable 
of achieving the same universality (Grosfoguel, 2006; Walsh, 2007). The ego politics of 
knowledge have allowed for a hierarchy of superior and inferior knowledge (Grosfoguel, 
2007, p. 214). Western knowledge has been considered superior or true and was treated 
as a commodity to be exported to non-Western parts of the world in order to modernize 
them by Western standards (Mignolo, 2011; Doxtater, 2004). 
 According to Alcoff (2011), the normative function of epistemology must include 
an evaluation of the current status of knowledge but also what should be. Thus, we must 
consider the following questions: How is knowledge produced and how should it be 
produced? Who is permitted (has access to/accepted into) to produce knowledge and 
question knowledge? How is knowledge afforded credibility? (p. 69-70). For Evans 
(2005), this type of critique is necessary to understand why some epistemologies are 
accepted as valid, but others are delegitimized (p. 36). Grosfoguel (2006) adds that 
critique is needed in order to respect the various ways in which people confront 
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patriarchy, capitalism, and coloniality and the diverseness of decolonial epistemic and 
ethical historical projects (p. 144-145). Through the revelation of indigenous and 
colonized epistemologies, and recognition of African indigeneity, an obvious disjuncture 
can be seen between the colonizer experiences and interpretations of history and those of 
the colonized. This is what Quijano refers to as a “colonial wound” because the 
disjuncture in epistemologies and the labeling people and places as economically and 
mentally underdeveloped (Mignolo, 2009, p. 161) has left a “gaping unhealed fissure in 
the social realm” (Taylor, 2012, p. 389). Or, as the Chicana decolonial scholar Glora 
Anzaldua says referring to the border between the US and Mexico, that "The U.S.-
Mexican border es una herida abierta (is an open wound) where the third world grates 
against the first and bleeds" and as it heals it "hemorrhages again, the lifeblood of two 
worlds merging to form a third country, a border culture” (Anzaldua, 1987, p. 25).  
 Grosfoguel (2007) contends that healing the colonial wound requires the 
application of decolonial epistemic perspective: First, knowledge as a concept has to be 
extended beyond the Western canon. Secondly, there needs to be “critical dialogue 
between diverse critical epistemic, ethical, and political projects” (p. 212), the intention 
of which is not to create an abstract universal epistemology but a pluriversal 
epistemology. Finally, decolonial epistemic perspective has to give sincere attention to 
subaltern and subjugated critical thinkers (p. 212). The application of this decolonial 
perspective creates the space and conditions the possibility for the liberation that, for 
Dussel (1977), is political and economic as well as epistemic. 
 In the following section, the ways in which Eurocentrism has colonized human 
rights education are examined. A brief history of human rights education is followed by 
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an examination of critiques of human including a decolonial critique. Finally, the 
decolonizing criteria used for the qualitative research of this project are explained.  
 
Decolonial Theory and Human Rights Education 
 
A Brief History of Human Rights Education 
 
 The mandate for human rights education (HRE) was established in 1948 with the 
creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The preamble declared 
that the UDHR was a “common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations,” 
that were to “strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and 
freedoms.” Additionally, Article 30 states that one of the goals of education should be to 
strengthen the respect for “human rights and fundamental freedoms”. In 1974, UNESCO 
established the Recommendation Concerning Education and International Understanding, 
Co-operation and Peace and Education relating to Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. The purpose of this recommendation was to highlight- through education- the 
need to respect human rights as well as endorse human rights instruments (Coysh, 2014, 
p. 93); however, it was of little effect. The reasons for this are complex, and have to do 
with the Cold War as much as a lack of methodological guidelines. Coysh (2014) offers 
that during the Cold War “the idea of collective critique could have been a challenge to 
the capitalist ideological order.”  She also explains that the lack of methodological 
guidelines resulted in a lack of “institutional control or regulation over the political nature 
of the discourse that could emerge” (p. 92). It was not until almost forty years after the 
adoption of the UDHR that a significant push occurred within the United Nations to 
prioritize and expand human rights education. The literature is not clear as to why there 
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was such a gap between the formal recognition of the need for human rights education 
and its elevation in importance (Coysh, 2014, p. 92), but the lack of development over 
such a long period raises concerns as to the sincerity of the UN Charter and UDHR’s 
tenets and feeds the perception that the UDHR was not more than utopian ideas. 
Nonetheless, at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, steps were 
taken to push for the realization of those goals. The conference reaffirmed the importance 
of HRE and the need for training and public information about human rights; human 
rights education was declared "essential for the promotion and achievement of stable and 
harmonious relations among communities and for fostering mutual understanding, 
tolerance and peace” (UN, 1993).  
 Starting in 1995, a 10-year period known as the United Nation’s Decade for 
Human Rights Education began with the objectives of assessing the needs to further 
HRE, building programs from local to international levels, creating human rights 
materials, strengthening the ways in which mass media can further HRE, and 
disseminating the UDHR in as many languages as possible (United Nations, 1996, pg. 6). 
Essentially, the Decade for Human Rights Education changed the emphasis within human 
rights education from global violations of human rights to the dissemination of the rights 
contained within the UDHR (Coysh, 2014, p. 93). 
 Upon the conclusion of the Decade for HRE, the UN General Assembly initiated 
the World Programme for Human Rights Education (WPHRE) to “promote a common 
understanding of basic principles and methodologies of human rights education, to 
provide a concrete framework for action and to strengthen partnerships and cooperation 
from the international level down to the grass roots.” It also reaffirmed the need for HRE 
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and determined that HRE needs to provide knowledge about human rights and the 
mechanisms that protect them as well as develop the skills needed to “promote, defend 
and apply human rights in daily life” (United Nations, 2010, p. 2).  
 Initially, in the mid 1960s, human rights education was taught from a primarily 
cognitive perspective to children within formal education settings. Starting in the 1970s, 
the participants began to expand as did the intention of HRE programs. Rather than 
mostly focusing on a cognitive understanding of human rights, programs began to see 
HRE as a means of effecting social change. With the change in focus and intention came 
a change in participation. Now, HRE is taught in schools and within community 
programs, but programs are also specifically designed for educators, social workers, 
scientists, medical personnel, lawyers, police and soldiers (Lenhart, 2002, p. 152-154). 
Just as the goals and audiences of HRE have changed, so have the pedagogical 
approaches. Rather than approaching HRE as an endeavor of memorization and 
regurgitation, pedagogies are now engaged with the goal of transformation and social 
change. A number of pedagogical approaches are promoted by HRE advocates within the 
field including: activity-centered, problem-posing, participative, dialectical, analytical, 
healing, strategic-thinking oriented, and goal and action-oriented (Tibbitts and 
Kirchschlaeger, 2010, p. 5-6).  
 Over the course of the past twenty years, purposes and approaches to HRE 
changed; and HRE has grown in importance globally. Universities and colleges around 
the world have begun teaching human rights and beginning human rights programs, and 
many organizations have emerged with the purpose of supporting HRE. Two such 
organizations that have had a global impact are Human Rights Education Association 
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(HREA) founded by Felisa Tibbitts, a lecturer at Columbia University’s Teachers 
College, and Equitas, which was founded by Canadian scholars and activists including 
John Humphrey. Both of these organizations offer training or courses in human rights 
intended to build the skills and knowledge of human rights educators and activists. 
Equitas is celebrating 50 years of work in the field of human rights while HREA began 
just over 20 years ago. Both organizations partner with non-governmental and inter-
governmental organizations around the world.  
HRE has grown in importance, in large part, as a result of the UN’s resources and 
influence (Tibbitts and Kirchschlaeger, 2010, p.1). This influence highlights that the 
political authority of the UN has to interact with the political authority of a university, 
though not directly, but in relation to curricular and pedagogical approaches, to amplify 
or put into practice a goal of a learning experience that transforms oneself and the social 
conditions in which one lives.  Coysh (2014) argues that the UN’s extensive involvement 
in the creation and dissemination of human rights education discourse has allowed it to 
“regulate[d] and direct[ed] how human rights [are] understood and adopted in the 
language and action of individuals and communities” often at the expense of subjugating 
particular types knowledge (p. 94). Coysh explains that discourse often prioritizes the 
language of the UN Charter and other declarations and conventions and disregards 
discourse stemming from forms of knowledge not included in those documents (p. 95). 
Likewise, most models of HRE derive from goals and principles established through UN 
directives in a top-down approach by teaching communities about human rights rather 
than through a bottom-up approach asking communities what human rights are (p.95) 
from their situated perspectives and experience. 
   62 
 Generally, programs have been categorized based on their intended audience or 
by their intended outcome. For this project, the relationship between audience and 
outcomes, specifically with regards to curriculum and pedagogy within higher education 
has the potential to re-categorize how knowledge is produced and transmitted. Dr. 
Tibbitts of the Human Rights Education Associates (HREA)15 has provided a model of 
HRE that differentiates between three types of programs : “values and awareness”, 
“accountability”, and “transformational” (Tibbitts, 2002, p. 163).  Her work on defining 
these models in 2002 indicates that a little more than halfway through the UN Decade for 
HRE, templates for instruction had already been developed. The “values and awareness” 
model focuses on providing basic information about human rights to the general public 
and children in school so that they might be integrated into public ethics (p. 163). The 
“accountability” model is geared toward 1) people whose professions involve monitoring 
human rights violations and advocating for human rights and 2) those who care for and 
protect the rights of vulnerable populations. Examples include lawyers, civil servants, 
medical professionals, and journalists. The focus of this model is ensuring that these 
groups are knowledgeable about human rights law and protection mechanisms and 
improve their lobbying and advocacy skills (p. 165). The last model, the 
“transformational” model, is intended for vulnerable populations, victims of abuse, and 
post conflict societies. The focus of this model is on healing and transformation at the 
                                                
15 “HREA is an international non-governmental and non-profit organization that supports 
human rights education; the training of human rights defenders and professional groups; 
and the development of educational materials and programming. HREA is dedicated to 
quality education and training to promote understanding, attitudes and actions to protect 
human rights, and to foster the development of peaceable, free and just communities.” 
(http://www.hrea.org/about-us/) 	
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individual and community level. In other cases, models have been established based upon 
the relative importance of individual and collective rights (Bajaj, 2011, p. 486).  Finally, 
Flowers (2007) has noted that models often come from the core objective the program is 
trying to accomplish in a particular area; for example, in some contexts, civil and political 
rights may be a priority over economic and social rights or vice versa dependent upon the 
human rights violations most prevalent (p. 30).  Despite the variances in the models used 
to construct human rights programs, there are commonalities as many of the programs 
aim to uphold similar goals. Importantly, the UDHR often serves as the template for 
curriculum (Lohrenschiet, 2002, p. 175; Tibbitts, 2002, p. 162). Given the UDHR’s 
accessibility and many translations, it has been thought of an easy instrument to work 
from to establish awareness of what human rights are.  
 Additionally, programs generally have four distinct components that stem from 
the human rights framework of rights, duties, and violations. First, programs provide 
information regarding pertinent human rights instruments. For example, if the “values 
and awareness” model is implemented, pertinent human rights instruments may include 
the UDHR and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Whereas if the 
“transformational” model is implemented, the instruments may include the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women or the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
Second, the programs explain the rights and duties, and these include the rights of 
individuals to their community and the State to its people. Third, they also define and 
identify human rights violations. Finally, they provide information about how people can 
   64 
fight for their human rights and utilize international grievance procedures (Lohrenscheit, 
2002; Bajaj, 2004).  
 A third commonality between programs is their categorization into one of three 
ideologies. HRE for Global Citizenship “presents international standards as the ideal” and 
“seeks to cultivate vibrant global citizenship” emphasizing “interdependence, global 
knowledge, and a commitment to counter injustice” (Bajaj, 2011, p. 490). HRE for 
Coexistence is the second ideology. It is intended for audiences that have been 
historically oppressed or silenced and focuses on creating space for empathy and 
understanding between the oppressor and the oppressed for the purposes of peaceful 
coexistence (p. 492). In practice, this ideology may involve learning about the people 
whom they have warred with in the past or engaging in inter-group events. Lastly, HRE 
for Transformative Action takes an analytical approach to human rights through the 
contrasting of historical and current realities of power relationships. This ideology aims 
to foster both greater agency in learners as well as solidarity with others in the hope that 
both individuals and communities experience positive transformation (p. 494).  
 Although each of the three aforementioned ideological categories has its own 
purposes and intentions, there are four common goals to each. They seek cognitive, 
attitudinal, and action-oriented changes in the participants toward human rights (p. 483), 
and the transformation of “human rights from the expression of abstract of norms to the 
reality of… social, economic, cultural, and political conditions” (p.483). Lohrenscheit 
(2002) discusses two means of accomplishing these goals. Human rights education can 
focus on learning about human rights or learning for human rights. Learning about 
human rights pertains to understanding what human rights are, where they come from, 
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the instruments that exist to protect human rights, and how human rights are protected 
internationally. Learning for human rights concerns creating communities of respect for 
human rights that are empowered by their knowledge of human rights and understanding 
how to invoke them (p. 177). Learning about human rights results in greater awareness of 
the institution of human rights whereas learning for human rights is purposed on 
transformation. In practical application, HRE claims a need for both goals. The objectives 
established through these models of HRE, including countering injustice, transformative 
action, cognitive as well as action-oriented changes to everyday conditions, and learning 
for human rights, are not just curricular possibilities; they also highlight the ways in 
which learning conditions the possibility of HRE praxis that can emphasize the tensions 
and the contradictions that decolonial theory points out.  
 
Critiques of Human Rights Education 
 
 Critiques of human rights range from being critical of the whole human rights 
framework to more discriminating critiques. Alasdair MacIntyre represents one end of the 
spectrum as he claims that, “human rights does not provide any good reasons for the 
assertions that it makes” as does Zygmunt Bauman who claims that human rights 
function as a blackmail tactic for groups who wish to exact power from States (Baxi, 
2002, p. 138). Less blanketing and more discriminating critiques concern issues such as 
(1) the overproduction of human rights, (2) the ineffectiveness of international treaties 
designed to protect human rights, (3) the conceptualization of rights, particularly an 
emphasis on their relationship to duties, and (4) and the seemingly individual bias of 
human rights over the importance of group rights in some cultures.  
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 The most prominent critiques of human rights have come from feminist and 
cultural relativist scholars who find fault with the framing of the language of human 
rights through a patriarchal and Western lens respectively. Most feminist critiques argue 
that rights were really a construction of men’s rights, and although rights are labeled as 
universal, they still work to exclude women (Brems, 1997, p. 137; Benedek, 2003, p. 21). 
Cultural relativist critiques argue that while we are all human, humanity is culturally 
relative, and discourse surrounding international human rights only considers the 
definition of humanity through a Western lens (Donnelly, 1984, p. 403; Benedek, 2003, 
p. 22). Each of these critiques is briefly outlined below and followed by a thorough 
explanation of the decolonial critique.  
 
 Feminist critique. 
 
 Feminist arguments relating to the human rights framework regard the male 
inspiration of rights as well as the public/private sphere. Feminists have long been 
concerned about the representation that women receive with regard to human rights 
documents; the experiences of women are not considered equivalent to those of men and 
women are oppressed in ways that are unique and not shared by men (Higgins, 1996, p. 
100).  There is deep concern that the character of rights is alien to the experience of 
women (Binion, 1995, p. 525).  While human rights are considered to be universal, many 
feminists believe that universality does not occur in practice and women are not 
considered to be human (Reitman, 1997, p. 104), calling into question the way human 
rights are defined, adjudicated and enforced (Binion, 1995, p. 513). The rights of men 
have been established as human while the rights of women required the establishment of 
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another secondary document, the Convention on Eliminating All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Many feminists believe that a male model 
was used to construct not only the theories and compilations of human rights but also the 
prioritization of them (Okin, 1998, p. 34). For example, it is often held that “traditional 
approaches to human rights privilege male-defined aspects of civil and political rights” 
(p.34), prioritizing them over economic, social and cultural rights and leading to the 
belief that both maleness and a western bias are inherent in the human rights framework.  
 This critique that rights have been defined within a male construct brings into 
question whether the needs and rights of women can be met using the current human 
rights framework. Romany (1993) succinctly summarizes the concerns of many 
feminists:  
 Women…must create a dialogue, which avoids the one-dimensionality that 
 currently infects the human rights discourse. Patriarchal domination is a state of 
 being, which goes beyond material conditions of subordination; women are also 
 stripped of the ‘psychic, linguistic and textual vehicles of resistance. (p. 125) 
 
A second major argument made by feminists pertains to the dichotomy of the public and 
private spheres. Human rights and human rights law operate mostly in the realm of the 
public sphere.  State actors are violators of human rights and create a dynamic where the 
private spheres that women often operate are left unprotected and vulnerable. The state’s 
absence within the private sphere enables systematic violations of women’s human rights, 
essentially making them invisible (Johnstone, 2006, p. 152).  Further, many feminists 
argue that this dichotomy of a public and private sphere not only contributes to the 
violations of women’s rights but is also senseless as all acts can be considered to have a 
public and private component. They explain that the political sphere has created the 
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domestic arena thereby intertwining the two spheres.  Thus, feminists debunk the belief 
that human rights violations within the private sphere are not the concern of the state and 
that the inclusion of the private sphere will somehow dilute human rights (Binion, 1995, 
p. 518).   
 Feminists also adhere to the belief that the private sphere has been neglected as a 
means of maintaining male dominance, in effect perpetuating the oppression and 
discrimination of women. Distinguishing between public and private spheres has 
permitted rights violations and abuse. Feminists believe that the state needs to reconsider 
its intervention policies regarding violations. The need for the right to privacy and family 
autonomy should be balanced against the state’s obligation to protect the rights of women 
regardless of whether a violation occurs in the private or public sphere. The maintenance 
of state involvement solely within the public sphere results in the continued abuse of 
women and violations of their human rights. 
 Cultural relativist critique. 
 
 Cultural relativist arguments against the human rights framework are based on 
four pervading concepts: all cultures are valid but are not recognized as such within the 
framework; the framework is based upon the concept of liberal individualism and is 
imperialistic; there is a need for greater emphasis on cultural and economic rights rather 
than civil rights; and finally, there is a need to establish a system of core and periphery 
rights as compared to universal rights.  
 The first cultural relativist argument against the human rights framework rests 
upon two premises that argue against the universalist nature of rights as traditionally 
expressed within the framework. First, cultural relativists believe that truth and 
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knowledge are culturally constructed (Higgins, 1996, p. 95; Reitman, 1997, p. 100). 
Therefore, the idea that rights, as constructed in human rights documents, are able to 
transcend the cultural truths and knowledge of a specific group of people is not 
guaranteed.  Nor can assumptions be made that the rights and duties of humans can 
readily be justified by all cultures.  
 Further, human nature is culturally constructed, and thus, the term ‘human’ really 
doesn’t encompass a normative meaning across cultures (Donnelly, 1984, p. 403). The 
concept of human rights references rights that people have because they are human. 
Because a person is either considered to be human or not human, these human rights are 
concretized as equal rights. To the cultural relativist, this argument can fall flat in its 
ability to protect people from the violations that stem from categorizing people as 
‘Other’.  Universality is impossible and human rights can be interpreted differently 
amongst cultures. A culture’s definition of ‘human’ and ‘truth’ must be taken very 
seriously and with much consideration because cultural relativists adhere to the concept 
that all cultures are valid (Higgins, 1996, p. 96; Kim, 1993-1994, p. 56).  An argument 
often made by cultural relativists is that the human rights framework has been 
constructed based upon a Western worldview. This worldview not only fails to take into 
consideration non-Western worldviews but completely negates the concept that all 
cultures are valid, though different, and can’t be boxed in by a set of rights that don’t 
adhere to culturally constructed truths and knowledge.  
 The second cultural relativist argument stems from a belief that the framework is 
reflective of liberal individualism, a construct that is prevalent in the Western 
Hemisphere but is conceptually absent in many cultures where group identity and 
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membership surpass in importance individual rights (Binder, 1999, p. 213). Such a focus 
on the individual is foreign to other cultures and fails to recognize that claims to 
individual rights may necessarily be ignored for the best interest of the community as a 
whole. In these cases, the framework has not taken up the cause of the non-individualistic 
society or culture. Further, because the framework is based up this individualistic 
ideology, attempts to make human rights universal are an imperialistic measure on the 
part of Western countries (Reitman, 1997, p. 104).  The West’s particular view of 
humanity and rights is imposed on non-Western cultures through the political and legal 
dimensions of human rights as they are declared in human rights documents.  
 The third argument made by cultural relativists pertains to rights, specifically 
those that are given greater attention within human rights documents. Civil liberties, 
considered more pressing in the West, are given priority and greater emphasis than the 
economic and social liberties that are more pressing in the developing world (Binder, p. 
213; Kim, 1993-1994, p. 58). For example, the rights to free speech and election of 
government leaders are civil rights and of significance to the West, but are not inherent to 
human nature (Binder, 1999, p. 214). Thus, they can be seen as lacking in priority within 
non-Western countries. Again, this argument vents the issue of imperialistic fervor over a 
set of rights that are not universally relevant.   
 The final argument of cultural relativists derives from the belief that there are core 
and periphery rights within the human rights framework (Brems, 1997, p. 147).  Core 
rights are those that are deemed to be universally applicable and necessary. Periphery 
rights are those that ought to allow for the influence of individual cultures in their 
interpretation and enforcement. Core rights should be determined only when there is no 
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disagreement by any culture over their existence. Any right that is arguable should be 
considered as peripheral and given over to context when determining the interpretation of 
the right, coinciding duties, and ultimately the way a violation is determined to have 
occurred.  
 Decolonial critique. 
 
 Decolonial theory’s critique of human rights is relatively new and is critical of the 
human rights framework. It shares some of the same critiques informing feminist and 
cultural relativist critiques such as opposition to colonial-based hierarchies of gender and 
a rejection of culturally constructed universalism that disavows non-Western knowledge. 
However, the decolonial critique is distinct from the feminist and cultural relativist 
critiques as it centralizes colonization and coloniality as the basis for the Eurocentric 
liberal tradition of human rights. According to Barreto, writing five years after the 
Decade for Human Rights Education (1995-2005) and just a few short years after 
Lohrenschiet wrote about the UDHR serving as a template for curriculum, human rights 
are understood to have been a result of the Eurocentric belief that the West is the 
fiduciary of all knowledge regarding human rights (p. 1) and that the Eurocentric theory 
of human rights is objective and universal (p. 4). As a result, non-Eurocentric ways of 
understanding human rights have been disregarded or excluded (p. 2). In order to 
construct a non-Eurocentric theory of human rights, Eurocentric theories need to be set 
aside and the historical and geographical context in which they were created needs to be 
deconstructed (p. 3). Barreto (2012) explains:  
Resisting colonisation in the field of human rights can proceed by dismantling the 
notion that knowledge and material conditions are discrete. Contextualising 
theories of human rights means showing the genealogical connection that ties the 
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Eurocentric theory of rights to the historical setting in which it was elaborated. 
Unveiling the linkage to the site of emergence of knowledge weakens or destroys 
the legitimacy of claims to universality.  
 
For this project I want to emphasize that the historical setting in this case refers to: anti-
colonial political struggles; the cultural and intellectual production of anti-colonial 
scholars and artists that are forerunners a genealogy to decolonial theorists; the history of 
HR at an international level, and the relationship between human rights law and 
education on the one hand and nation-states on the other; and how all these come to bear 
on how human rights education is conceptualized and actualized in graduate training, and 
curricular and pedagogical options for students, as well as access to pedagogical training 
post Ph.D. education.  Contextualizing human rights also implies demonstrating that “the 
dominant theory is no longer ‘the’ theory of human rights; it is just ‘a’ theory born in the 
background of the history of Europe and, as a consequence, has no claim to be 
universally valid. The re-contextualisation and contextualisation of the hegemonic theory 
of human rights in the material conditions of modern/colonial geography and history 
paves the way for re-drawing and re-writing the geography and history of human rights” 
(p. 6). 
 Barreto (2012) argues that the Eurocentric history of human rights does not need 
to be discarded or prohibited within human rights discourse and education, but that 
decolonial theory requires that it dialogue with other conceptions of rights in order to 
remove itself from its monologue.  He also contends that the only way to heal the 
colonial wound that Anzaldua and Quijano write of is through the epistemological 
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decolonization of knowledge by way of dialogue and a political effort, which will allow 
for a new theory and strategies of human rights to emerge. 
 Baxi argues that “human rights colonialism” has resulted in rights-wariness that 
comes from a variety of colonial approaches to human rights: First, human rights 
discourse fails to afford equal dignity to all traditions and is hegemonically Western. It 
does not account for “divergent religious, cultural and inter-faith traditions.” Second, the 
liberal tradition of rights and justice perpetuates colonialist/imperialist conceptualizations 
of them. Third, the human rights agenda conceals the true Western agendas of achieving 
greater power and domination. Finally, capitalist ideologies and priorities have 
overwritten community responsibilities (Baxi, 1994, pg. 17-18). 
 Al-Daraweesh and Snauwaert (2013) have also written of the Eurocentric liberal 
tradition of human rights, which they concur has informed human rights education and 
created obstacles to its implementation (p. 391). They argue that international treaties and 
conventions are misused as the primary source of pedagogy and curriculum. While they 
are valuable for accomplishing and assessing human rights, as a primary source for 
pedagogy, they are “perceived as an obligation to realize an idealized, unassailable 
conception of the good life…a set of final truths that all countries and cultures are to 
uphold” (p. 391-392). This leaves little room for contributions outside of the western 
liberal tradition, including those from local cultural traditions; as a result, many people 
feel a lack of ownership of the principles of human rights and cannot understand how 
human rights are relevant to their lived experience (p. 392). Al-Daraweesh and Snauwaert 
argue that the current paradigm of human rights will not result in widespread legitimacy – 
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particularly in the Third World - without a dialogical approach, which will allow for an 
“authentic cosmopolitan consensus” on human rights (p. 392). 
 Critiques of human rights are similarly made of human rights education. Coysh 
(2014) has critiqued human rights education through the use of critical discourse analysis. 
While not analogous with a decolonial perspective, she makes several points that echo 
decolonial scholars. Coysh confronts the idea that human rights are inherent and 
universal and argues for the inclusion of subjugated knowledges in human rights 
education (p. 94). She asserts that human rights education as a field has been overtaken 
by UN- originated discourse, and the dissemination operationalized by the UN (p. 92). 
Historical and subjugated knowledge has been buried as it is considered simplistic or 
substandard to Eurocentric knowledge (p. 95). She also argues that the practice of 
framing human rights to make them relevant to various populations has “obscure[d] how 
power relationships shape the dominant discourse, affect action and the use of speech” (p. 
106).  Non-Eurocentric epistemologies have been dismissed as invalid, but later used to 
contextualize institutional discourse to make it more palatable. Coysh contends that these 
issues have resulted in a global model of human rights education that is “ahistorical, 
apolitical, and decontexual” therefore limiting the possibility for social transformation (p. 
108). 
 Decolonial theory’s application to human rights and human rights education 
focuses on the Eurocentric origins of human rights and also the ways in which the West 
has sought to exclude and suppress divergent voices as well as the ways that the West has 
used human rights as a means of maintaining colonial dominance and power in 
modernity. Human rights education has lacked non-Eurocentric epistemologies of human 
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rights and been dominated by UN-centric discourse impacting its legitimacy and its 
potency to be transformational. Below, I provide a synthesis of key criteria for 
decolonization, which is used to determine whether decolonial approaches to human 
rights are being implemented by university professors in their courses.  
 
Decolonial Criteria 
 In my research, I established the key criteria for the development of a decolonial 
approach by analyzing numerous authors’ writings on decolonial theory (Tejeda and 
Espinoza, 2002; Grosfoguel, 2007; Grosfoguel, 2012; Richardson, 2012; Escobar, 2011, 
Escobar, 2004; Baxi, 2002; De Lissovoy, 2010; Sykes, 2006; Doxtater, 2004; Al-
Daraweesh and Snauwaert, 2013; Grosfoguel, 2006; Alcoff, 2011; Andreotte, n.d.). 
These key criteria can be used as measures to critique human rights. Relevant to this 
research project, these criteria can be used to critique human rights pedagogy, which can 
be defined as the methods and practices that inform how human rights are taught. In the 
context of this research, applying these key criteria can help determine whether a 
decolonial pedagogy has been used by current professors of human rights, and if so how 
and why; however, they are also very much key aspect of decolonial theory. There 
inclusion here provides additional context to understanding how theory led to 
measurements used in the research. In the following section, the writings that provide 
these criteria are further explored. Many decolonial theorists have provided criteria for 
decolonization by clearly articulating the tenets of decolonial theory.  
 Grosfoguel (2012), Richardson (2012), and Escobar (2004, 2011) have written of 
the need to recognize the absence of non-Eurocentric epistemologies. They have also 
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emphasized a need to engage these non-Eurocentric epistemologies. They argue that 
colonization has resulted in the dismissal of non-Eurocentric epistemologies that need to 
be considered and compared to Eurocentric epistemologies and that failure to engage 
these epistemologies allows for the continuance of an epistemicidal logic. They argue 
that discourses are often accepted without recognition that they have been privileged due 
to their origination in Eurocentric thought. According to Escobar (2004), Grosfoguel, 
(2006, 2007), Alcoff (2011), and Andreotte (n.d.), these hegemonic discourses require 
tempering through the inclusion of discourses and knowledge that emerge from subaltern 
positions. Baxi (2002), De Lissovoy (2010), and Sykes (2006) emphasize the need for 
discussion regarding which social identities are given a voice and authority. They 
encourage critical reflection on the geo-and body-politics of those in authority and also 
those who are excluded from having authority. Doxtater (2004), Al-Daraweesh and 
Snauwaert (2013), and Coysh (2014) stress the avoidance of solely emphasizing 
hegemonic discourses.  
 Similar criteria have also been articulated, specifically within writings on how to 
engage a decolonizing pedagogy. Tejeda and Espinoza (2002) have developed criteria for 
defining a decolonizing pedagogy for social justice, which can be applied to human 
rights. They begin by asking two important decolonial questions of social justice 
education: “(1) Where do our beliefs about what social justice is come from? (2) Who 
benefits and who is harmed from the current conceptualization of social justice and the 
instantiation of that conceptualization?” (Tejeda and Espinoza, 2002, p. 1) In other 
words, they are concerned with where our beliefs originate – or the geo- and body-
politics – and who benefits and suffers the most from the way social justice is framed and 
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represented. They worked from the decolonial belief that ideas of social justice that fail to 
take into account the epistemicide that has occurred over many years will never 
accurately embody the interests of working-class indigenous and non-white people (p. 2).  
 They also argue that it is necessary to analyze and understand the ways 
colonialism has been concretized and its effects (p. 2). For example, the racial 
classification of people is a tangible effect of colonialism (see Quijano). Within the 
context of education, they have established criteria for decolonial pedagogy. Curricular 
content, design, and instructional practices must develop a critical decolonizing 
consciousness and provide students with a “rich theoretical, analytical, and pragmatic 
toolkit for individual and social transformation” (p. 8). This toolkit is accomplished 
through the development of the learner’s critical consciousness and instruction in the 
history and current manifestations of colonialism. It is also developed through instruction 
in the theory and conceptual framework of decolonization in order to critically analyze 
the past and present. Further, it is developed through the examination of neocolonial 
conditions that impact all types of curricular subject matter (p. 8). Regardless of the 
subject matter, the content of the pedagogy “highlights, examines, and discusses 
transforming the mutually reinforcing systems of neocolonial and capitalist domination 
and exploitation…” (p. 8). Lastly, the toolkit is developed through critiquing and 
problematizing a curriculum’s “complicity with neocolonial domination and exploitation” 
(p. 8).   
 Finally, Grosfoguel (2007) provides requirements for the development of a 
decolonial epistemic perspective. He contends that a decolonial epistemic perspective 
requires that knowledge as a concept be extended beyond the Western canon to include 
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subaltern knowledge. Additionally, the diversity in epistemologies and ethics requires 
critical dialogue to take place. The purpose of this dialogue is not the creation of an 
abstract universal epistemology but one that is pluriversal. Finally, significant and 
genuine consideration needs to be given to subaltern and subjugated perspectives (p. 
212). 
 This synthesis of the criteria provided by decolonial theorists, can be used to 
provide measures for determining whether decolonial approaches are being applied by 
human rights professors within their classrooms. In the next chapter, the methods I used 
to conduct the research are explained including how the measures were operationalized 
for this research project. 
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     CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 This chapter is focused on explaining the design strategies the research is based 
upon and presents the qualitative approach taken, the philosophical assumptions of the 
study and the philosophical paradigm as well as how it influenced the research design. 
Furthermore, this chapter describes the researcher’s background, beliefs, and biases and 
explicates the research methodologies, design, and instruments used in the research in 
addition to the methods of data collection and analysis.  
Researcher’s Background, Beliefs, and Biases 
 Creswell (2013) argues that since all research is interpretive, it is important for 
researchers to be self-reflective and make transparent their background and their beliefs 
and biases as they relate to the research. In the following paragraphs, I discuss each in 
detail.  
 This project stems from three levels of inquiry: first, it stems from my own 
experiences as a student within a Master’s and PhD program that addressed human rights; 
second, it comes from questions I have as a researcher interested in understanding how 
human rights education can undergo decolonization; and third, it has emerged from my 
own experiences as a professor who teaches human rights to English as a Second 
Language (ESL) students. Throughout this paper, I move between these positions of 
student, researcher, and teacher, and this can be recognized not only in shifts of voice but 
also in moments of reflexivity.  
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 Prior to engaging in this research, my own engagement with decolonial 
pedagogical approaches when teaching was limited. Within discussions and exercises I 
do explore the lack of universality of human rights, the impact of power relations on 
human rights discourse, law, implementation and enforcement, and the hierarchical 
categorization of human rights; however, I have found that I rely quite often on UN 
declarations and conventions to help students understand the human rights system. This is 
not problematic in itself as students need to understand what the system consists of, but it 
is problematic because I have been unable to incorporate subaltern epistemologies to the 
extent that I would like. This is in large part due to access to decolonial readings and/or 
materials that would be understandable to my ESL students. Much of what has been 
written is complex and uses complex language. In order to be able to use a lot of the 
readings that I have included in this research, I would have to modify them significantly. 
Doing so is a possibility, but the amount of time it would take to do so would be 
significant.  
 After engaging in this research, my perspectives as student, teacher, and 
researcher have transformed. As a student, I have thought much more about the pedagogy 
that professors have used in the courses I have taken, specifically what content was 
included and what was excluded but also the pedagogical practices that were used and 
how they impacted my understanding of the content presented. As a teacher, I have 
reflected on my own syllabi but also the choices I make on a day-to-day basis in terms of 
what I am presenting to students and how I am doing so. Additionally, I’ve become more 
thoughtful about the curriculum we are using in my ESL department and ways that we 
could move toward decolonization, particularly with regards to classes based on thematic 
   81 
instruction.  Finally, as a researcher, this project has made me aware of the challenges of 
altering or adopting a new pedagogy is. Not only are there institutional and disciplinary 
challenges to overcome, there are also challenges that relate to an individual’s 
epistemology, fears, time constraints, and energy (as discussed previously), for example. 
I did not anticipate the changes that would take place within myself when I decided to 
embark on this PhD journey.   
 As I entered my PhD program at Arizona State University, my goal was to focus 
my studies on human rights education, but I was not clear in terms of the specifics of the 
research I might engage in. I took a bit of a winding road to emerge at this institution and 
in the Justice Studies program. Having completed a B.A. in Interdisciplinary Studies in 
2001 and an M.A. in Teaching English as a Foreign Language in 2002, I taught for 
several years as an English as a Second Language (ESL) teacher in the U.S. as well as 
abroad. I enjoyed my work and my students and yet didn’t feel fulfilled. I thought 
perhaps my true calling per say lay in the field of law, and in 2008, I began law school in 
the Los Angeles area. It didn’t take too long to determine that law was not actually my 
passion but that something related tangentially was: social justice and human rights. In 
my last term at law school, I took a course that engaged with human rights law and felt 
that working to protect human rights and engage in social justice was my passion. As a 
result, I transferred into the Social Justice and Human Rights Master’s program at 
Arizona State University. There, I found my fit and also found a means of connecting my 
love for teaching ESL students with my love for human rights work. For my final project, 
I created modules for a human rights organization that focused on providing detailed 
lesson plans for educators on human rights topics.  
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 After completing this degree, I went back to teaching ESL and attempted to 
incorporate some human rights education into my courses; however, there was some push 
back from both administration and other faculty who felt that the topics were just too 
controversial for the program. While I could expound to them the reasons why human 
rights were relevant to the ESL classroom, I determined that I wanted to expand my own 
understanding of what social justice was and obtain a degree that might allow me to teach 
human rights in an environment with less push back. Hence, my application to and 
subsequent enrollment in the Justice Studies program at Arizona State University.  
 Taking courses in this program was as much eye opening as it was uncomfortable. 
I considered myself to be pretty liberal politically and socially, understanding, and 
educated in the area of social justice, yet my first year in the Justice Studies program 
demonstrated just how much knowledge and understanding I lacked. I had to really begin 
looking at my privilege, my whiteness, and my conceptualization of how the world really 
works. It was in this first year that I felt truly exposed to the idea that even the concepts, 
like human rights, that I thought were sound and just were actually problematic. Cultural 
relativistic and feminist critiques of human rights were familiar to me, but critiques that 
examined the Eurocentrism of human rights were not. In studying these critiques further, 
I began to consider what their existence meant for human rights as a system of providing 
individuals a form of justice in their lives. While I was frustrated with what I deemed a 
lack of concern for these critiques within the field, I was not ready to throw the baby out 
with the bath water. I wanted to find a way to support the idea that each human has 
inalienable rights because they are human but also challenge current conceptualizations 
of human rights.  
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 I began my dissertation work thinking that I would investigate how human rights 
were being taught across the U.S. to students like me. In particular, I wanted to know if 
their professors were exposing them to critiques of human rights but more so whether the 
professors were actually engaging these critiques in their classrooms and through their 
pedagogy. I determined to focus on the decolonial critique specifically and created the 
research questions that have guided this project. 
 The question of whether human rights education can be decolonized is complex, 
with professional, institutional, pragmatic, personal, and political implications. While it is 
feasible to use a decolonial approach to guide both pedagogy and practice, the larger 
issue of decolonization stems from whether human rights discourse can ever be de-
colonized – and more to the point, what does it mean to decolonize human rights? The 
genealogy of human rights is contested, and as such, the interrogation of their origins 
brings into question whether human rights, as established within the international body of 
the United Nations, can be reclaimed/decolonized. Is it possible for human rights to be 
something other than colonizing? In examining the research of decolonial theorists in 
conjunction with theorists of other critiques, I find it inescapable that human rights 
evolved out of a very Eurocentric and colonizing worldview. Human rights education, 
being constitutive of human rights, has evolved in some locations in the same way. They 
have been integral to each other, informing each other, creating, reproducing, and 
re/inventing Eurocentric epistemology.  
 In conducting this research, I aim to make the case that while human rights may 
not be the ‘Trojan Horse of Recolonization’ (Prakesh and Esteva, 2008), careful 
consideration must be given to whether human rights can ever embrace a de-colonizing 
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discourse.  Prakesh and Esteva (2008) believe that the right to education is really an 
attempt to impose particular knowledge and ways of knowing on three groups: the 
“miseducated”, the “noneducated”, and the “undereducated”. They evocatively explain 
that  
these groups are learning to resist any and all universal formulae of salvation; to 
recognize the cultural roots of each promoted globalism or universalism; to 
realize that all of them— including the different brands or breeds of education—
are nothing but arrogant particularisms. What for some people is the proverbial 
dream come true, for other people is a waking nightmare: a plague, a disease 
destructive of their traditions, their cultural and natural spaces.  (p. 4) 
 
Human rights education is a component of the imposed education of which Prakesh and 
Esteva write. The imposition of human rights (law, training and education) that presents a 
Eurocentric epistemology of human rights becomes an issue of recolonization and 
questions any potential of decolonizing human rights. Furthermore, if human rights can 
be separated from its colonizing discourse, human rights education must then push to 
ensure and create the continued possibility of decolonized human rights through 
education as reinforcing processes. 
 While engaging in this research, I operated from two assumptions of what the 
research would reveal. One of my assumptions was that some of the decolonial criteria 
for a decolonial pedagogy would be met by the professors but that it would be unlikely 
that a majority of the professors’ pedagogy would meet all of the criteria. In part, this 
assumption was made based on my own experiences as a law student some time ago, my 
experiences in human rights courses, and my experiences in my Justice Studies program. 
It was also based in part on my perception that decolonial critique is lesser known than 
other critiques of human rights. Lastly, it was also based in part in an overall lack of 
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emphasis on pedagogy in graduate programs. Another assumption I held while engaging 
with the research was that based upon the discipline the professor was trained in or 
worked within, the professor may be less likely to utilize a decolonial pedagogy. For 
example, I assumed that law professors would be less likely because, based on my own 
experience taking two law courses, the nature of the international human rights law 
courses is to focus on the human rights instruments, their implementation, and their 
enforcement.  
 In addition to my biases and making some assumptions regarding the research, I 
also recognized prior to, during, and after the research some of my own epistemological 
barriers. One of my barriers was not recognizing from the beginning that I was operating 
from the three perspectives of student, researcher, and teacher while engaging this 
research. Another barrier is the extent to which I have training in conducting qualitative 
research, in particular, the analytics involved. A final barrier relates to my own 
positionality as a white women trained within a Eurocentric and neoliberal system of 
higher education. Despite my own attempts to reach beyond that barrier, it is still 
limiting.  
 I offer this brief introduction to my position and experiences as student, 
researcher, and professor because I cannot separate myself from the research questions 
below or of the implication, for example, of what type of labor it would take to train 
graduate students in decolonial pedagogies, and not just theory. I am a graduate student 
taking topical classes in social justice, human rights, and methodology, but I am also a 
teacher that incorporates HRE into my courses. In conducting this research, I had to 
respond to the questions that I asked, to the findings that resulted, and to the challenges to 
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implement the changes I suggest in the final conclusion. I needed to reflect upon how I 
learned what I learned and how that knowledge was created and transmitted. 
Furthermore, I needed to think through what it means for my own students that I was not 
trained in the how of human rights pedagogy even if I am aware of the what. This 
research has made me aware of how my own experiences as a student but also a teacher 
and a researcher can contribute to furthering the goals and understanding the implications 
of a decolonial pedagogy for human rights.  
Research Questions 
 According to Furo (2013), decoloniality is “a pedagogical project oriented against 
the Eurocentrism that underlies the politics of content and knowledge in education, and is 
oriented towards building solidarity based on non-dominative coexistence” (p. 9). 
Decoloniality is not just about thinking but also about doing (Mignolo, 2011). In other 
words, decoloniality is not just theory; it includes praxis. Thus, in order to decolonize 
human rights education, it is necessary to change how we think about human rights and 
how we practice human rights, and most critically and specifically for HRE pedagogy, 
the “how” of creating a space of learning that can transform and promote solidarity and 
non-domination. The praxis of doing also means asking questions about the geopolitical 
history of human rights as well as hierarchical thinking and the structures of hierarchical 
learning. 
 While there is extensive research on the need to decolonize higher education and 
to a lesser degree on the need to decolonize human rights, very little research exists on 
the need to decolonize human rights education. Although there has been a focus on 
decolonial theory within some disciplines of academia, very little attention has been 
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given to the need for decolonization of human rights programs despite the extensive 
literature linking human rights – historically and presently - to Eurocentrism and Western 
colonialism (Coysh, 2014; De Lissovoy, 2010; Barreto, 2012; Baxi, 2002; Imani, 2008; 
Onazi, 2009; Koshy, 1999). What little research has been done calling for the 
decolonization of human rights education has only focused on the absence of 
contributions from outside the western liberal tradition and the lack of inclusion and 
acceptance of non-Eurocentric epistemologies (Barreto, 2012; Al-Daraweesh and 
Snauwaert, 2013; Coysh, 2014; Zembylas, 2017).  
 Likewise, there is a dearth of research that examines the pedagogy of U.S. human 
rights professors and the extent to which professors are implementing decolonial praxis. 
Yet, investigation into the colonization of human rights and human rights instruments has 
been quite prevalent (Coysh, 2014; De Lissovoy, 2010; Barreto, 2012; Baxi, 2002; Imani, 
2008; Onazi, 2009; Koshy, 1999). Decolonial theorists have claimed that from the initial 
attempts to create international consensus and instruments defining human rights until 
now, colonization has plagued both the process and the resulting instrumentation and 
implementation (Mignolo, 2013; Baxi, 2002; Grosfoguel, 2012; Richardson, 2012; 
Escobar, 2011).  
 To take seriously the critique of decolonial theorists’ is to make space in human 
rights education for not only the introduction of their criticism but also for decolonial 
analysis. Furthermore, the exploration of the ties of decolonial theory to human rights 
education in the previous chapters points to a need for professors to engage in decolonial 
praxis with regard to their human rights courses. By exploring professors’ pedagogies 
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when teaching human rights, we can determine whether and how decolonial praxis is 
occurring in human right courses.  
 The research questions this project sought to answer are exploratory and can be 
categorized as both ontological and epistemological. They are ontological in that they 
capture: professors’ beliefs about the colonial nature of human rights; how the colonial 
contestation over who was human enough to create knowledge and therefore had rights, 
continues in the second colonization (Nandy, 2010); how professors’ lived realities of 
human rights impacts their pedagogy; and provides insight into the relationship between 
graduate training, pedagogical training, and teaching post Ph.D. They are epistemological 
because they explore the phenomena of human rights and the pedagogical approaches 
used to teach about them. This research project was designed to answer these questions:  
1) How do U.S. human rights professors’ engage with decolonial pedagogical 
approaches in their human rights courses?  
 
2) How do professors’ pedagogical approaches support a decolonial perspective 
of human rights? 
 
3) Why do challenges to approaches supporting a decolonial perspective on 
human rights exist, and how can pedagogical barriers to implementation of a 
decolonial approach be overcome? 
 
To answer these questions, professors were asked questions about their disciplinary and 
teaching background, their courses, and their pedagogy. These questions can be found in 
Appendix A. 
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Research Design 
Qualitative Approach 
 In order to get at these main questions, this research project utilizes an interpretive 
and constructivist grounded theory approach that focuses on syllabi, pedagogical 
practices and structured interviews. More specifically, it develops a theory based on 
semi-structured interviews and content analysis and explains how U.S. human rights 
professors develop pedagogical approaches to teaching human rights, how they 
implement those approaches in their classes, and how these approaches differ. Grounded 
theory investigates a process with the objective of developing a theory that is set in 
observations. Grounded theory method, developed by Glaser and Strauss in the 1960s, 
holds that research should begin with the researchers becoming familiar with the sphere 
from which their research would be conducted. In doing so, key attributes could be 
discovered and framework of explanation developed aiding greater theoretical acumen. 
According to Antony Bryant and Kathy Charmaz (2011), Glaser and Strauss’ research 
utilized the findings from the interviews and observations they conducted to formulate 
codes and categories that would be used when gathering further data (para. 8). Although 
tautological, Reichertz (2010) contends this process is also “truth-conveying” because the 
deductions made in the findings confirm the validity of codes and categories but also 
their application to the new data. Initially and primarily used in the fields of nursing and 
sociology, grounded theory increasingly became a popular method of research for many 
other social scientists.  
 Although the research method has its critics, whose opposition stems from 
“inductive logic and lack of quantification”, many others have found the method to be 
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thorough and methodical (Charmaz, 2011, para. 12). Grounded theory has been 
somewhat remodeled under Kathy Charmaz (2000, 2006) moving grounded theory from 
objectivist to constructivist. According to Bryant and Charmaz (2011), “Constructivist 
grounded theory recognizes and retains the strengths of the method itself, while engaging 
with the philosophical debates and developments of the past 40 years or so; offers clear 
guidelines for examining how situations and people construct the studied phenomenon; 
and moves the method further in to the interpretive tradition” (“Constructivist GTM”, 
para. 6). Charmaz contends that “constructivists study how - and sometimes why – 
participants construct meanings and actions in specific situations…A constructivist 
approach means more than looking at how individuals view their situations. An 
interpretive approach to grounded theory focuses on “interpretation and abstract 
understanding more so than explanation” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 230) as well as 
“understanding meanings and actions and how people construct them” (Charmaz, 2014, 
p. 231). It not only theorizes the interpretive work that research participants do, but also 
acknowledges that the resulting theory is an interpretation…The theory depends on the 
researcher’s view; it does not and cannot stand outside of it” (Charmaz, 2014, p. 239). 
With regard to data collection, Bryant and Charmez claim that it is not “found” but 
“made”. Rather than uncovering the data, it is the result of relationship between the 
researcher and the context of what is researched. They articulate that, within this 
approach, theorists “construct situated knowledge reflecting how their respective research 
relationships arise in specific situations” and focus on “the historical moment, social 
structures and situations in which their research participants are embedded” 
(“Constructivist GTM”, para. 6).  
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 The construction of situated knowledge is an important component to this 
research as this is an acknowledgement of the complexity of what is being studied and 
that what is considered “knowledge” is a reflection of the conditions in which it is 
‘situated’ (Haraway, 1988). Thus, in conducting this research, it is relevant to examine 
the current political and academic climate in addition to other conditions in which the 
participants are embedded such as their academic background, their training in human 
rights, the length of time they have taught human rights, and the extent to which they feel 
they have autonomy in their courses.   
 As a qualitative approach, grounded theory investigates a process or action and 
aims to develop a theory based upon the collected data. When a constructivist approach is 
taken, such as in this research, Creswell (2013) explains that guidelines are flexible, the 
theory that develops in dependent upon the views of the researcher, and less emphasis is 
given to methods than to ascertaining “embedded, hidden networks, situations, and 
relationships, and making visible hierarchies of power, communication, and opportunity” 
(p. 87). Creswell also describes constructivist grounded theory as having a procedure in 
which the research not only determines the categories of coding but also “advances 
personal values, experiences, and priorities” (p. 88).  One last, but important, component 
of this qualitative approach is its stance that complicated terms or jargon as well as a very 
systematic scheme are a distraction and unnecessary to the research. As this research 
stems out of a justice studies field, this element of the approach seems to fit with the 
field-related concept of accessibility in that the research is not intended for a solely 
academic audience. 
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Philosophical Paradigm 
  Understanding a researcher’s philosophical assumptions is important because 
those assumptions underlie the research and impact the study. Creswell (2013) identifies 
four philosophical assumptions or paradigms within qualitative research. These 
paradigms are beliefs about ontology, epistemology, axiology, and methodology. 
Creswell (2013) argues that understanding these four paradigms is important for three 
reasons. First, they affect how researchers look at problems and create research questions 
to investigate them (p. 18). In addition, they impact the ways in which the researcher tries 
to answer those research questions.  Second, they are a reflection of how researchers are 
trained and how research is typically conducted within their field. Third, those who read 
the researcher’s studies benefit from understanding the researcher’s paradigms as they 
help in making appropriate critiques (p. 19).  
 Ontology pertains to the nature of reality and the articulation of it. A person’s 
ontology confines what can be known about the nature of reality (TerreBlache and 
Durrheim, 1999). Creswell (2013) explicates, “Different researchers embrace different 
realities, as do the individuals being studied and the readers of qualitative 
study…researchers conduct a study with the intent of reporting these multiple realities. It 
is worthwhile to note that ontology is a contested term. In “Afro-Pessimism: The Unclear 
Word”, Jared Sexton (2016) provides one delimitation of the term from Robert Nichols: 
“Ontology…does not refer to an essentialized structure of reality...Instead, ontology 
refers to a particular form of analysis, one that affirms the idea that knowledge claims 
about the world are also interpretations of what sorts of entities there are to be known, 
and, simultaneously, a certain ethical positioning of the subject of knowledge in relation 
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to the world so interpreted...” (para. 5). This delimitation provides an understanding of 
ontology from a critical perspective that reality is socially constructed and under constant 
surveillance to eliminate police out any notion of ontological equality that would accept 
broad, cross bio-political, concepts of bodies, minds, words, ideas, ways of knowing, 
ways of defining, and ways of creating meaning.  
 Research using grounded theory most often takes a constructivist or interpretive 
approach to ontology arguing that reality cannot be expressed singularly but is created by 
people within groups and, as such, needs to be interpreted in light of surrounding events 
and occurrences. For this research, a critical approach to ontology that considers how 
power relations influence reality is more appropriate given the intent of decolonial theory 
to problematize coloniality’s dominant power structures. Additionally, when considering 
ontologies, attention to the question of “whose reality?” is needed. In order to have a 
reality, one must be considered “human” first. Mignolo (2009) writes: “The concept of 
human used in general conversations, by the media, in university seminars, is a concept 
that leaves outside of “humanity” a quite large portion of the global population” (p. 7). 
Thus, if not everyone falls within the category of humanity, what follows is that not all 
ontologies are acknowledged, permitted, or even seen to exist. Thus, any restriction of 
ontologies will result in an imposed explanation of what can be encompassed as reality 
within qualitative research. 
 Epistemology concerns the nature of value and how something can be known. In 
conducting studies, researchers try to get to know their participants as much as they can 
from firsthand experiences. Epistemology encompasses what is known and how it is 
known, and it is always positioned within structures of power that include hierarchies of 
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class, race, sex, gender, spiritualism, linguistics, and geography. Epistemologies are 
always “situated” meaning that they come from specific bodies, spaces, and places 
(Grosfoguel, 2007, p. 213). Decolonial theory argues that non-Eurocentric epistemologies 
have been excluded and disregarded from discourse because they come from “othered” 
bodies, spaces, and places (Escobar, 2004; De Lissovoy, 2010; Richardson, 2012; 
Grosfoguel, 2007). Therefore, particular attention must be paid within the research 
project to the incorporation of and intentional emphasis on non-Eurocentric 
epistemologies in the analysis and discussion of the research.  
 The final two paradigms are axiological assumptions and methodology. 
Axiological assumptions pertain to the researcher’s recognition that values and biases are 
attached to the information gathered for the study. In the section above, in which my own 
beliefs and biases are explored, I have clarified that this research presumes the necessity 
of decolonization within education, human rights, and human rights education. In 
conducting the research – from the interviews with professors to the analysis of those 
interviews – lack of use of a decolonizing approach to pedagogy is held as a deficient and 
value is attached to the recognition of a need to decolonize human rights and human 
rights education. Finally, methodology relates to the procedures used to determine what 
can be known and to acquire that knowledge. The methodology of this research project, 
which is described further in the following sections, is focused on process rather than 
measurement. Western philosophy defines a telos of learning by outcomes whereas the 
objective of decolonial pedagogy is movement toward decolonization. That said, process 
is hard to represent in syllabi and content because it is affective and experiential, and 
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pedagogical practices that have decolonial goals may not be the same as decolonial 
pedagogy.  
 This research addresses ontological assumptions (perspectives/analysis) as the 
different perspectives of professors toward decolonial theory and approaches are reported 
and utilized in the identification of themes in the findings. In addition, my own 
perspectives and biases are also addressed in this methodology section. Epistemological 
assumptions are a primary component of this research as the interview questions directly 
address the question of what counts as human rights knowledge and who gets to claim 
which human rights knowledge is justified. In order to answer these questions, the study 
examines the responses of professors and their syllabi to conclude the answers to these 
questions. Furthermore, this research seeks to establish the background of the professors 
to gain an understanding of how and under what circumstances they have developed their 
human rights knowledge. Within this research, particularly within the section on my 
biases, the values and the interpretation of them that shape the research are exposed. 
Moreover, I attempt to expose the biases of the professors interviewed as they are bared 
in analysis of the interviews. Thus, axiological assumptions are explored. Finally, this 
section of the paper attempts to provide the methodological assumptions that are carried 
through the research and highlights the process of the study.  
 
Population, Participants, and Sampling Technique 
 For this research project, the population I studied were professors who taught 
human rights courses within colleges and universities in the U.S. This particular 
population was an appropriate source of data as the research questions were focused on 
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understanding how and why this particular population engages with decolonial 
approaches in their human rights courses. In order to recruit participants, I conducted an 
online search of human rights programs, which I identified as those programs offering an 
undergraduate major or minor in human rights, graduate programs offering a Master’s 
degree, and law schools offering an LLM in Human Rights.16 I established these criteria 
to identify instructors with a specialty in human rights and actively engaged in teaching 
the subject. Thus, this study used criterion or purposive sampling in which participants 
are selected according to pre-determined criteria, but also convenience sampling as these 
professors were easy to contact and willing to be interviewed. Through searches of these 
schools’ human rights programs’ websites, I identified and contacted approximately 75 
professors who teach human rights courses via e-mail in April 2015, and again in August 
2015, November 2016, and January 2017.   In each round of e-mails, new professors were 
contacted as were professors whom had indicated an interest in being interviewed but had 
not responded to additional e-mails.  
 The e-mails sent to professors described the research, requested their participation 
in a 45 to 60 minute interview, and contained a consent form detailing the benefits, risks, 
and compensation of participation. I asked professors to consent to be interviewed by e-
mailing their consent back to me. All interviews were conducted with the agreement that 
interviews would remain confidential and that the interviewees’ names and schools 
would not be revealed in relation to their responses. E-mail recruitment resulted in 
interviews with twenty-two professors.  These twenty-two professors represent sixteen 
different programs out of a total of forty-seven based on research from 2015. Typically, 
                                                
16 A spreadsheet of all human rights programs in the U.S. is available in Appendix B 
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in a qualitative study, twenty to thirty interviews are typical (Creswell, 2013) and 
considered an appropriate sample size. In addition, given the small but growing field of 
human rights education as well as the number of attempts to recruit professors, the final 
sample size of twenty-two professors was deemed sufficient.  
 In terms of the analysis of demographic information on these professors, I 
recorded their sex, instructional rank, degree background, and the number of years each 
has taught human rights courses. Six professors were women and sixteen were men; of 
which, at the time of interview, eight were full Professors, five are Associate Professors, 
four Assistant Professors, three were full Directors, one was a Clinical Professor of Law 
and another a Professor of Law. Interviewees included professors with graduate degrees 
in Political Science, History, Law, International Human Rights Law, Cultural Studies, 
Anthropology, Sociology, Social Work, International Studies, Social Science, Education, 
International Relations and Political Theory.  Five of the professors have under ten years 
of teaching experience in human rights, twelve have between ten and twenty years of 
experience, and five have more than twenty years of experience. Professors came from 
sixteen different colleges and universities, of which one is a private liberal arts college 
and fifteen are universities.  
Procedure and Data Processing 
 I conducted twenty-two semi-structured interviews via phone and Skype from 
2015 to 2017. Interview lengths varied from forty-five minutes to one hour dependent 
upon the amount of information the interviewees had to share and the amount of time 
available. I designed interview questions to collect data on three issues: (1) the 
methodology and pedagogy used in their human rights courses, (2) their intellectual 
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history and how they perceived its influence on course and program development, and (3) 
a detailed description of their use of decolonial pedagogy in their courses. Each interview 
took place by telephone or Skype and was audio-recorded with the permission of 
interviewees. Each interview consisted of three sets of questions pertaining to the 
educational and professional background of the interviewee, the content of the human 
rights courses taught, and the pedagogy utilized in the classroom. Interview questions can 
be found in the Appendix A. After the interviews, I asked participants to share sample 
syllabi via e-mail for later analysis for the purpose of triangulation and incorporated 
information from the syllabi within the findings. The syllabi were artifacts that underwent 
content analysis along with the interviews. During the interview process and after, I 
wrote memos including questions and ideas that emerged from the conversations with 
professors. These memos were helpful to the coding process and they brought depth to 
the transcribed interviews.  
 The interview questions were divided into three categories: background questions, 
course questions, and pedagogical questions. There were six background questions that 
centered on length of time teaching human rights courses, the human rights courses 
taught, the motivation behind teaching human rights, the educational training professors 
received to teach human rights, how teaching human rights is different than teaching 
courses in other social science fields, and how the professor’s background, training and 
teaching influence the presentation of human rights in the classroom. The second 
category contained five questions pertaining to professor’s human rights courses. 
Included were questions on how the professor chooses course materials for the syllabus, 
how UN treaties, conventions, and case law are integrated into the courses, and whether 
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and why the professor structures courses to engage with critiques of human rights. 
Professors were also asked if any of their course materials demonstrate contributions to 
human rights outside of the Western or liberal tradition, and finally, the reasoning 
professors attribute to the lack of textbooks that contain non-Western ways of 
understanding human rights.  
 The last category of interview questions engaged professors in the topic of their 
pedagogy.  The topics of the interview questions included pedagogical approaches, 
epistemology of human rights, production of human rights, credibility of human rights 
knowledge, power relations, and hierarchies of human rights knowledge. Each category 
of questions provided the opportunity to elicit rich responses from the professors and 
follow-up with additional questions based upon those responses.  
 Each interview was transcribed verbatim. Using open coding, I used a directed 
approach to conduct content analysis on the responses provided to each interview 
question. Hsieh and Shannon (2005) explain that a directed approach uses existing theory 
to identify key concepts as coding categories (p. 1281). The research questions for this 
study are focused on understanding professors’ use of and support for a decolonial 
approach to human rights. By analyzing numerous decolonial theorists’ writings, I 
established the key criteria for the development of a decolonial approach (Tejeda and 
Espinoza, 2002; Grosfoguel, 2007; Grosfoguel, 2012; Richardson, 2012; Escobar, 2011, 
Escobar, 2004; Baxi, 2002; De Lissovoy, 2010; Sykes, 2006; Doxtater, 2004; Al-
Daraweesh and Snauwaert, 2013; Grosfoguel, 2006; Alcoff, 2011; Andreotte, n.d.). 
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These key criteria17 can be used to critique human rights pedagogy, which can be defined 
as the methods and practices that inform how human rights are taught. In the context of 
this research, these key criteria provide a means of determining whether decolonial 
pedagogy has been used by current professors of human rights, and if so how and why. 
 Many decolonial theorists have provided criteria for decolonization by clearly 
articulating the tenets of decolonial theory. Grosfoguel (2012), Richardson (2012), and 
Escobar (2004, 2011) have written of the need to recognize the absence of non-
Eurocentric epistemologies. They have also emphasized a need to engage these non-
Eurocentric epistemologies. They argue that colonization has resulted in the dismissal of 
non-Eurocentric epistemologies that need to be considered and compared to Eurocentric 
epistemologies. Failure to engage these epistemologies allows for the continuance of an 
epistemicidal logic to continue. Baxi (2002), De Lissovoy (2010), and Sykes (2006) 
emphasize the need for discussion regarding which social identities are given a voice and 
authority. They encourage critical reflection on the geo-and body-politics of those in 
authority and also those who are excluded from having authority. Doxtater (2004), Al-
Daraweesh and Snauwaert (2013), and Coysh (2014) stress the avoidance of solely 
emphasizing hegemonic discourses. They argue that discourses are often accepted 
without recognition that they have been privileged due to their origination in Eurocentric 
thought. According to Escobar (2004), Grosfoguel, (2006, 2007), Alcoff (2011), and 
Andreotte (n.d.), these hegemonic discourses require tempering through the inclusion of 
discourses and knowledge that emerge from subaltern positions. 
                                                
17 My use of the term “criteria” rather than “measure” or “measurement” is purposeful in 
this research as decolonization is a process in which measurement is difficult.  
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 Similar criteria have also been articulated specifically within writings on how to 
engage a decolonizing pedagogy. Tejeda and Espinoza (2002) have developed criteria for 
defining a decolonizing pedagogy for social justice, which can be applied to human 
rights. They begin by asking two important decolonial questions of social justice 
education. The first pertains to intent: “(1) Where do our beliefs about what social justice 
come from? The second pertains to consequence: (2) Who benefits and who is harmed 
from the current conceptualization of social justice and the instantiation of that 
conceptualization” (Tejeda and Espinoza, 2002, p. 1)? In other words, they are concerned 
with where our beliefs originate – or the geo- and body-politics – and who benefits and 
suffers the most from the way social justice is framed and represented. They worked from 
the decolonial belief that ideas of social justice that fail to take into account the 
epistemicide that has occurred over many years will never accurately embody the 
interests of working-class indigenous and non-white people (p. 2). Though questions, 
such as those posed by Tejeda and Espinoza, can lead us to recognizing absences, we 
must also concern ourselves with praxis. To a certain extent, a decolonial pedagogy is 
about action as Ruth Wilson Gilmore (2007) explains: “In scholarly research, answers are 
only as good as the further questions they provoke, while for activists, answers are as 
good as the tactics they make possible” (p. 27). In addition to posing these questions, 
Tejeda and Espinoza also argue that it is necessary to analyze and understand the ways 
colonialism has been concretized and its effects (p. 2). For example, the racial 
classification of people is a tangible effect of colonialism. Within the context of 
education, they have established criteria for decolonial pedagogy.  
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 Curricular content, design, and instructional practices must develop a critical 
decolonizing consciousness and provide students with a “rich theoretical, analytical, and 
pragmatic toolkit for individual and social transformation” (p. 8). This toolkit is 
accomplished through the development of the learner’s critical consciousness and 
instruction in the history and current manifestations of colonialism, as well as the process 
by which professors and teachers learn and define what a critical consciousness is and is 
not. It is also developed through instruction in the theory and conceptual framework of 
decolonization in order to critically analyze the past and present. Further, it is developed 
through the examination of neocolonial conditions that impact all types of curricular 
subject matter (p. 8). Regardless of the subject matter, the content of the pedagogy 
“highlights, examines, and discusses transforming the mutually reinforcing systems of 
neocolonial and capitalist domination and exploitation…” (p. 8). Lastly, the toolkit is 
developed through critiquing and problematizing a curriculum’s “complicity with 
neocolonial domination and exploitation” (p. 8). 
 Finally, Grosfoguel (2007) provides requirements for the development of a 
decolonial epistemic perspective. He contends that a decolonial epistemic perspective 
requires that knowledge as a concept be extended beyond the Western canon to include 
subaltern knowledge. Additionally, the diversity in epistemologies and ethics requires 
critical dialogue to take place. The purpose of this dialogue is not the creation of an 
abstract universal epistemology but one that is pluriversal. Finally, significant and 
genuine consideration needs to be given to subaltern and subjugated perspectives (p. 
212). 
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 Thus, a synthesis of the criteria provided by decolonial theorists, can be used to 
analyze whether decolonial approaches are being applied by human rights professors 
within their classrooms. These criteria for a decolonial pedagogy were operationalized 
and used as coding categories for the analysis of the interviews: 
1) Recognition of the absence of and need for engagement with non-Eurocentric 
epistemologies thus avoiding approaches that enact an epistemicidal logic 
 
Operationalization:  
o Discussion topics include the pluriversal epistemology of human rights, 
the absence of non-Eurocentric epistemologies in human rights discourse, 
and the hierarchical categorization of human rights knowledge 
 
2) Consideration of which social identities are deemed authoritative and why 
 
Operationalization:  
o Course topics include power relations and their impact on human rights 
 
3) Avoidance of the sole emphasis on hegemonic Eurocentric discourse 
 
Operationalization:  
o Professor does not center the majority of course materials on documents 
created by the UN and includes critiques of the human rights framework 
 
4) Inclusion of subaltern knowledge 
 
Operationalization:  
o Course materials by subaltern authors and theorists are included 
 
 I color-coded each of the coding categories. I then highlighted and extracted 
sections of the interview that pertained to each of the color-coded categories. I put each 
of those sections into an Excel spreadsheet and highlighted only the parts of the interview 
that demonstrated implementation of the decolonial measures. After the first coding, I 
further coded each section of the interviews according to the operationalized 
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subcategories each section met. Following the coding, I analyzed and interpreted the data 
to identify which and to what extent human rights professors implemented decolonial 
measures in their courses.  
 As part of the research process, I conducted content analysis on the syllabi that 
were provided to me by the interviewees. Not all interviewees provided their syllabi, and 
in those cases, I attempted to acquire the syllabi by looking into the university websites of 
each professor. I was able to obtain at least one syllabus from thirteen of the twenty-two 
professors interviewed. When engaging in content analysis, two aspects to the content 
must be considered: the themes and main ideas of the text and context information 
(Becker and Lissman, 1973). Mayring (2000) describes content analysis as “an approach 
of empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts within their context of 
communication” (para. 5). Using a deductive category application, the same categories 
used to analyze the interviews were used to analyze the professors’ syllabi.  
 Syllabi from the professors’ human rights courses were collected between 2015 
and 2017. Of the twenty-two professors interviewed, thirteen provided at least one 
syllabus. Four professors provided one syllabus while the other seven provided between 
two and five syllabi, each for a different class that they teach. Each syllabus was analyzed 
according to the coding categories and used as its own data set as well as in combination 
with the professors’ interviews.  
 Again, a direct approach to content analysis was utilized to examine each of the 
thirteen syllabi provided by professors. The operationalized decolonial measures were 
used to categorize the content of the syllabi. Specifically, four components of each 
syllabus were analyzed when present: the course description, the course objectives, the 
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required texts, and the course schedule – in particular which course materials would be 
required and which topics would be covered. These four components contained a short 
description of the course, the aims and goals of the course, course materials that students 
would need to purchase or obtain, and a plan detailing the topics to be covered, including 
readings, and any required projects and assignments.   
 Analysis of these components of their courses were helpful in determining the 
extent and use of decolonial approaches to pedagogy by professors within their university 
human rights courses. In addition, the data provided a useful means of comparison for the 
self-reported description of course content and pedagogy by professors. The 
operationalized decolonial criteria used to analyze the syllabi are as follows:  
1) Recognition of the absence of and need for engagement with non-Eurocentric 
epistemologies thus avoiding approaches that enact an epistemicidal logic 
 
Operationalization:  
o Discussion topics include the pluriversal epistemology of human rights, 
the absence of non-Eurocentric epistemologies in human rights discourse, 
and the hierarchical categorization of human rights knowledge 
 
2) Consideration of which social identities are deemed authoritative and why 
 
Operationalization:  
o Course topics include power relations and their impact on human rights 
 
3) Avoidance of the sole emphasis on hegemonic Eurocentric discourse 
 
Operationalization:  
o Professor does not center the majority of course materials on documents 
created by the UN and includes critiques of the human rights framework 
 
4) Inclusion of subaltern knowledge 
 
Operationalization:  
   106 
o Course materials by subaltern authors and theorists are included 
 
As key concepts within decolonial theory, these operationalized decolonial criteria served 
as a priori codes to help establish themes. However, following advice provided by 
Creswell (2013), I remained open to the development of additional codes through the 
analysis. From the codes, I classified the data into themes and provided an interpretation 
of those themes, both of which are explored in the following chapter.  
Process Statement 
 In an effort to validate this research project, I have provided a section within this 
chapter in which I explore my background, beliefs, and biases as well as the 
philosophical paradigm that informed the research in an effort to reveal their impact on 
the project (Creswell, 2013; Merriam, 1988). In addition, this project claims validity 
through the process of triangulation in which the data collected, analyzed, and interpreted 
derived from a significant number of interviews with professors as well as the utilization 
of two types of data: interviews and the content analysis of syllabi. In doing so, I intended 
to ensure that the analysis and interpretation of the data was both accurate and credible. 
With each additional interview and syllabus wherein a code was applicable, the data was 
triangulated providing greater validity (Creswell, 2013; Creswell 2008). Although some 
qualitative researchers argue that reliability is not relevant to qualitative research 
(Stenbacka, 2001; Wolcott, 1990), I also aimed to confirm the reliability of the research 
by recording and carefully transcribing each interview. I also revisited the coded data to 
determine if the code remained applicable. Lastly, this same process of revisiting the 
coded data was applied to the themes to ensure consistency (Creswell, 2013).  
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 In the following chapter, I present my findings as they relate to the decolonial 
criteria and specifically the what of professors’ pedagogy, focusing on the topics and 
content they include in their courses.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DECOLONIAL APPROACHES IN HUMAN RIGHTS COURSES 
Introduction 
 This chapter explores how human rights professors are engaging with decolonial 
pedagogical approaches as well as how professors are incorporating a decolonial 
perspective of human rights. In addition, it addresses the challenges that exist to 
supporting a decolonial perspective and how barriers to implementation can be overcome. 
First, I re-introduce the participants and provide additional information regarding their 
backgrounds. Then I discuss the findings from the interviews with the human rights 
professors in the section on engaging and supporting decolonial approaches.  Finally, I 
address the implications of the findings for the decolonization of human rights courses.  
Re-introducing the Participants 
 As outlined in Chapter 3, the professors interviewed for this research had diverse 
backgrounds. Fifteen of the interviewees were male and seven were female. Six of the 
professors were full professors; three were Professors of Law, one was an Associate 
Professor of Law; three were associate professors; six were assistant professors; one was 
a Director; one was an Associate Director; and one was a Clinical Director. The 
professors came from educational backgrounds of social work, law, political science, 
cultural studies, education in language and literacy, southern US history, international 
human rights law, anthropology, international relations, sociology, law, and social 
science. The professors’ experience teaching human rights also varied extensively from 
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two years of experience to 40 years.18 For most of the professors, their motivation for 
teaching human rights courses stemmed from their own interest and graduate work or 
programs, activism in the field prior to teaching, the influence of faculty members in their 
graduate programs, or experience practicing human rights law. During the course of the 
interview, I asked the professors questions about their training, preparation and 
motivation for teaching human rights, and influences on their pedagogy and courses 
taught. Their responses are included below to provide a more thorough understanding of 
the professors’ relationships to human rights and human rights education.  
 Although many of these professors feel that their educational training prepared 
them to teach human rights courses, almost a third explicitly stated that they did not. 
Some cited the relative newness of human rights as an educational field while others 
explained that their programs did not offer courses in human rights or that human rights 
were not taught directly. Even so, these professors do not see their lack of educational 
training as a limitation to their teaching; however, the majority does feel that teaching 
human rights is different than teaching courses in other academic fields. Many indicated 
using an interdisciplinary approach within their human rights courses, emphasizing a 
desire to disrupt students’ expectations about human rights and social existence, the 
ability to use a different pedagogy and to teach outside a set canon.  
 For many, their educational training directly correlates to how they design 
curriculum and pedagogy with regards to human rights-focused courses. Professors 
whose backgrounds are in fields such as political science, law or anthropology felt that 
their approach to human rights reflected their educational background and influenced the 
                                                
18 This demographic information is available in Appendix C 
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types of course materials they included. For others, their pedagogy is reflective of those 
with which they worked or took classes. Additionally, for those who have experience 
practicing human rights law or have been involved in human rights commissions and 
courts, bringing in treaties, conventions, and case law was important. 
 The courses in human rights that these professors have taught or currently teach 
include many introductory courses to human rights and human rights clinics as well as 
courses covering specific aspects of human rights. The majority of the professors were 
satisfied with the content of these courses but wished that they had more time or that they 
could bring in more perspectives of human rights.  
 The backgrounds of the professors as established above are important 
considerations to the research questions this study sought to address. In the follow 
section, I detail the extent to which professors engage with and support a decolonial 
approach to pedagogy in their courses based on the analysis of their syllabi and 
interviews conducted with them. 
Engaging and Incorporating Decolonial Pedagogical Approaches 
 
 The human rights professors interviewed for this research reflected a diverse 
understanding of human rights epistemology and the need for decolonial approaches to 
human rights discourse.  Analysis of the data revealed substantial complexity to 
professors’ engagement with decolonial approaches. Engagement with all of the four 
criteria of a decolonial approach was ultimately low overall as each was addressed by 
half or fewer of the professors. In addition, the extent to which the operationalization of 
each criterion was met proved inconsistent, as some professors may have met one aspect 
of the operationalization of the criterion, another aspect was not. Though not unexpected, 
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this analysis points to the need for further engagement with decolonial theory in human 
rights courses. With regard to the first criterion, the majority of the professors recognized 
the existence of hierarchies within human rights knowledge, discussed the impact of 
power relations on human rights discourse, and included some critiques of human rights 
in their courses. Significantly fewer presented human rights epistemology from a 
pluriversal perspective in their courses. Similarly, few decentered hegemonic Eurocentric 
discourse by limiting UN human rights documents, such as treaties, conventions, and 
case law, or incorporating a significant number of works by subaltern authors or theorists 
in their courses. Thus, overall, the research shows that a minority of the professors are 
engaging in a decolonial approach to their pedagogy; however, there is some inclusion of 
each of the criteria, and a small number of these professors have adopted a decolonial 
approach. In what follows, I provide a detailed analysis of professors’ engagement with 
each of the decolonial criteria and of how their pedagogical approaches support a 
decolonial perspective of human rights. 
Analysis of Decolonial Criteria 
 Engaging with non-Eurocentric epistemologies. 
The first criterion is the recognition of the absence of and the need for 
engagement with non-Eurocentric epistemologies, thus avoiding approaches that enact an 
epistemicidal logic, by which I mean the process by which non-Eurocentric 
epistemologies have been dismissed resulting in their absence within human rights 
discourse.  In operationalizing this criterion, I considered whether a pluriversal 
epistemology of human rights was presented; if the absence of non-Eurocentric 
epistemologies in human rights discourse is addressed; and whether the hierarchical 
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categorization of human rights is discussed. As a reminder to the reader, by pluriversal 
epistemology, I mean an epistemology that recognizes the co-existence and diversity of 
epistemologies and rejects attempts to universalize an abstract universal epistemology. 
Grosfoguel (2007) contends that decolonization requires critical dialogue between 
epistemologies, and that intention of this dialogue is the creation of a pluriversal 
epistemology rather than an abstract universal epistemology.  
The research revealed that only four of the professors present a pluriversal 
epistemology of human rights in their courses, and the rest either do not subscribe to this 
epistemology themselves or only present a universal epistemology in their courses.  The 
four professors who explicitly stated that they present a pluriversal epistemology of 
human rights in their courses and provided explanations that centered on a disbelief in 
any universals, the way in which the conceptualization of rights have been overtaken by 
some states, and a lack of global consensus. Professor M, an anthropologist, insisted that 
a universal epistemology was not possible: “Universals? No. I don’t believe there is such 
a thing. No, human complexity is so widely divergent that we can’t possibly have a single 
perspective about that.” She contended anthropologists don’t believe in universals. Rather 
than an overarching rejection of the idea of universals, Professor K reasoned that human 
rights have not been achieved by consensus, explaining: “I engage students with literature 
that challenges that it is not universal…it has been co-opted skillfully by states, and 
therefore, has been de-radicalized and is not as critical of power as it could be.” Professor 
D concurred explaining that the lack of consensus on human rights requires a pluriversal 
epistemology: 
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 I have them look at the result of the Vienna meeting in 1995 where you get the 
canonical statement that human rights are universal…this is the canonical western 
view of human rights, but it is not the view that in fact elites around the world 
share. There is not a consensus on this… in practice it is not so…”  
 
Though these four professors readily and explicitly confirmed their belief in pluriversal 
epistemology the majority of professors did not. Rather they fell into one of three 
positions: they chose not to label their epistemology, they presented both epistemologies 
in their courses or emphasized neither, or they presented a solely universal epistemology 
of human rights. 
There were five professors that were not inclined to label their epistemological 
presentation of human rights as universal or pluriversal. In these cases, the professors 
seemed to fall somewhere along a continuum of epistemology. Professor U explained that 
she rejects any epistemology of human rights that does not acknowledge the importance 
of cultural context. She maintained that human rights norms should be understood as 
universal due to their wide ratification, but at the same time, contended that there is and 
should be space for “implementation of these norms in ways that are culturally specific.” 
She felt that human rights is able to accommodate a wide range of approaches to norms. 
Other professors choose not to present either epistemology; instead they focus their 
students’ attention on understanding the claims of universalism but also critiquing them. 
For example, Professor P doesn’t present a universal or pluriversal epistemology of 
human rights but problematizes the concept of universality. She explained that she has 
her students examine the concept of universality through a lens of critique. She stated, 
“First of all, we look at when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted, 
and who was at the table, who was not at the table.” She goes on to explain that she also 
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has always “had a debate on is the concept of universal liberating or oppressive.” 
Professor N, likewise, addresses universality in his course but talks about it “as one of the 
challenges of an international human rights system”. He described how he engages with 
this challenge in the classroom: 
We discuss the manner in which the Charter was concluded, how the initial 
 documents, like the UDHR for example, were drafted and adopted…and talk 
 through what does it mean to be universal at the at that point in time and how 
 universal can [human rights] be. 
 
Professor L offered his assessment of human rights as “contextual”, “interpretable”, 
“segmented”, “chopped up”, and “prioritized” to explain to students that while human 
dignity can be a universal concept, rights as established in documents like the UDHR are 
too specific to be considered universal. Lastly, Professor G explained that he does not 
believe that human rights have a single epistemology and believes that human rights can 
“fit in with other worldviews and ideologies, and frameworks” and “leaves the door open 
to multiple sources of authority”, but does did not indicate that he specifically labels the 
epistemology he presents as universal or pluriversal. Thus, while each of these professors 
addresses the epistemology of human rights, there seems to be some hesitancy to embrace 
labeling their presentation as universal or pluriversal. This begs the question as to 
whether universalism versus pluralism is a false dichotomy and whether speaking of it as 
such reifies what is actually a colonial binary. The presentation of binary epistemologies 
may be useful, particularly in introductory human rights courses; however, as suggested 
by Nakata, Nakata, Keech, & Bolt (2012) “teaching the practice of…suspension of pre-
suppositions and suspension of foregone conclusions while engaging the implications of 
the knowledge interface” may be a better way of engaging “students in the politics of 
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knowledge production and ultimately the politics of their location and social 
reproduction” (p. 135). 
Eight of the professors presented both a universal and pluriversal 
conceptualization of human rights epistemology in their courses, or they did not 
emphasize either.  These professors provided varied reasons for doing so. Five of these 
professors explained that they present both epistemologies of human rights noting the 
importance of allowing students to make their own determinations.  Professor S reasoned, 
“one right answer is kind of …a heroic way of looking at philosophy.” He went on to 
explain, “Sometimes a universal view of human rights is really helpful. Sometimes a 
pluriversal perspective on human rights is very helpful… students should be exposed to 
both perspectives and should be able to deconstruct both perspectives.” He believes that 
just as he has, his students “will go from being pluriversal…to universal and vice versa,” 
suggesting that epistemologies need not be fixed. Six additional professors affirmed that 
they present both epistemologies as well. According to Professor F, many of his students 
“go away with a commitment to think through [questions of universality versus 
pluriversality] in a serous way” and that the students wrestle with this issue. Several of 
the professors explained their reasoning for presenting both epistemologies. Professor Q 
explained: “My approach to human rights emphasizes the fact that they’re a contested 
signifier, and that…human rights change and evolve over time, that their meaning is 
never settled.” Professor B’s decision to present both is centered on the importance she 
places on engaging with students about the potential effects of making universalist 
judgments and the multiplicity of human rights even though she adheres to a universal 
epistemology of human rights. Similarly, Professor E also believes in a universal 
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epistemology, but considers hers a “light” version in that she believes human rights 
knowledge and interpretation is very cultural and recognizes that it is only the Global 
South that is asked to make compromises. It is these premises that she presents in her 
courses. In each of these cases, perhaps Grosfoguel’s requirement that dialogue regarding 
the differing epistemologies is, in a sense, being met; however, whether or not students 
arrive at a conceptualization of human rights epistemology as pluriversal seems 
uncertain.  
The final four professors presented only a universal epistemology of human rights 
in their courses. Some were very firm in their belief in universalism while others were 
willing to introduce critiques of universalism. Two of the professors, Professors T and O, 
asserted that human rights documents like the UDHR and Covenants defined human 
rights and can only be understood within those parameters. Professor T explained her 
adherence to a universal epistemology in this way:  
I’m a lawyer, made to look at primary documents and court decisions. Remember 
my major training was as a lawyer, not as a human rights or international law 
person. So my training tells me to look at documents and to look at the definitive 
interpretations of those documents given by the tribunals who have the authority 
to do that. That’s where the content comes from. That’s the way in which I 
approach it in my law classes. I don’t know if there’s another place where it 
would come from or not.  
 
Though seven of the professors that I interviewed were also lawyers, none of them firmly 
believed in a universal epistemology of human rights or were as beholden to human 
rights documents. Thus, her response seems idiosyncratic and such responses are a barrier 
to the adoption of decolonial approaches throughout the field.  Finally, two other 
professors adhere to the concept of a universal epistemology but believe that this 
conceptualization is challenging due to some need for cultural interpretation and changes 
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to human rights that have taken place over time. For example, Professor C believes that 
there are universal norms and standards but that “application of the specific norms is 
flexible”. The absence of exposure in these courses to the ways in which certain 
epistemologies are lacking in human rights discourse and international legal documents is 
prohibitive to decolonization; thus, the barrier that this absence presents must undergo 
greater examination.  
Another aspect of this first criterion of a decolonial approach to human rights is 
the recognition of the hierarchical categorization of human rights knowledge which 
includes the absence of non-Eurocentric epistemologies in human rights discourse. The 
coloniality of power is based upon a racial and ethnic hierarchy and structures of power 
which privilege Western worldviews and that have remained globally entrenched and 
have determined who gets to speak, what can be spoken about, and what should be 
excluded within human rights discourse (Grosfoguel, 2006; Baxi 2002). If we consider 
the coloniality of power is about the politics of epistemology, then its important to 
consider the political nature of these hierarchies and whether and how their 
embeddedness within human rights determines who gets to define human rights, whose 
rights should be protected, and who gains in supporting human rights institutions.     
All but two of the professors believe that hierarchies exist within human rights 
and confirmed that they address those hierarchies in their courses. They asserted that 
hierarchies are embedded within human rights include personhood, knowledge 
production, human rights interpretation, and human rights implementation. Many agreed 
that the West has been overwhelmingly influential in what is prioritized. Professor V 
went as far to say that human rights rhetoric is the “façade of capitalism”. In order to 
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address the question of hierarchies, these professors include the topic in their class 
discussions or introduced the concept of hierarchies through course readings. Professors 
explained that the importance of addressing these hierarchies lies in understanding how 
power dynamics affect human rights, the ways in which normative documents have been 
influenced by particular states, how hierarchical categorization results in the needs of 
some people going unheard or ignored, the lack of relevancy human rights will have if 
hierarchies are not addressed, and finally, the very important questions of whose voices 
are privileged and whom are human rights for. Professor Q explained the consequences 
of hierarchies in this way: 
I think that the consequences are much like the consequences for all forms of 
knowledge in that they become…there’s a dependency for them to become more 
instrumentalized toward the interests of those in positions of power. They tend to 
become utilized in ways that exclude certain perspectives and voices and privilege 
others. They tend to become mechanisms for accumulating and justifying unequal 
distributions of resources, and they are susceptible, therefore, to all the abuses and 
perversions that we’ve seen over the past two decades in particular. 
 
Professor E concurred explaining that she believes it takes “vast amount of privilege to 
think that hierarchies don’t exist” and that these hierarchies “reflect the values of society” 
and create “vast amounts of human suffering and create division”. Professor F added 
another consequence explaining: 
A variety of concerns that relate to people’s fundamental needs and desires for 
happiness and justice and relations in their communities don’t get heard, get 
ignored, or if heard, they are shoehorned into conceptual constructs that are alien 
to them.  
 
Despite so many of the professors addressing the hierarchical categorization of 
human rights knowledge, there were two professors who did not address this topic in 
their courses even though they believed questions of hierarchy were important and that a 
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de facto hierarchy exists. Professor A did not explain why he does not present a hierarchy 
but was quickly able to provide an example pointing to the right to development which 
developing countries tried to assert but whose declaration “never made it off the paper it 
was written on”. As a consequence, he admitted that only certain groups and nations get 
to decide what gets to be human rights. Professor B said she did not address the 
hierarchical categorization explicitly. She said it is only addressed via some of the 
framing of the readings she assigns. However, she did speak of the consequence of this 
hierarchy affecting the development of human rights norm creation, resolutions, and soft 
law. For these two professors, and the others who do not address hierarchies of 
knowledge, a key piece to decolonization is missing from their pedagogy. They seem to 
recognize the great impact of these hierarchies, but have left them out of purposeful 
discussion. Grosfoguel (2007) warns that hierarchies of superior and inferior knowledge 
are perpetuated when the ego politics of knowledge is concealed. In other words, it might 
be that students come away with assumptions about where human rights knowledge 
comes from and, therefore, could conclude that there is no hierarchy resulting in the 
exclusion of subaltern voices, needs, concerns. 
Considering which identities are authoritative. 
 
The second criterion of a decolonial approach is the consideration of which social 
identities are deemed authoritative. In operationalizing this criterion, I consider whether 
power relations and their impact on human rights is a course topic within human rights 
courses. This criterion differs from the first in that professors focused on power relations 
as related to not only personhood but also political systems, economic systems, and law.  
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A major tenet of decolonial theory is that power imbalances and patterns of world 
power have maintained colonial hierarchies of race, class and gender (Quijano, 2000). 
Coloniality of power involves the epistemological domination of Western and 
Eurocentric knowledge, and in particular, knowledge that comes from geopolitical spaces 
dominated by white, upper class men.  Classifications and depictions of gender, class, 
and race maintain colonial power relations, and this has meant that human rights 
epistemology has excluded specific bodies, spaces and places (Grosfoguel, 2007). 
Therefore, in decolonial human rights courses, it is vital to decolonization that power 
relations are acknowledged, especially those social identities that are deemed 
authoritative.  
All of the professors interviewed assigned readings that engaged issues of power 
relations to some extent in their courses but varied considerably in terms of the types of 
power relations they addressed. I specifically asked how patriarchy, racism, sexism, and 
capitalism shape human rights discourse. Some professors address all of these aspects of 
power relations while others only address one or two. Overwhelmingly, professors 
introduce power relations within the frameworks of sexism, patriarchy, and racism most 
often. Some professors cited ageism, classism, capitalism, neoliberalism, and colonialism 
as topics that are also addressed but much less frequently than the aforementioned. 
Twelve of the professors provided syllabi that reflected the inclusion of at least one 
reading that addressed power relations. Following is a sampling of some of the readings 
included and the number of syllabi in which they were found:  
• Makau Mutua: “Savages, Victims, and Saviors” (6)  
• Balakrishnan Rojagopal: International Law from Below: Development, Social 
Movements and Third World (2) 
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• Amartya Sen: Development as Freedom (2) 
• Martha Nussbaum: “Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings” (2) 
• Boaventura de Sousa Santos: If God were a Human Rights Activist (2) 
• John Gerard Ruggie: Just Business: Multinational corporations and Human 
Rights (1) 
• Deborah Spar: “Spotlight on the Bottom Line: How Corporations Export Human 
Rights” (1) 
• Mahmood Monshipouri: “Islamism, Secularism, and Human Rights in the Middle 
East” (1) 
• Kimberle Crenshaw: “From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking 
Intersectionally about Women, Race, and Social Control (1) 
• Terrance Loomis: “Indigenous Populations and Sustainable Development: 
Building on Indigenous Approaches to Holistic, Self-Determined Development” 
(1)  
 
 Though thirteen of the professors did include at least one reading pertaining to 
power relations, only six of the syllabi provided reflected a heavier emphasis on power 
relations by including three or more readings. Although the number of readings 
incorporated does not seem to demonstrate prioritization of readings on power relations, 
all of the professors asserted that power relations is a topic addressed in class. The 
interviews indicated that though students are not reading about it, discussion of power 
relations and their impact on human rights is taking place. This is important because 
discussion of power relations can be a critique of human rights because discussion of it 
recognizes its (intended) absence. 
Also noteworthy is that although decolonial theory emphasizes the ways in which 
hierarchies of race, class, and gender have been maintained through the coloniality of 
power (Quijano, 2000), even in modern liberal societies, neoliberalism and colonialism 
are each addressed by just one professor. The absence of the inclusion of these topics 
perhaps reveals a disconnect between why the hierarchies of race, class, and gender exist, 
the extent to which they are embedded in other ideologies, like neoliberalism, 
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colonialism, and coloniality, and how they are perpetuated. Their absence also implies 
that even within discussion of power relations, there is a de facto hierarchy. It is worth 
considering what it means that these other types of power relations are much less 
frequently addressed in relation to human rights. 
In explaining their presentation of the impact of power relations on human rights, 
professors offered examples of how they introduce power relations. One way is to 
highlight the ways in which dominant countries benefit from power relations. For 
example, Professor R explained that he discusses with his students how “the United 
States [has] used human rights as part of their international strategy to have more 
influence and have more power in the world.” Another way is to discuss the ways in 
which powerful countries have also monopolized the issues undertaken by the 
international community. Professor K cites the “belated interest of the international 
community to address and acknowledge that issues of sexual violence, domestic violence, 
and rape are human rights issues.” In other cases, students are asked to continually keep 
in mind issues surrounding race, gender, and power as they work through topics 
involving human rights instruments and issues. For example, Professor N asks his 
students to keep the question of power relations in mind as they discuss the different 
categories of rights as well as how “the system and manners in which human rights are 
both prescribed and enforced.” Additionally, some professors use particular course topics 
to bring up issues related to power relations. For example, Professor U introduces 
capitalism when covering international economic law and introduces racism when 
discussing the topic of truth and reconciliation.  Professor M examines power relations 
   123 
with his classes through discussion relating to the work and influence of Western NGOs, 
which he believes is questionable:  
Their good purposes actually add up to… very little, because they’re not actually 
going up to the people themselves to ask them what they think they need. Instead, 
we’re running in with this ‘Let’s rescue people who need our help,’ which is a 
very, very Western thing to be doing and that is deeply, deeply problematic. 
 
 Finally, some professors try to keep the topic of power relations at the forefront of 
their classes. Professor O explained that he tells his students from the first day of class 
that “the majority of this world is not white, and it’s not rich, and its’ not free, and the 
struggle for human rights has to be seen from beyond the lens of white Westerners.” 
Likewise, Professor V explained that he addresses power relations all the time by talking 
about UN human rights conventions, which he believes easily lend themselves to 
discussion of patriarchy, ageism, sexism, racism, and classism. Besides Professor V, none 
of the professors in the course of their interviews referred to particular readings or other 
course materials they use to introduce the topic of power relations. Instead, the main 
method these professors seem to use to address power relations is class discussion. 
Though class discussion is not a decolonial pedagogical leap, it offers a starting place 
from which professors could present epistemologies outside the Western/Eurocentric 
canon (Grosfoguel, 2007). It is not clear from the interviews, however, whether that is the 
case.  
Also of significance were the explanations that some professors gave for why they 
do not thoroughly discuss power relations in their courses. Both the lack of time and the 
survey theme of their human rights course played a factor, as did the knowledge that 
power relations are more thoroughly taken up in other courses required in their human 
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rights program. Professor U explained that the incorporation of power relations “is 
somewhat limited by the fact that it’s a survey course”. She explained: “My ability to 
drill down on any one of these issues is limited because we only do a day on whatever 
issue…but I do try to bring it out where I can.” Professor P highlighted the importance of 
including the topic of power relations in her department but explained that she relies on 
other courses to address particular power relation frameworks. She explained: 
A number of the students who take human rights education are taking critical race 
theory and praxis, and then we have a class called gender and globalization that’s 
part of the human rights concentration, so in other classes, gender and patriarchy 
are particularly addressed in that class. That’s not an underlying framework of the 
class I teach because we try to make sure we’re not being repetitive. 
 
Time constraints and a desire to avoid repetitiveness are common challenges in any 
course. However, it speaks to a pedagogy in which a process of “add and mix” has been 
adopted. In the case of decolonial pedagogy, an “add and mix” approach is not ideal. In 
order to achieve a truly decolonial pedagogical approach, decolonization needs to be the 
underlying theme that influences all other pedagogical choices rather than an afterthought 
that may not fit into an already set schedule or a topic that can be introduced but does not 
require repetition.  
The effort by all of the professors to touch on the ways that power relations 
impact human rights, albeit to different degrees, is constructive toward achieving a 
decolonial approach; however, given the significance of this issue to decolonial theory, 
there is certainly much room for growth in this criterion. Power relations are important to 
decolonization because the hierarchies established based on them result in “situated” 
epistemologies that are Eurocentric but positioned as uncontestable and universal 
(Grosfoguel, 2007; Mignolo, 2009).  Thorough discussion of the impact of power 
   125 
relations on human rights is necessary because without it we cannot begin to understand 
the extent to which voices have been silenced, or construct a non-Eurocentric theory of 
human rights (Barreto, 2012).  
 Avoiding solely emphasizing Eurocentric discourse. 
 
The third criterion of a decolonial approach is the avoidance of the sole emphasis 
on hegemonic Eurocentric discourses. Though similar to the criterion of consideration of 
which identities are authoritative, this criterion focuses on the types of materials and the 
critiques that are included rather than whether power relations is a topical component of 
the course. Both criteria are important to a decolonial pedagogical approach. Therefore, I 
consider whether the majority of course materials are centered on documents created by 
the United Nations and whether critiques of the human rights framework are included as 
course topics and materials. 
Doxtater (2004), Al-Daraweesh and Snauwaert (2013), and Coysh (2014) stress 
the importance of avoiding the sole emphasis of hegemonic discourses in human rights, 
which are often accepted without recognition that they have been privileged due to their 
origination in Eurocentric thought. Mitigation of these discourses is necessary and can be 
accomplished through the inclusion of discourses and knowledge that emerge from 
subaltern positions (Escobar, 2004; Grosfoguel, 2006; Alcoff, 2011). Al-Daraweesh and 
Snauwaert (2013) and Coysh (2014), in particular, have contended that human rights 
education suffers from an over-reliance on international treaties and conventions as well 
as UN-originated discourse. Human rights discourse as well as UN documents are 
genealogically tied to a Eurocentric theory of rights (Barreto, 2012). As a result, within 
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human rights education, the decentralization of UN documents along with the inclusion 
of critiques from subaltern spaces is needed for decolonization.  
Analysis of syllabi and interviews demonstrates that many of their courses are 
focused on UN documents or that they are incorporated extensively. Of the professors, 
thirteen attested that these documents are a significant component of their course 
material. Professors cited the importance of these documents as the foundation of and 
fundamental to the international human rights system and the necessity of embedding 
them in their courses. Professor J articulated exactly why he emphasizes UN documents, 
particularly treaties, in his courses: “International treaties are the bedrock of the 
international human rights system. No international human rights regime exists without 
these treaties. Students are made to understand this.” For Professor U, the inclusion of 
these documents stems from a desire to help students think critically about international 
law topics: 
I cover the fundaments. I want them to know some basic things like the fact that 
the UDHR isn’t a treaty. I want them in some way to be intelligent consumes of 
news about international law. To be that they do need to know some of those 
fundamentals. 
 
Several professors connected their inclusion of these documents to their objective of 
encouraging students to critically consider these documents. For example, Professor P 
explained that although she includes human rights treaties and instruments in her classes, 
she has her students examine them critically: 
We look at the limits of the human rights instruments, what they can accomplish, 
and what they can’t do. So, I think we don’t have this perspective that it’s all 
about the treaties, that it’s all magical, at all. So, we critique the framework and 
practice. 
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Professor A explained that he brings in UN conventions because he wants his students to 
“consider how people think about and use these documents” and also to think about what 
“different social movements [are] doing with human rights”. Professor D described his 
process for introducing UN documents like treaties, covenants and declarations 
explaining, “Students read and they discuss them practically article-by-article and the 
discussion centers on issues, ambiguities, internal conflicts, and problems of 
implementation and execution that revolve around those articles.” Others explained that 
they used treaties, conventions, and declarations in combination with case law to 
demonstrate their use, as well as address analytical questions that arise from their creation 
and implementation. Professor P described her use of treaties and case studies in this 
way: 
This year I have three case studies, and we spent two class sessions on each case 
study. The first class would be looking a lot at the human rights instruments and 
treaties and so on as connected to the issue. And then the second class, more or 
less, is more focused on the pedagogy. So then in their final project they have to 
identify a human rights issue which is meaningful to them, and then they have to 
also do research including making the connections to the international treaties. 
 
Professor K takes on the analytical aspect of the creation and implementation of these 
documents with his students:  
I spend quite a bit of time in my courses discussing how, in addition to structural 
problems let’s say within human rights discourse, how in implementing it while 
you are starting with the best of intentions, you can end up doing more harm than 
good. Kind of the road to hell is paved with good intentions. And I discuss cases 
and situations in which this happened so that the students don’t leave my course 
in a kind of starry-eyed mode. That we have found the tool that will help us 
empower people, to educate people, to help them move forward because even 
sometimes with the best of intentions, a lot of damage is being done. 
 
In analyzing the syllabi, it was very common for professors to assign at least one 
UN document per class that students would need to read or analyze. There were two 
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professors would explicitly stated that they don’t specifically teach or use UN documents 
in their courses much, if at all. Professor M explained that he works “more from an 
anthropological perspective” of human rights, and as a result, does not teach students 
about treaties. He explained further:  
the articles of anthropologists writing on indigenous people’s human rights, for 
example, do include reference to [UN documents], but the students will get those 
in the basic human rights courses… I don’t specifically teach them those things. 
 
Professor F, a law and political science professor, also refrains from incorporating many 
UN documents but provided very different reasoning explaining, “I don’t use them much 
anymore because I reached the conclusion that … with the treaties there is not a lot of 
ground for the serious analytical work I do.” Though I will address this in greater detail 
in the next chapter, it bares mentioning here that arguably, each of the professors’ 
disciplinary training had some impact on their presentation of human rights as well as 
their inclusion and use of critiques of human rights. However, in particular, Professor M 
whose educational training is in anthropology, Professor V, whose educational training is 
in social work, and Professors U and I, whose training are in law and sociology 
respectively, spoke specifically about how their disciplinary training has impacted the 
way they teach their human rights courses. The analysis of each of the professors’ 
disciplinary training does not reveal any particular themes about their pedagogical 
choices; however, for some professors their educational discipline and for others the 
experiences they have gained through their years in the field of human rights have clearly 
influenced their pedagogical approach to teaching human rights. 
With regard to types of course materials professors are incorporating, it is 
important to note that decolonial theorists do not advocate for the elimination of UN 
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documents in course materials. Rather, they argue that they should not be central to 
human rights education, and that when presented they should be met with course 
materials that come from non-Eurocentric and subaltern epistemologies. Grosfoguel 
(2007) emphasizes that “diverse critical epistemic projects” need to be in dialogue with 
each other (p. 212) and asserts that “epistemic diversity” needs to be “incorporated into 
necessary inter-epistemic dialogues in order to produce decolonial, pluriversal” fields of 
study (2012, p. 84). In order for epistemic projects to speak to each other, there needs to 
be discussion regarding what each project represents and how the course materials fit into 
these projects. For this reason, the inclusion of critiques of the human rights framework, 
particularly that of the need for decolonization, is a necessary component to decolonizing 
human rights education. Thus, this criterion does not solely analyze human rights courses 
by their reliance on UN documents but also the extent to which they critique the human 
rights framework in order for the dialogue to begin.  
 The majority of professors did bring critiques in to their courses. The critiques 
varied in number and type, but cultural relativism and feminism were cited most often 
(by eight and seven professors respectively). In order to give some perspective as to how 
these critiques are addressed, some examples from professors’ syllabi are included below.  
 One of the professors, Professor R, teaches a course on cultural relativism and 
focuses the course on critiques from Asian cultures. Within this course, he incorporates 
several readings on cultural relativism from: 
• Bilahari Kausikan; “Asia’s Different Standard” and “An East Asian Approach to 
Human Rights” 
• Partha Chatterjee; Nationalist Through and the Colonial World: A Derivative 
Discourse? 
• Joanne Bauer and Daniel Bell; The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights 
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• Daniel Bell, Andrew Nathan and Ilan Peleg; Cultural Differences and Values: 
Human Rights and the Challenge of Relativism 
• Neil Englehart; “Rights and Culture in the Asian Values Argument: The Rise and 
Fall of Confucian Ethics in Singapore” 
• Mahmood Monshipouri; Islam, Securalism, and Human Rights in the Middle East 
• Martha Nussbaum; “Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings” 
 
In a course on indigenous people and culture, Professor M includes readings from: 
• John Barker; Ancestral Lines: The Maisin of Papua New Guinea and the Fate of 
the Rainforest 
• Karen Engle; The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, 
and Strategy 
• Dorothy Hodgson; Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous: Postcolonial Politics in 
a Neoliberal World 
• Elvira Pulitano; Indigenous Rights in the Age of the UN Declaration 
 
In an introductory human rights course, Professor K includes a reading from Abdullabi 
Ahmed An-Naim - Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives.  
 Feminist critiques are included in Professor E’s introductory human rights course 
through the inclusion of work by Martha Nussbaum - “A Woman Seeking Justice”. 
Professor Q incorporates a reading by Anne Griffiths in his contemporary debates course: 
“Gendering Culture: Toward a Plural Perspective on Kwena Women’s Rights”. Professor 
P incorporates Kimberle Crenshaw’s work, “From Private Violence to Mass 
Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally about Women, Race, and Social Control” in her 
human rights education course. Professor A includes the work of Muna Ndulo- African 
Customary Law, Customs, and Women’s Rights; and Professor B incorporates two 
feminist readings. The first is by Hope Lewis, “Embracing Complexity: Human Rights in 
Critical Race Feminist Perspective”, and the second by Johanna Bond, “Intersecting 
Identities and Human Rights: The Example of Romani Women’s Reproductive Rights”, 
in her feminism and human rights course.   
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 Other critiques cited by more than one professor in their interviews included post-
colonial, liberal imperial, and religious (Islamic) critiques. Professors A, G, H, and S all 
present post-colonial critiques in their courses.19 Professors B, F, and G incorporate an 
Islamic critique of human rights.20 Professors D and L present a liberal imperialist 
critique. Critiques cited by just one professor included the mythology of international 
law, judicial romanticism, the immutability of human rights, colonialism, and 
decolonialism.   
Professors who do incorporate critiques provided reasons such as the desire to 
help student improve their critical thinking skills; to encourage students to view issues 
from critical perspectives; to engage students in norm-contestation; to problematize 
human rights ideologies; to help students understand the oppression and exploitation that 
occurs based on people’s race, class, or gender; to acknowledge the short-comings of 
human rights instruments; to introduce debates as to what human rights should be; to 
address structural problems within human rights discourse; and to help students 
understand that the regime of human rights is a work in progress. Professor F was 
particularly articulate regarding his purpose including critiques. He explained that when 
critiques are not addressed there are dangerous consequences:  
Students will go off in the world of human rights and will frequently end up 
simply adopting relatively passively a variety of attitudes and conclusions about 
what human rights does and doesn’t include, or how much pluralism can be 
tolerated in the system without ever really thinking through the problem. They 
                                                
19 David Hollinsworth; “Decolonizing Indigenous Disability in Australia” 
20 Azizah Yahia al-Hibri; Muslim Women’s Rights in the Global Village: Challenges and     
  Opportunities 
  Madhavi Sunder; “A Culture of One’s Own” 
  Khaled Abou El Fadl; “The Human Rights Commitment in Modern Islam” 
  Abolfazi Ezzati; “An Islamic Analysis of the Concept of Human rights and UNUDHR” 
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take for granted certain answers that are not obvious. And I think that the second 
problem, which derives from the first, is that you often end up seeing what are 
from the perspective from other parts of the world could be described loosely as 
imperialistic attitudes about human rights on the part of relatively wealthy 
privileged western elites without even an awareness that what they’re asserting, in 
fact, may be sort of quite contentious and particular and not as universal as they 
assume it is.  
 
 Of these practices, engaging students in norm contestation and helping students 
understand the oppression and exploitation of people based on hierarchies are 
representative of a decolonial human rights approach. However, the other practices do 
represent a critical human rights approach, which we might see as foundational to any 
critique including that of a decolonial critique. Critical thinking allows for the 
interrogation of assumptions and the recognition of absences pertaining to knowledge and 
voices. Critical approaches, however, should not be understood as identical to utilizing  
critical pedagogy. Whereas critical pedagogy stemming from critical theory does not 
account for violence that stems from imperialism and is humanist in its approach to 
liberation (Zembylas, 2017), critical approaches offer a critical examination of and a 
critical relationship to a Eurocentric epistemology of human rights.   
Of the professors who do not incorporate critiques, two gave very specific reasons 
for not incorporating them. Professor T spoke mostly of her reasoning for not including 
cultural relativist or feminist critiques. She explained the she believes rights are “those 
things that are necessary elements to be a human being and to be a person. That doesn’t 
change from society to society. So this whole cultural relativism issue, I think in terms of 
the real issues of human rights- it’s not about culture…what makes that human being 
inviolable doesn’t change from culture to culture.” She later referred to this critique as 
“bogus”. She also explained that she does not address feminist critiques in her courses 
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because she thinks it is “stupid”. She qualified this response by highlighting how the 
UDHR contains a provision about non-discrimination that specifically mentions women 
as do other treaties and that a treaty such as the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women is unnecessary. Another professor, Professor O, 
had very different reasoning for the lack of inclusion of critiques citing more opportunity 
to cover such topics at the graduate level as most of the students in his program had plans 
to attend graduate programs:  
The undergraduate, it’s an introduction. My graduate students, they are closer to 
taking their interest in this into their careers. My undergraduates, most of them are 
headed off to grad school, law school. They’ll have more opportunity to get it at 
the graduate level than at the undergraduate level. The course is so packed…it’s 
just a struggle to it all.  
 
 This overview of critiques highlights four important points. First, the professors 
interviewed represent sixteen different colleges and universities across the United States 
that offer human rights training. Sixteen professors provided at least one syllabus from a 
human rights course that they teach. Out of all the professors interviewed, sixteen 
incorporate at least one critique into their courses. Eleven of them incorporate more than 
one, and six of them incorporate at least four critiques. All four of the professors with a 
disciplinary background in political science incorporated critiques, and each incorporated 
two or more critiques. Of the nine professors with a background in law, eight of them 
incorporated critiques. Five of these professors, however, only included one critique, 
which was a cultural relativist critique.21 This analysis points to an under-representation 
of critiques, and thus, the need to incorporate more critiques that represent subaltern and 
                                                
21 A table containing the professors’ disciplinary training and the critiques they 
incorporate can be found in Appendix D 
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non-Eurocentric epistemologies of human rights, in particular the inclusion of decolonial 
critiques. Along with the inclusion of critiques of power relations, the inclusion of 
critiques is the other main vehicle for introducing students to non-Eurocentric 
epistemologies. 
The second point is that six of the professors do not incorporate any critiques into 
their courses and another five only incorporate one critique. However, twelve of the 
professors attested to presenting a pluriversal epistemology in their courses.  While it 
might be possible to present a pluriversal epistemology without presenting specific 
critiques, it seems at odds to the conceptualization of a pluriversal epistemology that so 
few included more than two identifiable critiques.  
Third, as stated in a previous chapter, cultural relativism and feminist critiques are 
widely known and referred to within human rights discourse; however, there are many 
other critiques of the human rights framework, some of which are being used by the 
professors such as post-colonial, liberal imperialism, colonial, neocolonial, Asian, and 
Islamic critiques. The very limited inclusion of critiques does not allow for the kind of 
dialogue needed for a recognition of the impact and possibilities that could arise from a 
decolonial perspective on human rights and from a perspective that recognizes human 
rights as a discourse of coloniality. The presentation of one critique against the dominant 
Eurocentric discourse of human rights limits the degree to which students understand the 
extent or variety of subaltern epistemologies of human rights that exist.   
The fourth important point that emerges is the scarcity of critiques of colonialism. 
Only four professors listed the inclusion of a post-colonial critique and there were no 
professors who mentioned including a decolonial critique. Although the inclusion of 
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other critiques from subaltern spaces is important to decolonization, the absence of a 
critique that specifically underscores the impact of coloniality and the subsequent 
marginalization of non-Eurocentric voices reveals a place where new approaches can be 
developed and implemented for curricular and pedagogical creativity; where discussion 
can arise within departments among faculty about the relationship between coloniality 
and human rights; and where graduate student training can be developed. Identifying the 
reason for the lack of this critique is important and should be addressed by decolonial 
theorists concerned with human rights epistemology. As a question for the long future: Is 
it possible to do the work of decolonization without understanding its complexity from a 
decolonial point of view, without considering coloniality as the context in which 
questions about the efficacy, function, and limitations, among other questions, are asked? 
Tejeda and Espinoza (2002) contend that it is not and that decolonization must involve 
problematizing a curriculum’s “complicity with neocolonial domination and exploitation” 
(p. 8).   
 But what does problematizing even mean? In this dissertation I have introduced 
some initial means of problematizing curriculum, and to a lesser extent, pedagogy, as a 
process characterized by practices, specific perspectives and thematic discussions, 
including the relationship between theory and practice within human rights law and 
teaching, as well as considerations for unpacking what complicity with exploitation and 
domination mean on a localized level of higher education. In addition, because 
considering what decolonization means for the ideas and processes that reproduce the 
structures of an institution, and what the possibilities of asking questions about 
coloniality and power are in an institution like the university, there is a direct relationship 
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between the training of professors-as-grad-students and the (possible) continued learning. 
Such that, the process of considering meanings of decolonization and coloniality in 
relation to HR teaching/curriculum is not severed from the experiences of people 
considering the impact of coloniality/decolonization on both how they teach/research, 
approaches to justice and redress, etc.; and most significantly, perhaps, situating 
knowledge production, representation, and circulation (the main job of the professoriate) 
within a context that asks these epistemic questions. 
Including subaltern knowledge.  
 
 The final criterion of a decolonial approach is the inclusion of subaltern 
knowledge. Subaltern knowledge does not assume a critique; however, it is unclear how 
knowledge is subaltern without the inclusion of a critique. Yet, subaltern knowledge is 
not simply critical knowledge or non-European knowledge. The inclusion of subaltern 
knowledge as a category of criteria refers to that knowledge which emerges from a 
subaltern epistemic location geopolitically. In operationalizing this criterion, I consider 
whether course materials by subaltern authors and theorists are included in the course 
materials. In order to expose how Eurocentric epistemologies subjugate marginalized 
voices, decolonial theory proposes that subalternized, non-Eurocentric epistemologies 
from different geopolitical contexts be included in human rights education (Escobar, 
2004). This inclusion allows the subaltern epistemic project to emerge and to dialogue 
with that of the Eurocentric project revealing the hierarchy of knowledge that has 
excluded many voices. Knowledge about human rights must extend beyond the Western 
and Eurocentric canon in order to heal the colonial wound, which “refers to racism and 
sexism and the social classifications that ensue from them” (Mignolo, 2017, para. 23) 
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making certain epistemologies and lives disposable (Grosfoguel, 2007; Vazquez & 
Mignolo, 2013). The lack of contribution from subaltern epistemologies has multiple 
effects on human rights. For example, one of the effects is that people feel a lack of 
ownership of the principles of human rights and do not believe that the principles are 
relevant to their lived experiences (Al-Daraweesh and Snauwaert, 2013). Another effect 
is that human rights loses its legitimacy and ability to be transformational (Barreto, 
2012). A third effect is that there is a proliferation of human rights abuses and violations 
and the concerns of the subaltern are ignored and issues are reframed to fit a Eurocentric 
epistemology.   
Here the interviews were somewhat helpful, but the syllabi were also helpful in 
identifying additional course materials that professors were unable to recall or forgot.  
Overall, of the 22 professors, 19 were able to cite, or their syllabi incorporated, at least 
one course material representative of a subaltern perspective on human rights. Similar to 
the data regarding the incorporation of issues related to power relations and critiques to 
their courses, twelve professors did include three or more of these course materials while 
eight included more than five that represented a subaltern perspective. The course 
materials were wide ranging, and there was no overlap in the course materials with the 
exception of Makau wa Mutua’s “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of 
Human Rights”, which was incorporated into courses by six of the professors.  Mutua’s 
article was written in 2001 and has seemingly become, based on its inclusion in so many 
of these professors’ courses, a very popular text as representative of a critique of human 
rights. In brief, Mutua argues that a subtext of human rights discourse is the racialized 
categorization of people into three groups: savages, victims, and saviors. This categorical 
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construction stems from a Eurocentric epistemology that has deemed human rights 
universal and neutral. Only Professor Q contextualized his use of Mutua explaining that 
he uses Mutua’s work to “problematize the kind of distinction between the West and non-
West in discussing human rights…and it’s a different discussion as to whether he’s 
liberal or not. So, what are the boundaries of liberalism, what are the boundaries of the 
West?” I would propose its inclusion may also stem from the accessibility of his 
argument due to his clear examples that demonstrate his categorization of savages, 
victims, and saviors. I also believe his argument resonates within the context of the 
United States and our own racial, colonial, and Eurocentric history. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of his article/critique may be reflective of an effort to present a critique that 
does not require an extensive build-up to be understandable. Many of the professors also 
commented on the lack of time and how difficult it is to fit in everything that they’d like. 
For example, Professor F explained that some critiques, particularly those from the 
Global South are “a step too difficult for an introductory course.” 
In addition to these articles and books, a few of the professors indicated that they 
incorporated documents and case studies from the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights as well as the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights.  Furthermore, some professors did indicate that they showed videos and had guest 
speakers come to their courses that presented a subaltern epistemology.  
 Below, I’ve provided the journal articles and books that professors indicated they 
believed demonstrate a non-Western or a subaltern perspective. Many of these same titles 
were cited early as examples of texts used to present critiques. They fit into other 
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typologies beyond that of subaltern and non-western, but very few would fit into a 
typology of decolonial. There is an absence of the decolonial reflected in this list, and it is 
this absence that is revelatory. There are consequences to the lack of subaltern 
epistemologies, but there are additional consequences to the inclusion of texts whose 
theoretical genealogy is not introduced, possibly not even known, to students. The 
contextualization of decolonial theory within both colonialism and modernity/coloniality 
is a vital component to comprehensibility. It is this perceived lack of need for 
contextualization that I believe leads many professors to choose Mutua’s work as a 
critical exemplar of universality. Consider the impact of Mutua’s argument if it were 
situated within a more robust historical context that, for example, first considered the 
work of Fanon, Césaire, Freire, and Spivak. 
 This list of books is connected in the sense that many are thematic examples of 
critical perspectives/critiques of human rights (feminist, cultural relativist, Islamic, 
indigenous, decolonial, etc). Each selection is illustrative of content that the professor 
believes is important to the discourse/teaching/learning of human rights. Each is also 
representative of the epistemology of human rights that the professors adhere to and 
present in their courses.  
Al-Hibri, “Muslim Women’s Rights in the Global Village:  Challenges and 
 Opportunities.” 
An-Naim, Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus. 
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. 
Barker, “Ancestral Lines: The Maisin of Papua New Guinea and the Fate of the 
 Rainforest.” 
Bolten, “Being “For Others”: Human Rights, Personhood, and Dignity in Sierra 
 Leone.” 
Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? 
Chinkin, & Charlesworth, “The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist 
 Analysis.” 
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de Sousa Santos, If God Were a Human Rights Activist. 
Dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence.” 
Eggers, The Voice of Witness Reader: Ten Years of Amplifying Unheard Voices. 
Engle, “On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
 Peoples in the Context of Human Rights” 
Engle, “The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture and 
 Strategy.” 
Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. 
Enloe, The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire. 
Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our 
 Families. 
Griffiths, “Gendering Culture: Toward a Plural Perspective on Kwena Women’s 
 Rights”. 
Heleta, “Decolonisation of Higher Education: Dismantling Epistemic Violence and 
 Eurocentrism in South Africa”. 
Hopgood, Endtime of Human Rights. 
Kapur, “Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century: Take a Walk on the Dark Side”. 
Kausikan, "An East Asian Approach to Human Rights". 
Lee, “Liberal Rights or/and Confucian Virtues?” 
Lewis, “Embracing Complexity:  Human Rights in Critical Race Feminist  Perspective.” 
Loomis, “Indigenous Populations and Sustainable Development: Building on 
 Indigenous Approaches to Holistic, Self-Determined Development.” 
Magendzo, Pedagogy of human rights education: A Latin American perspective. 
Mahmud, “Geography and International Law: Towards a Postcolonial Mapping”. 
Malek & Hoke, Palestine speaks: Narratives of lives under occupation. 
Masaki, “Recognition or Misrecognition? Pitfalls of Indigenous Peoples’ Free, Prior, 
 and Informed Consent.” 
Meekosha & Soldatic, “Human Rights & the Global South: The case of disability.” 
Meekosha, “Contextualizing Disability: Developing Southern/Global Theory”. 
Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity. 
Monshipouri, Islamism, Secularism, and Human Rights in the Middle East. 
Mutua, “Human Rights International NGOs: A Critical Evaluation”. 
Mutua, “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights”. 
Mutua, “The Ideology of Human Rights,” 
Ndulo, “African Customary Law, Customs, and Women's Rights”. 
Pahuja, “Decolonizing International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the 
 Politics of Universality”. 
Pulitano, “Indigenous Rights in the Age of the UN Declaration” 
Quijano, “Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality” 
Rajagopal, “Counter-hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and 
 Development as a Third World Strategy.” 
Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third 
 World. 
Rieff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis. 
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Rosenblum, “Teaching Human Rights:  Ambivalent Activism, Multiple Discourses, 
 and Lingering Dilemmas.” 
Sachedina, “The Clash of Universalisms”. 
Schweder, “Moral Realism without the Ethnocentrism: Is It Just a List of Empty 
 Truisms”. 
Stamatopoulou, “Taking Cultural Rights Seriously: The Vision of the UN Declaration 
 on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”. 
Weston, “Universalism Versus Cultural Relativism: An Appeal for Respectful 
 Decision-Making”. 
Yang, “Afterword: Will human rights education be decolonizing?” 
 
 Even though all these materials demonstrate contributions to human rights from 
outside the Western or liberal tradition, not all of the authors represent a subaltern voice. 
Rather, some of the authors above are writing about subaltern experiences or 
epistemology even though it is not their personal experience. Decolonization does not 
require that subaltern epistemology is only presented by subaltern voices, but as notes 
Heleta (2016), these non-subaltern voices “cannot be seen as the all-knowing and all-
important canon upon which the human knowledge rests and through which white and 
Western domination is maintained”(para. 23). Subaltern voices need to be given authority 
in sharing their own epistemologies. In addition, consideration of the locus of enunciation 
is relevant (Grosfoguel, 2006) as people “always speak from a particular location within 
power structures” (Grosfoguel, 2008, para. 4). One’s epistemic location is situated by 
their ethnicity, race, gender, and sexual orientation but also “the structures of colonial 
power/knowledge from which the subject speaks” (para. 4). We must consider that the 
knowledge that emerges from a person not situated within a subaltern epistemic location 
is different than the knowledge that emerges from a person who is situated within such a 
location. Furthermore, and of great import, is to what extent voices that are not subaltern 
should be advanced when so many subaltern voices are able to speak and have written 
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extensively of their epistemologies regarding human rights. Is there not a need to listen to 
what the subaltern is saying? 
This is not to say, however - and this point is significant for both what is included 
in a syllabus and the pedagogical approach to engaging material - that anyone situated 
within a subaltern epistemic location will reflect a priori that location within their 
thinking, and the representation of that thinking, much less thinking from a subaltern 
epistemic location. Grosfoguel (2008) explains why in his article “Transmodernity, 
Border Thinking and Global Coloniality”: 
The fact that one is socially located in the oppressed side of power relations does 
not automatically mean that he/she is epistemically thinking from a subaltern 
epistemic location. The success of the modern/colonial world−system consists 
precisely in making subjects that are socially located on the oppressed side of the 
colonial difference think epistemically like the ones in dominant positions. 
Subaltern epistemic perspectives are knowledge coming from below that produces 
a critical perspective of hegemonic knowledge in the power relations involved. I 
am not claiming an epistemic populism where knowledge produced from below is 
automatically an epistemic subaltern knowledge. What I am claiming is that all 
knowledges are epistemically located in the dominant or the subaltern side of the 
power relations and that this is related to the geo− and body−politics of 
knowledge. The disembodied and unlocated neutrality and objectivity of the 
ego−politics of knowledge is a western myth. (para. 4) 
 
Likewise, it is not necessary that knowledge that is epistemically located in subaltern 
power relations must also be socially geopolitically located. Mignolo and Grosfoguel, 
who are cited often in this paper, epistemically think from a subaltern position but are 
geopolitically located at Duke University and the University of California-Berkeley 
respectively.  
 Human rights educators must be very cautious when choosing course materials to 
represent the subaltern perspective and that whenever possible, the subaltern voice should 
speak for itself. I state “whenever possible” because there can be a real challenge to 
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finding international human rights textbooks that present non-Western ways of 
understanding human rights. For professors who opt to use textbooks rather than books or 
articles in their courses, there are few textbooks that take a decolonial approach 
(Aldawood, 2015). When asked, many professors agreed that finding textbooks that 
present critiques or non-Western epistemologies was difficult and provided several 
reasons. Professor A explained that the “canons reflect academia as a whole…other 
voices aren’t being recognized in academia as a whole.” 
 Professor C offered a related reason. He believes that non-Western epistemologies 
are absent because “most of these books are written by Westerners. The authors have a 
Western education and value system and are writing their books for Western students.” 
Another reason provided by Professor F was that “writers are not competent to [include 
other epistemologies] and they have no training in it.” He went on to suggest that most 
texts are  
dominated by the frame of reference of public international law, which has a 
strong orientation toward uniformity which means there is an underlining attitude 
that in order to be credible as a system of international law, it has to be presented 
that way.  
 
Professor I contended that non-Eurocentric epistemologies are absent out of a desire to 
present the  
mainstream view of where the origins of human rights are. The mainstream view 
is grounded in the Western, liberal tradition. This is part of why it is hard to find 
other works – the market confines it – non-western views are also the ‘bonus’ add 
on at this point rather than a main point. 
  
Finally, Professor J offered that  
there is an assumption that non-Western societies have no concepts of human 
rights, and there is therefore no need to examine their ideas. The notion of 
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universality also precludes specific understanding of other ideas of human rights 
since there is a singular notion of universalism at play. Sometimes, it is also due 
to ignorance and the unwillingness to understand what other societies offer.  
 
Thus, human rights professors who value a decolonial approach do face difficulties and 
must carefully examine and evaluate the materials they choose for their courses. 
Readings that are decolonial, even if only incorporated through class discussion, are still 
able to move beyond the ‘Othering’ narrative as their incorporation separates knowledge 
from its embeddness in the colonial matrix of power (Mignolo, 2009).     
Analysis of the interviews and syllabi demonstrates that although the vast 
majority of the professors have not fully undertaken a decolonial approach to their 
pedagogy, or the what/method and how/practice of teaching, many have subscribed to, 
and presented in their courses, a need to engage with some of the tenets of decolonial 
thought, albeit perhaps not labeling them as such. Many of the professors’ remarks reflect 
an understanding of and effects of the hierarchical categorization of human rights 
knowledge. They also believe that discussion of the ways in which power relations shape 
human rights discourse is needed and worth discussion. Others have been very purposeful 
in incorporating subaltern voices and epistemologies into their courses through their 
course materials. In these ways, the professors are actively doing some of the work of 
introducing ideas that include: (1) consideration of what decolonization means, and (2) 
the role of the university in that process of meaning and bringing about the 
transformations that might arise from a context where these ideas are engaged with in 
regard to curricular, pedagogical and graduate training (not mutually exclusive).  
Yet, engaging in some of this work is not decolonization; rather, this work 
encapsulates a part of the processes of decolonization and decoloniality, which are 
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complex. They are complex because they involve critiquing and addressing how human 
rights are taught in the context of coloniality and then implementing curriculum and 
pedagogy that decolonizes; but even more so, the process is complex because the very 
critique that decoloniality puts forth is a paradigmatic critique. It provides an analysis of 
the entire episteme and paradigm including relationships, structures, institutions, 
expectations, affect ideas, imaginary, and historical re-configuring. Thus, this dissertation 
engages the (almost) impossible question of: What does it mean to include a critique of 
the paradigm within the paradigm?  
 In order to progress in this process of decoloniality and decolonization and 
implement decolonial pedagogy, a multi-dimensional approach is needed. Professors 
need to carefully examine their syllabi and consider whether their syllabus is reflective of 
an “add and mix” approach to their inclusion of non-Eurocentric epistemologies or if 
their approach reflects a view of non-Eurocentric epistemologies as foundational to their 
presentation of human rights (Grosfoguel, 2012; Richardson, 2012; Escobar 2004, 2011). 
This means that professors need to critically analyze whether their course materials and 
content reflects hegemonic discourse of human rights or a discourse that sees 
decoloniality and decolonization as the starting point rather than just a critique. In 
addition, the processes and practices that could lead to decolonization require “critical 
dialogue between diverse critical epistemic, ethical, and political projects” (Grosfoguel, 
2007, p. 212). Professors must also analyze whether the how of their pedagogy allows for 
dialogue between the subaltern and subjugated epistemic project and the Eurocentric 
hegemonic project. This is a necessary component to fighting against epistemic 
coloniality of human rights. Part of this dimension of the approach may also involve 
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changes at the administrative, departmental, and institutional level in order to provide a 
supportive teaching/learning environment. While this work will not address all the 
changes needed at these levels, in the following section, I address various barriers to the 
implementation of a decolonial pedagogical approach and touch on the roles of these 
levels in overcoming the barriers. 
Another dimension of the approach pertains to how professors address power 
relations. When professors incorporate power relations in their courses, their inclusion 
needs to extend beyond incorporating readings or other materials to a critical analysis of 
how power relations limit whose voice has been and is heard within human rights 
discourse and in the classroom. Power relations are often taught from a perspective that 
problematizes implementation and enforcement but leaves out the absence of specific 
social identities/voices from sharing their own ways of understanding human rights and 
being considered an authoritative voice (Baxi, 2002; De Lissovoy, 2010; Sykes, 2006). 
Professors must also reflect on the authority of voices and sources and the assumptions 
that are made about who is capable of producing knowledge. It is not enough just to have 
people read about it, or consider the idea if an objective of decolonization is the collective 
production of knowledge. Professors may consider collective research projects as a tactic 
toward recognizing and naming what should be considered when imagining what 
decolonizing even means. 
Finally, and critically, professors should consider the importance of accepting a 
pluriversal epistemology of human rights in order to move non-Eurocentric 
epistemologies beyond critiques to an equally authoritative way of understanding and 
knowing that is capable of universality (Grosfoguel, 2006; Walsh, 2007). Until professors 
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condition the possibility of non-Eurocentric epistemologies as Truth, engaging in the kind 
of critical dialogue between epistemic projects that allows for a pluriversal epistemology 
to emerge is improbable. Mbembe (2016) explains that  
 knowledge can only be understood as universal if it is pluriversal (p. 36). By 
 pluriversity, many understand a process of knowledge production that is open to 
 epistemic diversity. It is a process that does not necessarily abandon the notion of 
 universal knowledge for humanity, but which embraces it via a horizontal strategy 
 of openness to dialogue among different epistemic traditions. (p. 37) 
 
Thus, the universality of human rights is re-conceptualized (Quijano, 2000).   
Conclusion 
 
The adoption of a decolonial pedagogical approach is part of the complex process 
of decoloniality and the decolonization of human rights. This process involves first 
thinking about what conditions are necessary to move toward asking questions about 
what it means to decolonize human rights education. The findings of this research 
demonstrate that the majority of human rights professors interviewed are not 
implementing a decolonial pedagogical approach in their classes. Although 17 professors 
have implemented to varying degrees at least two criteria, a comprehensively decolonial 
approach is not yet present. The continued implementation of pedagogical approaches 
that reify Eurocentric epistemologies of human rights limits the possibility of the creation 
of conditions in which a pluriversal epistemology, the aim of many decolonial theorists, 
can emerge.  
In the next chapter, the discussion of pedagogy shifts from professors curricular 
choices to the pedagogical practices they are employing in their courses. The chapter 
begins with reflection on professors’ motivations for teaching human rights and 
transitions to professors’ insights on how well they were trained to teach human rights as 
   148 
well as the extent to which they believe their disciplinary training influences their 
presentation of human rights. This is followed by a summarization of some of the 
pedagogical practices that professors are utilizing and how they use them in their courses. 
Finally, the chapter concludes by examining pedagogical barriers and possibilities for 
overcoming them.  
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CHAPTER 6 
PEDAGOGICAL REFLECTIONS 
 In the previous chapter, the curricular choices of professors were analyzed 
utilizing the key decolonial criteria established in Chapter 2 and operationalized for 
measurement in Chapter 3. The analysis revealed that while many of the professors 
leaned toward a critical pedagogy of human rights, the application of a decolonial 
pedagogy was only just emerging and was limited with regards to engagement with non-
Eurocentric epistemologies, consideration of authoritative identities within human rights, 
avoidance of sole emphasis on Eurocentric discourses of human rights, and the inclusion 
of subaltern knowledge. In this chapter, I aim to move beyond the curricular choices of 
professors, the what of pedagogy, to the practices and philosophies guiding the how of 
their pedagogies. In doing so, I recognize my own assumptions of what pedagogy should 
be based on my experiences as a student. I am also reflective of the challenges faced by 
professors, including myself, that are traced to timelines of disciplinary training, and the 
lack of any graduate pedagogical training in how to teach others, and challenges relating 
to the implementation of a new pedagogical approach. I point to absences within 
pedagogy not as a critique but in an effort to understand how we can better engage with 
pedagogical practices that will incorporate excluded voices, experiences, and dialogues. 
This chapter addresses questions of professors’ motivations for engaging in human rights 
education, professors’ disciplinary and human rights training and the influence of that 
training on their presentation of human rights, and the pedagogical processes and 
practices they are using to achieve those objectives. The chapter concludes by focusing 
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on how the pedagogical barriers professors may face in implementing a decolonial 
pedagogy might be overcome.  
Motivation for Teaching Human Rights 
 Understanding the motivating factors in professors’ decisions to teach human 
rights within higher education provides the starting point of the development of 
professors’ teaching histories and pedagogical strategies. In response to the question of 
what their motivating factors were in deciding to teach courses in human rights, the 
professors gave four reasons: their undergraduate and graduate work, their work as a 
practicing lawyer, their work as an activist or practitioners for human rights, or the 
appeal/interest of teaching human rights.  
 Ten of the professors explained that their motivation to teach human rights was 
linked to the undergraduate and graduate work they engaged in. Professors V, Q, A, G, 
and H all linked their interest in teaching human rights to the Ph.D. work they did on 
human rights in their programs. In the case of Professors U and E, a fellowship to work in 
a human rights clinic and the appointment of a graduate teaching position in human rights 
respectively were motivating factors for teaching human rights. Professor E’s original 
plan upon finishing her doctoral degree was to work for a human rights organization as a 
researcher, but she changed her mind after her experience teaching as a graduate student. 
Professors N, L and F also referred to their academic backgrounds as a motivating factor 
having either studied human rights at the undergraduate or graduate level or engaging in 
human rights research. Each of the professors’ motivational timeline began in higher 
education leading me to wonder about the impetus to engage with degrees that would 
include human rights work, but that is beyond the scope of the research data.  
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 Four of the professors cited their work as practicing lawyers as their reason for 
becoming involved in teaching human rights. For Professor C, his work as a practicing 
lawyer doing civil rights and civil liberties work was a motivating factor, but he also 
became interested in human rights law “when observing what the US was doing in 
Central America during the Reagan administration and what the U.S. was doing in 
Palestine.” Professor I worked as a human rights lawyer beginning in 1989 and took on 
some pro bono cases, which led to her interest in teaching human rights. Professor B and 
Professor D also cited their practice as lawyers as motivating factors for teaching human 
rights.  
 An additional three professors referred to their activist or practitioner work in 
human rights as the impetus to teach human rights. Professor T came to teach human 
rights within academia after a career as a consultant and teacher on law overseas. Her 
transition pertained mostly to an interest in economic rights. Human rights work in Asia 
was the starting point for Professor R who also explained that  “as the field of human 
rights emerged as an academic field in the last ten years or twenty years,” his field of 
political science began to merge with human rights leading to courses on human rights 
within his discipline. Professor K traces his motivation to teaching human rights to not 
only his activism but also to his upbringing. He explained, “If I had to single out one 
[reason] for my interest in human rights, my involvement in human rights activism, I 
would rank as number one the experience of growing up in my home country under a 
military dictatorship. This is the main – let’s put it this way - if this doesn't wake you up, 
I don't know what would.” 
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 The final motivating factor cited by five of the professors was the appeal or 
interest that human rights had in their own lives. Professor P explained that prior to 
teaching human rights, she was a social justice teacher, and then in 2005, she participated 
in a weeklong seminar in human rights across the disciplines which sparked her interest 
and her decision to sit in on a human rights law class at a law school. Following 
completion of that course, she began to design a course on human rights education. 
Professor S, similarly, attended a workshop on human rights law. He said, “I was so 
excited by the topics. I wanted to pass those onto my students; I wanted to explore that 
material with students. It wasn’t my field of training, originally, but it was kind of a 
revelation for me, and also, it allowed me to combine my activism with my teaching.” In 
the case of Professor O, he said that he traced his interest in doing human rights work 
back to childhood but did not expound more. Professor J expressed his belief in the 
equality of people as a motivating factor to teach human rights while Professor M 
reflected on the linkages between men’s violence, which is his area of interest, to human 
rights issues as the reason he began teaching human rights courses.  
 In most cases, professors’ motivations stemmed from their work either as 
graduate students or practitioners working in the fields of law or human rights. In a small 
number of cases, professors’ motivation to teach human rights seemed to emerge from a 
defined or undefined instructive moment in time. Though in some of the latter cases an 
assumption regarding lack of disciplinary human rights training can be made, the same 
may hold true for those whose disciplines or disciplinary training pertained to human 
rights. The following section examines professors’ reflections on whether their 
educational training prepared them to teach human rights as well as how their training has 
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impacted or influenced their presentation of human rights.  It concludes with discussion 
of how training, or the lack thereof, may have on the implementation of a decolonial 
pedagogical approach to teaching human rights.  
The Impact of Educational/Disciplinary Training 
 Some of my background questions were intended to elicit their perceptions of 
professors’ own readiness and preparedness to teach human rights and how they believed 
that their training or lack of training to teach human rights impacted their presentation of 
it, the how of their pedagogy. The professors were almost evenly split between those who 
believe that their disciplinary training prepared them to teach human rights and those that 
feel it did not, with a small number falling into a category of “somewhat”. The seven 
professors who do believe that their educational training prepared them to teach human 
rights also believe that their training has had an influence on their presentation of human 
rights; however, for the eight professors who do not believe that their training prepared 
them to teach, half contended that their disciplinary training has influenced their 
presentation of human rights. Those professors who believe their disciplinary training 
only somewhat trained them did; however, all assert that their training has influenced 
their presentation. Thus, it is clear that the disciplinary training these professors received 
has had a significant impact on how they teach human rights.  
 The seven professors who felt that their academic/disciplinary training prepared 
them to teach human rights came from the disciplines of law (2), cultural studies, political 
science (2), sociology, and social science. The length of time each of these professors has 
been teaching human rights spans between two and fourteen years, which provides some 
perspective in terms of the timeframe in which they were trained in their disciplines.  
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 Professor U and B both have disciplinary training in law and twelve and five 
years of teaching respectively. Professor U believes that the law training she received at 
an Ivy League school and, in particular, the international law courses and human rights 
clinic she attended as well as her time as a fellow provided her with the foundation that 
she needed to teach human rights. She explains,  
I went to law school...and took the human rights clinic there. That’s where I 
learned human rights. I took it all of the semesters that I could, starting in my 
second semester my first year and continued throughout. I also took the asylum 
clinic and through those courses I learned a lot of the basics of human rights law. 
I also took international law, two semesters worth that provided me with the 
international law foundation that I needed…But, certainly, between the clinic and 
international law, I got the foundation that I needed. While I was a fellow, I sort 
of had on the job training. 
 
Professor U utilizes her disciplinary training in law in her human rights courses but also 
believes that she teaches human rights differently than she teaches other types of courses. 
She explained that when teaching human rights, she consciously emphasizes strategic-
thinking, the indeterminacy of norms, and cultural relativism issues more than she would 
in non-human rights courses.   
 Professor B has solely been teaching human rights courses for the past fourteen 
years and also feels that the human rights law courses she took as well as her work with a 
human rights law firm in Africa as a student were instrumental in preparing her to teach 
human rights. However, she contends that she is an anomaly in that she does not believe 
most lawyers are well trained on international human rights law. In the case of both of 
these professors trained in law, it seems as though their coursework and their 
involvement in practical training via a clinic or work in a law firm during their time in 
law or graduate school were very helpful to their teaching. I would also contend that the 
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relative recency of the completion of those programs was likely a factor in feeling 
prepared, especially considering the other professors who have a background in law have 
taught between eleven and forty years and do not believe that their educational training 
prepared them to teach human rights.   
 Professors L and H come from the disciplinary field of political science. Professor 
L has five years of teaching experience in human rights while Professor H has eleven. 
Professor L attended a university that had a human rights institute with “excellent faculty 
and faculty mentors.” For him, his coursework, in particular one course on the theories of 
human rights and another on international law and human rights, were helpful. He 
described them as “ideal for teaching an introductory course in human rights.” In 
addition, much of his research was on international law and positive violations of law, so 
between his coursework and research he asserted that his training did prepare him to 
teach those human rights courses. He also explained that his methods are different when 
teaching human rights than political science. He emphasized the differences between the 
types of students he gets in each type of class:  
I would definitely say that with Human Rights…the students that I get are 
different than the students I get in straight Political Science courses. In human 
rights, the students that I get tend to be interdisciplinary. So, I tend to use lots of 
interdisciplinary tactics to teach the course.  
 
He also emphasized that because of the different backgrounds of students in his human 
rights courses, he avoids teaching extensively on methods:  
I try to make sure because, again, I have a lot of different types of students in 
there, I try to make sure that my, the pieces that I find are not too 
methodologically challenging. I’ll usually spend like one or two days on methods 
in the study of Human Rights and the rest of time I try to avoid getting too much 
into data and models and even like the base about like philosophy of science when 
it comes to understanding these things.  
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Professor H, who minored in human rights as an undergraduate and did her doctoral 
research in women’s rights, also contended that her training prepared her for teaching 
human rights. She explained that all the courses she teaches are informed by human 
rights “at some minimal level”, and that although she teaches through a political science 
lens, she, like Professor L, tries to take an interdisciplinary approach in the courses that 
she teaches. Although both of these professors do feel their educational training prepared 
them for teaching human rights, the other two professors trained in political science either 
opined that their training only somewhat trained them or didn’t train them at all. It also 
seems relevant that despite receiving their PhDs in political science, both chose doctoral 
work in the field of human rights, which provided a foundation in human rights.   
 The last three professors who believe that their training equipped them to teach 
human rights come from the disciplinary fields of sociology, social science, and cultural 
studies. Each described how human rights became incorporated into their graduate 
programs. Professor A, a sociologist by training has been teaching human rights for two 
years. Though his PhD work was in sociology, Professor A highlighted that he had prior 
training as an ethicist and has also had significant training around human rights through 
previous studies in political theory and human rights. He teaches human rights through a 
social constructivist approach and focuses on the sociology of human rights in his 
courses. Although he teaches across four disciplines, Professor A uses similar methods in 
each of his courses.  
 Professor E comes from an interdisciplinary social science background and has 
been teaching human rights for the past eight years. For Professor E, interdisciplinary 
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training was a conscious decision. She explained, “I had gotten into a poli-sci PhD 
program, and I decided that because I wanted to focus on human rights, I didn’t want to 
stick solely to one discipline.” This decision led her to attend a different program, which 
allowed her to take courses in ethics, global politics, international law, and social 
movements. She believes taking these courses prepared her for teaching human rights. In 
addition, in her last year of her PhD program, she was selected to teach a human rights 
course and that also helped prepare her for additional teaching assignments in human 
rights. Although she has also taught courses in international studies, she believes that she 
always teaches and “look[s] at things through the lens of human rights.”  
 Finally, Professor Q also believes that his training in cultural studies was good 
preparation for teaching human rights, which he has been doing for the past eleven years. 
As a cultural studies student, Professor Q chose to do his doctoral work on the historical 
and cultural origins of the UDHR. As his research methods were mostly historical, he 
presents human rights as “a constructed, historically situated set of institutions, 
discourses, and practices”, and as he has continued to work in different areas of his 
human rights program, he has “brought in a practical skills-based emphasis to…the 
curriculum [he] present[s].” Professor Q differs from Professors A and E in that he 
believes he teaches his human rights courses differently than other courses:  
Well, I think that human rights courses, the human rights courses I have taught, 
have been much more connected with contemporary issues and debates even 
when I’m teaching the history of human rights, but there’s always an element of 
both.  
 
Finally, Professor Q commented on a theme that has emerged in these interviews, which 
is the taking on of an interdisciplinary approach to human rights in their courses. He 
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commented, “I think for a large number of college instructors, that interdisciplinary focus 
would also be a kind of major difference from other forms of teaching that they’ve done.” 
Seemingly, for many of these professors who do believe that their training prepared them 
to teach human rights, extending beyond the disciplines in which they received their 
graduate degrees is an important aspect to their presentation of human rights. 
 In addition to the seven professors who do believe that their educational training 
prepared them to teach human rights, there were some who stated that their training had 
only partially or somewhat trained them to teach human rights. These professors have 
educational backgrounds in political science; international relations; sociology and law; 
and law. Their teaching experiences are more extensive than the previous group of 
teachers as two have eleven years of experience, one has twenty, and another has more 
than forty years of experience. For each of these professors, their hesitancy to firmly 
agree that their educational training prepared them to teach human rights is primarily 
grounded in a lack of a formal foundation in human rights and/or a periphery inclusion of 
human rights knowledge in their disciplinary training.  
 Professor J, who was trained in law, has been teaching human rights for the past 
eleven years. Although he has a legal background in constitutional law and other aspects 
of law, he contends, as in his case, “legal training does not always translate to an 
interdisciplinary understanding of human rights”.  Even so, his legal training does 
influence his presentation of human rights as his legal training “means that [his] bias is 
towards an understanding of the international legal regime of human rights.” Although he 
believes that the philosophy of human rights is contested, as is the concept of human 
rights, he feels it is important that human rights students understand that a “legal regime” 
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is in place. Additionally, and similar to many of the other professors previously 
discussed, Professor J also believes that “teaching human rights requires an openness of 
mind to other disciplines rather than the disciplinary imperialism found in many aspects 
of social sciences.” Thus, for him, teaching human rights requires a willingness to engage 
with other disciplines in order to present a full understanding of human rights. Professor I 
also has a background in law but went on to receive further training in the field of 
sociology. Having begun teaching human rights twenty years ago, she explained that she 
was “sort of trained to do human rights work”, but that it was her practice background as 
a lawyer that led her to teaching human rights and her practice is what really informs her 
teaching. Even so, she says that her training in sociology has slowly grown to impact her 
presentation of human rights: 
I like that [sociological] lens in my classes, and I think in human rights especially 
that it’s a complicated sort of attraction to human rights issues because of the 
violence, the marginality of people, and the exotic kind of other is definitely 
something that I’m mindful of in my human rights classes. But that’s like grown 
over time and I’ve learned that over time. 
 
While both of these professors feel their legal background has given them some needed 
training in human rights, neither seems to have deemed it sufficient. Likewise, Professor 
R, whose Ph.D. is in political science also received training that he felt was connected “to 
some extent” to human rights as his training was in comparative politics and political 
theory. However, he doesn’t believe any deficiency in training during his time in 
graduate school has been a problem because  
when you teach, you’re always evolving. For example, I wasn’t trained in 
international relations, but because of teaching needs, I ended up teaching 
Chinese foreign policy. Then somebody else came to the University who was 
going to teach domestic politics, so I switched. So you learn new things, and in 
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the same way, and in fact, it’s more fun to teach if you’re learning new things. So 
that’s the case with human rights — as I taught it, I learned more about it. 
 
His background in political science does inform his classes though. He stated, “there’s a 
certain sense in which the course is all about that. And the sense in which it’s all about 
that, as I mentioned before, is I’m interested in these norms and who made them.” 
Professor R feels that all of his courses are informed in the same way as his human rights 
courses. However, he did describe two different personalities he takes on as someone 
involved in the human rights field at multiple levels. His “uptown” personality is 
undertaken when he is on campus as he tries “to adopt an academic attitude and look 
critically, look at cultural relativism, look at the argument that human rights is a form of 
power politics, look at all these arguments”. His “downtown” personality is undertaken 
when he is “participating in some of the groups that [he] works with that do human rights 
that [he] see[s] [himself] as an advocate and a political tactician.” It is unclear if the 
adoption of these two different personalities is something he adopts with regard to his 
other courses.  
 The last professor who considered himself to be somewhat trained to teach human 
rights comes from the discipline of international relations and has been teaching for more 
than forty years. Professor K, much like the Professor J, sees his educational training as 
related to human rights, but he also spoke of lack of exposure to human rights in graduate 
school:  
When I was in graduate school we did not have much exposure to human rights. 
Very little. So I had to do a lot of reading on my own and we did not have the 
type of in-depth scholarly analysis that now are routine in the field. Most of your 
sources when I was in graduate school I mean academic sources I'm saying this of 
course at the risk of some overgeneralization were law review articles and reports 
and activities from non-governmental organizations and of course cases before the 
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regional courts - human rights courts - human rights reports - but we did not have 
the range and depth of programs. 
 
In discussing his courses, Professor K explained that he does not teach human rights 
courses differently than other courses but emphasized the importance of rigor and 
analytical work within human rights courses, which he credits to his legal training and 
social science training. He describes the influence his training has in this way:  
One way … is expecting very strong analytical reasoning and encouraging, 
hopefully demonstrating, this in the classroom by the way I analyze and assess 
data, documents, actions and so on and so forth. But also by expecting the 
students, that whatever statements they will make, they make an effort to make 
sure that there is an empirical basis and to emphasize to them that just wishful 
thinking is not enough to have a convincing argument. You must have some 
evidence to back it up, and this of course comes from my legal but also from my 
social science training. 
 
 In the cases of these four professors, each feels that some aspect of their 
disciplinary training is applicable to their human rights pedagogy and their presentation 
of human rights. At the same time, they have all commented that an important factor in 
how well prepared they felt to teach human rights was the periphery nature of human 
rights to their disciplinary training. The lack of training in human rights has seemingly 
led to a tactical choice of leaning on their disciplinary training to inform their 
presentation and engaging in additional studies and research to feel prepared. With regard 
to Professor R’s response that he learns through the process of teaching, this is a point 
that brings some pause. While professors who attend to their courses with some vigor are 
likely to also assert that they are learning even as they are teaching, the scenario 
presented here is different and worth questioning. First, it brings to the forefront concerns 
of expertise, but it also highlights a concern of pedagogical tactics and their forethought. 
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This is not to assume that Professor R was not effective in his teaching, but rather when 
professors teach a subject they are not trained in, nor are they pedagogically trained, what 
are the repercussions in terms of the objectives of HRE but specifically decolonial 
objectives of HRE? I’ll return to this question later, but it bares consideration as this 
discussion moves to the final group of professors who did not feel their educational 
training prepared them to teach human rights.  
 The final grouping of professors consists of those who do not feel they were 
prepared to teach human rights based on their disciplinary training. Four of these 
professors have law backgrounds and have been teaching between thirteen and forty 
years. The other professors come from the fields of political science, education, 
anthropology, and international studies and have been teaching between seven and 
eighteen years. For each of these professors, their journey to teaching human rights is 
unique and has impacted their presentation of human rights.  
 The four professors with law backgrounds had been teaching for thirteen, 
seventeen, twenty-eight, and forty years. Again, the genealogy of human rights law and 
education as an aspect of higher education training is important, particularly for 
Professors D and C who have been teaching for 40 and 28 years respectively. Both of 
these professors have worked extensively with international organizations and courts. 
These appointments have given them both the practical training over the years to teach 
human rights, but both agree that their time in law school did not prepare them as no 
classes were offered in international human rights law. As Professor C explains, human 
rights “was just not something that was on the curricular horizon.” Both professors, 
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however, attested to their own personal interest in human rights despite its absence in 
their training as the impetus to careers in human rights law.   
 In the case of Professor F, who did take human rights law courses in his law 
program, the courses alone were not sufficient. He explained that although he had 
exposure to others teaching human rights through his classes, those courses “[don’t] train 
you to teach.” Despite his legal training not preparing him to teach, his background in the 
field of law as well as political theory and philosophy “profoundly” influence his 
presentation of human rights. He shared that he brings in “a lot of philosophy and 
political theory into his classes” and that he is “always framing human rights in 
comparative terms- across cultures and traditions.”  
 Professor T shares a similar story of her law school experience having attended 
law school forty years ago. Her law school only offered one international law course, and 
she did not take it. As she only began teaching human rights law thirteen years ago, much 
of what she learned of human rights, she learned on her own. Within her human rights 
classes, her training influences her in that her focus is on substantive content of 
international human rights law. She explained,  
You read the documents, the primary sources. You read the decisions of the 
commissions, tribunals, courts and the international systems that deal with those 
principles. You know, interpret them. I think the substantive kinds of ways you 
convey that information, it tends to be same. You use the same types of sources. 
 
Even though she approaches her human rights courses with similar content as other law 
courses, she distinguished one main difference which she said “stems from her jaundiced 
view of international law”:  
…the big difference between a regular law class is that you can talk about 
enforcement. You can actually enforce regular law, like domestic law. You can 
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take people to court. You can throw them in jail. You can do stuff. International 
law, forget it. It’s this pie in the sky, aspirational. Very rarely can any of this be 
enforced. It’s committees shaking their fingers at governments, saying oh, you 
didn’t do this. You know, other than the International Criminal Court, look at who 
they target, politically. George Bush should be in there, of course we haven’t 
signed on. 
 
Thus, for Professor T, her presentation of human rights is informed by her training but 
also the lack thereof, and includes a strong critique of the lack of enforcement of human 
rights law. Prior to beginning her academic career in law, Professor T worked as a 
consultant on international labor law, which is her passion. Her practical experience in 
the field of law led to her move to the academy, but also bears on both her views of 
international human rights law and her presentation in the classroom. Similarly, 
Professors M, S, and P were also influenced and led to human rights courses by practical 
experience, but in their cases, it was their activism.  
 Professor M took a winding road to teaching human rights. Although his PhD is 
in anthropology, he also holds degrees other fields. Though none of his programs talked 
about human rights directly, he does believe human rights were addressed very 
peripherally, much like Professors R, K, I, and J. However, he explained that as a “child 
of the sixties” he has been interested in questions of human rights for a long time. He was 
involved in an activist organization in the 1970s calling for an end to global violence but 
especially in Asia. That “[laid] the foundation for [his] interest” in human rights. In terms 
of his presentation of human rights, Professor M’s multi-disciplinary background has 
influenced his interdisciplinary presentation, but his training as an anthropologist has also 
greatly influenced his presentation of human rights, particularly with regard to avoiding 
any conception of universal norms of human rights.  
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 Professor S, who has been teaching human rights courses for seventeen years, was 
also guided, in part, to human rights through his activism though his educational training 
in political science did not prepare him to teach. After attending a workshop on human 
rights law, he became interested in the subject and found it allowed him to combine the 
activism he was already engaged in with teaching. Though his disciplinary training did 
not include human rights, like Professor R, he does not view it as a limitation but rather a 
benefit explaining,  
I’ve taught a lot of things that weren’t in my field of training. Overall, it’s been a 
huge benefit, especially in human rights. There weren’t many people being 
trained in human rights in the 90’s, especially outside of law school and especially 
in the US and political science, which is my discipline. So, when I first started 
getting really excited about human rights and the field of study and the field of 
teaching, I was not limited by the paradigms of the field... I could have many 
choices on what to cover in class. I could cover the latest issues and issues that 
resonated with my students. I didn’t feel like it if it wasn’t taught to me in a 
graduate seminar that meant it wasn’t part of a discipline. I didn’t see it as a 
discipline, so that allowed me to explore a lot of things and give my own take on 
human rights. 
 
Even as he presents his own take on human rights, Professor S is “drawn to more critical 
fields of political theory.” While he doesn’t teach political theory in his courses, he does 
incorporate some of the themes of the theory. In addition, he believes that his 
presentation of human rights is also informed by the training that he received in 
quantitative and qualitative methods in addition to legal research. Professor S has always 
taught in interdisciplinary departments which has allowed him to teach as he wants, 
“blurring the lines between [his] human rights courses and other courses.” 
 Professor P is the last professor that also attributed activism to her preparation for 
teaching human rights more so than her academic training in education. Though she has 
been teaching human rights courses for the past eleven years, she said that she “always 
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feel kind of apologetic because in [her] own graduate work, [she] didn’t study human 
rights at all.” Part of her educational training did focus on social justice, particularly with 
regards to language and literacy and linguistic rights, but she feels that much of her 
knowledge of and training in human rights was done on her own. Even so, she does 
contend that the human rights education course she teaches is very different than other 
courses she has taught. The main difference, for her, stems around the pedagogy of the 
course. She explains her pedagogy this way:  
I think that very strongly we have a mantra that comes from the Declaration of 
Human Rights education training, although we’ve heard this before, which is 
‘teaching about human rights through human rights for human rights,’ so I always 
try to make sure the pedagogy is one that is in tune and armed with the human 
rights principles, so that we can ensure that everybody has its democratically run 
classroom. We base a lot of it on critical pedagogy. 
 
For Professor P, as well as Professors M and S, adapting to their lack of human rights 
training has meant utilizing their activism as well as some of their disciplinary training as 
influences to their presentation of human rights. Also brought to the fore again for 
consideration is a question of how professors’ lack of formal training in human rights 
influences their pedagogical methods. In the case of Professor P, she readily defined her 
theory of pedagogy as critical, but many of the other professors did not link their 
presentation of human rights to a pedagogical theory.   
 Professor G is the final professor who addressed the impact of his disciplinary 
training on his preparation to teach human rights as well as his presentation of human 
rights. Having obtained his disciplinary training in international studies but with a strong 
emphasis on human rights, he has been teaching for the past seven years. Regardless of 
the type of course he teaches, Professor G “tries to give [students] tools to think critically 
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about making things better and push more to be critical and challenge their worldviews.” 
He also aims to provide a historical and philosophical foundation to the course content at 
the beginning of the course. Despite having established some parameters of instruction in 
his human rights courses, Professor G does not believe that his educational training 
prepared him to teach. This, despite having taken many classes in human rights, writing 
his dissertation on human rights, and having an advisor who was the director of a human 
rights program. As he explains, “Not only was training in the field of teaching not part of 
our program but teaching in itself wasn’t part of the program.” Professor G makes a very 
important point here, which is why I have left his response for last. Besides Professor F, 
Professor G was the only other professor to address a critical issue within academia: the 
lack of any teacher training or pedagogical training in many of the PhD disciplines.  
 Absent from many of the interviews was discussion of any pedagogical training 
professors received in their graduate programs that helped prepare them to teach human 
rights. Reflection on this absence is not a critique of the professors but rather an attempt 
to understand 1) why pedagogical training is not common; 2) what it means to change 
one’s pedagogy in the absence of training in how to teach; and 3) what, if any, 
ramifications exist to for achieving the decolonization of HRE.  
 A recent article in the Chronicle of Higher Education, “Who’s Teaching the 
Teachers?” highlights the lack of pedagogical training within higher education. Elizabeth 
Alsop (2018), the assistant director in the Teaching and Learning Center at City 
University, argues that “the absence of [teacher] training for Ph.D.s will come as no 
surprise to many in higher education” (para. 4) despite the fact that “over 70 percent of 
all faculty positions are non-tenure-track” (para. 5), which are teaching rather than 
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research appointments. She notes that one of the reasons that pedagogy is not addressed 
in graduate education 
may be practical, as well as philosophical: Teaching someone to teach is hard. 
Like writing, teaching is a craft, learned not just in a single class, practicum, or 
workshop. Rather, it’s a recursive process, developed through trial and error — 
and yes, by "fire" — but also through conversation with others: a mentor, a 
cohort, your peers. (para. 8) 
 
Another explanation for the lack of pedagogical training may also lie in the devaluation 
of teaching, especially within Research 1 institutions (para. 7), which can be traced to the 
neo-liberalization of the university. Furthermore, the un-interrogated assumption that 
teaching “is more vocation than profession” (para. 7) may also explain the resistance to 
training.  
 Stowell et al. (2015) explain the consequence of the lack of pedagogical training 
within graduate programs as the frequent report that graduate students and new faculty 
are “unprepared for the responsibilities of teaching in tenure-track positions” even as 
“teaching experience is rapidly becoming a decisive factor in faculty job searches of all 
levels” (p. 318; citing the work of Nyquist et al., 1999; Golde and Dore, 2001; Austin, 
2002). Although some graduate programs have begun to include teacher-training 
programs, they are often not a requirement and are only attended by few students. Thus, 
many students use their professors as models for their own pedagogical approaches 
(Brownell and Tanner, 2012).  
 Considering the lack of pedagogical training throughout graduate programs and 
the likelihood of students replicating the pedagogical approach of their own professors, it 
is quite easy to visualize the challenges that exist for the decolonization of the university, 
but also for the field of HRE. Without explicit pedagogical instruction, graduate students 
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may rely on assumptions about teaching as well as learning that are not true (Brownell 
and Tanner, 2012). Thus, it is possible that HRE professors who have not received any 
pedagogical training may not only teach from a Eurocentric pedagogy but a pedagogy 
steeped in misconceptions about what it means to engage pedagogy in their courses. 
Changing one’s pedagogy in the absence of training and these misconceptions that fill 
those absences is a challenge that requires a strategic response for decolonial theory. It is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to ascertain what that exact response should be; 
however, I do provide some suggestions later in this chapter on how such barriers can be 
addressed.  It is important to the decolonization of HRE in higher education to confront 
and alter the Eurocentric pedagogical practices that exclude subaltern voices, 
experiences, and knowledge.  
 The professors that participated in this research represent a wide range of 
disciplinary training and experiences with human rights. Their responses are reflective of 
very different attitudes toward their preparedness to teach human rights within the 
university system, but the timeline of when professors were trained in their discipline 
does seem to correlate to whether they feel they were well-prepared to teach. The Decade 
of Human Rights Education did not emerging as a priority for the UN until 1995, yet 
many of these professors received their disciplinary training before or just as HRE was 
becoming a global priority. Thus, the disciplines they were trained in, prior jobs and 
activism, lack of teacher training, and the timeframe in which they attended their 
graduate programs were all factors in how well prepared professor felt they were to teach 
human rights courses. Lack of training in the discipline of human rights may be seen as 
one problem for human rights education, but lack of pedagogical training, regardless of 
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discipline, also has consequences. In the following section, the pedagogical practices of 
the professors are surveyed with special attention given to pedagogical practices 
professors might employ in their process to adopt a decolonial pedagogy.  
Pedagogical Practices 
 Chapter 4 examined professors’ pedagogical approaches with regards to what is 
taught, focusing specifically on the topics and materials professors incorporate within 
their human rights courses. The decolonial measures established for this research through 
a synthesis of decolonial discourse provided a tool for analyzing the extent to which 
professors integrated four key criteria of a decolonial pedagogical approach. In analyzing 
the curricular choices of professors, or the what of pedagogy, the analysis reflects a lack 
of full implementation of that approach. However, pedagogy pertains not only to their 
curricular choices but also the practices, or instructional techniques, used to implement 
the curriculum. In this section, the focus of the pedagogical discussion is on the 
instructional techniques or pedagogical practices that the professors employ to achieve 
their objectives whether explicit or implicit. Decolonization is a process, and the 
pedagogical practices professors use is part of that process. This section seeks to identify 
and demonstrate the particular practices that professors are using to connect to their 
curricular content, and concludes with some questions professors may consider as they 
reflection on their own practices and make future pedagogical decisions.  
Categories of Pedagogical Practices 
 Tibbets and Kirchschlaeger (2010) maintain the audiences and goals of HRE have 
changed overtime as have the pedagogies of HRE. Rather than solely utilizing 
pedagogical practices that focus on cognitive understandings of human rights, 
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transformation (cognitive and attitudinal), solidarity and social change have all emerged 
as goals or anticipated outcomes of HRE (Bajaj, 2011; Tibbitts, 2002). These three goals 
are reflected in three common models of HRE: “values and awareness”/solidarity, 
“accountability”/social change, and “transformational”/transformation (Tibbitts, 2002). In 
order to meet those goals, advocates in the field of HRE have promoted the use of 
specific pedagogical practices to help foster environments that promote these three new 
objectives. For example, practices include activity centered, problem-posing, dialectical, 
strategic-thinking oriented, and goal and action-oriented (Tibbetts and Kirchschlaeger, 
2010). The goals of transformation, solidarity, and social change are not goals specific 
just to HRE but are also important aspect of decolonial pedagogy.   
 When I asked professors about their pedagogy, their interpretation of what I 
meant by “pedagogy” differed. Some asked specifically if I wanted to know about what 
they include in their courses or how they teach. Some asked for an explanation of what I 
meant while others talked about their classes but didn’t give many details about their 
pedagogy. Given the lack of pedagogical training in graduate schools, confusion over the 
meaning of pedagogy is not unexpected and may reflect discipline specific 
understandings of the term. Thus, the practices that I’ve included are limited to those 
specifically mentioned by the professors in response to the interview question. I sorted 
the practices into ten categories by type. While not all of the same categories as noted 
above are used, many of the same pedagogical practices for achieving the HRE goals of 
solidarity, transformation, and social change are being used by the professors 
interviewed.  In addition to their practices, I have also included some of the context 
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provided by the professors as to how these practices are incorporated in their courses. 
The practices are ordered according to the number of professors that use them.  
 The first category is writing activities. Nine professors reported incorporating this 
category, which includes essays, reports, lesson plans and journals. Professor N and A 
have their students do weekly short writing exercises based on the readings. Professor R 
has his students write two short papers on topics that students select while Professor H 
has her students complete in-class writing assignment. Professor E asks her students to 
write review of human rights books. Professor L engages his students in selecting a 
critique of human rights that they believe is either “compelling” or “problematic” in its 
current form and explain why. Professor O has his students keep a human rights journal. 
He explained that he “want[s] them to train their eyes to see this [human rights] material, 
everywhere.” Professor T has her students write a chapter of a textbook. She described 
the requirements of the assignment:  
Each student has to pick a country, and it can’t be their home country. It has to be 
another country. They have to write basically what I call a chapter of the 
textbook, because I use my own textbook. All the materials are mine.  So I say, 
okay, you’re going to write the last half of the text book and each of you write a 
chapter and it’s on your country and you have to do a thirty-page sort of 
discussion and analysis of the legal system, the labor issues, using primary and 
secondary sources, case law. And then at the end of that I want you to talk about 
how does this fit in? 
 
Professor L has her students develop sample lesson plans that address indigenous rights 
issues.  
 The second category of practices is class discussions. Seven of the professors 
reported engaging in this practice with their students and some provided examples of 
what the class discussion might entail. For example, Professor T and Q generally end 
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their classes with discussion questions related to the lecture they gave. Professor B 
provides students with discussion questions, which she circulates in advance. She also 
uses a circle process, which she described:  
I use what they call the circle process where you have a talking piece and you 
pass it around and the only one who can speak is the one who has the talking 
piece. It’s a way of encouraging deep listening and tends to engage students who 
otherwise would be intimidate about speaking in class. It also encourages much 
deeper reflection so I use that often for sensitive topics. 
 
Professor D has students read the articles from Covenants. Then he assigns students to 
different articles and has them discuss problems related to those articles. Professor T also 
has students engage in discussion, but in her courses, the students are responsible for 
leading the discussion by talking about a human rights issue that they identified by 
watching or reading the news.  
 The third category is the inclusion of guest speakers. Five of the professors 
mentioned inviting people from the human rights community, local organizations, or 
human rights defenders into their courses. For example, Professor K said,  
When we’re studying particular issues, I always try to invite local organizations 
that are doing something to address that issue. We brought Black Lives Matter 
this semester into this semester as speakers, and so I think that the fact that there 
are human rights violations going on right in front of us in our own communities 
in the United States. I think that’s becoming more and more clear. 
 
Professor R explained that his university brings in human rights advocates every year 
from all around the world and that he invites them to his class to talk about their 
experiences. He has also brought in members from UN committees such as the 
Committee Against Torture. Professors S, I, and B also bring in guest speakers that are 
human rights practitioners, defenders, advocates, or victims.  
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 The fourth category is lecture. Five of the professors mentioned that this is an 
aspect of their pedagogy. Professors T, R, Q, H, and D regularly incorporate lecture into 
their courses.  
 The fifth category of practices is social action activities. Three of the professors 
reported that they use activities in which students engage with their community to see 
human rights in action. For example, Professor V’s students have sponsored state bills 
and lobbied legislators and organized a community meeting on the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Professor O requires his 
students to engage in community service with people working in the field of human rights 
or with survivors of human rights abuses and violations. He explained, “We have people 
working through homelessness to Holocaust survivors to violence against women, 
poverty issues, literacy issues; we have a center for survivors of torture here.” Professor S 
has his students get involved with a local or global issue. As examples he said, “Last 
semester when the students worked with the Lost Boys, they were actually helping to 
design something in South Sudan” and “undergraduate students work[ed] on a pretty high 
profile death penalty case, where the students were full legal partners with the public 
defenders office.” 
 The sixth category is case studies, which might be real or hypothetical. Three 
professors reported using case studies. Professor N has students learn about the rights 
contained in the UDHR and then look at case studies and apply the rights to those cases. 
Professor L said that he uses real or hypothetical cases to see if students “can predict how 
the case was decided by an international court or how it was, if it was domestic law, if it 
was ratified by a particular country or something like that.” Professor K provides students 
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with case studies and has them “prepare briefs or position papers and give them an 
opportunity to do background research and see how they construct an argument in 
defense of a particular position as opposed to a different position.” 
 The seventh category is exams. Only three professors spoke of exams as part of 
their pedagogy. Professor L said that he gives exams but did not provide any additional 
details. Professor N has students take two exams; one comes one-third of the way through 
the course and the other two-thirds of the way. Professor H also uses exams but said she 
has been experimenting with having students take the exams in groups.  
 The eighth category is project-based activities or assessments. Three of the 
professors reported that they have students engage in an individual or group research 
project or creative project. Professor Q said that his students either complete a research 
project individually or a collaborative group project. Professor K described his research 
project as involving the identification of a human rights issue that is important to them, 
research of the issue, and connection of international treaties to the issue. Professor O has 
his students complete a creative project:  
all have to do something artistic at the end of the course. Whatever it is, they have 
to draw, paint, sculpt, write poetry. Whatever their creativity is, they have to 
create something in relation to a scene, or several scenes, whatever they’re 
interest is. It can be a collage. They’ve got to do something and talk about what 
they did, why they did it, what does it detect, why what they choose to do 
resonates in the first place. 
 
 The ninth category is simulations. Two of the professors reported their 
incorporation of simulations into their courses. While Professor H did not give any 
details, Professor B explained that she uses the simulations to help students “exercise and 
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learn practical skills like interviewing” and she also uses simulations for human rights 
scenarios.  
 The final category of practices is debate. Two of the professors reported that they 
regularly use this practice in their courses. Professor L explained that he has the students 
debate how international judges might interpret a situation in which a human rights 
violation is said to have occurred. Professor K said that he frequently uses the Socratic 
method in class and always includes a debate on the concept of “universal” and whether 
it is liberating or oppressive.  
 Inclusion of these pedagogical practices is intended to help identify and 
demonstrate the ways in which professors are presenting the content that they are 
providing to students. Though the content is important to a decolonial pedagogical 
approach, the instructional techniques professors use to convey and make meaning of the 
content also hold some importance. While there is no theoretical framework for assessing 
which techniques might be most beneficial for decolonization, there are some practices 
that HRE educators have determined to be more effective for achieving the goals of 
transformation, solidarity and social change – problem-posing, social action-oriented, and 
dialectical, for example.  More so than depending on a particular pedagogical practice for 
effectiveness, there are some aspects of decolonialism that human rights professors might 
consider as they make decisions regarding the practices they incorporate. Some questions 
professors might ask of their practices are: 
 
• How do they promote solidarity among my students? Within the community? 
• How do they work toward transformation as a goal of decolonization but also of 
HRE? 
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• How do they help create an environment in which students might be able to 
inhabit other spaces and different perspectives? 
• How do they promote epistemic disobedience? 
• How do they encourage students to contribute as co-collaborators whose 
knowledge is important? 
• How do they decenter their own knowledge and positionality? 
 
 These questions may prove useful to professors as they move along in the process 
of decolonizing their courses. The implementation of a decolonial pedagogy is not an 
easy task as the time and energy demands are significant. As an educator who teaches 
human rights to ESL students, I struggle to implement a decolonial pedagogical approach 
in my own classes, and I question whether my content and the practices I use in the 
classroom are effective as they could be. To implement a decolonial approach requires 
recalibration and much reflection; in addition, beyond the barriers of time and energy, 
there are other challenges to implementation. In the following section, I revisit those 
barriers but also offer ways that they might be confronted and overcome.  
 
Challenges to Decolonial Perspectives and Barriers to Implementation 
 
Linda Smith, a Maori scholar, argues, “decolonization is a process which engages 
imperialism and colonialism at multiple levels” (p. 21). As such, there are also practical 
barriers that exist at multiple levels to the engagement and implementation of a 
decolonial pedagogical approach. Analysis of the interviews and syllabi has demonstrated 
that while many professors address some of the key criteria of a decolonial approach to 
pedagogy, most are not incorporating all the tenets emphasized to represent a possible 
decolonizing approach to teaching human rights. Understanding the challenges to 
approaches supporting a decolonial perspective of human rights is paramount. In what 
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follows, I highlight the pedagogical and institutional challenges, explaining their 
persistence and addressing how these challenges might be addressed.   
Pedagogical barriers to a decolonial perspective on human rights are situated 
within the epistemological and ontological questions of how one knows what constitutes 
valid knowledge about human rights and who is doing the knowing. I propose that we can 
think of pedagogical training as possibly addressing questions of ontology and 
epistemology to make the point that who is doing the knowing is at the heart of the 
barriers that exist because the “who” impacts what we know, and what we accept as valid 
knowledge of human rights. Decolonial theorists have argued that reality has been 
determined by Western imperial philosophers for centuries (Mignolo, 2009) who have 
categorized the world according to their own epistemologies, including what constitutes a 
“human”, and what is a “right”, bringing to the fore the question of who is the “human” 
in human rights. Mignolo (2009) directly confronted this question in his article “Who 
Speaks for the “Human” in Human Rights”? Mignolo refers to the work of Sylvia Wynter 
who articulates how the categories of “human” and “humanity” came to exclude specific 
populations of people (Wynter, 2003). People were categorized into “human” and “man” 
between the 15th and 18th centuries when humanists sought to separate themselves from 
the Christian Church. “Humans” were close to the Christian God and considered worthy 
while “Man” was a subject of the state and his rights were dependent upon following the 
rules of the state. Beginning in the 18th century, categorization changed and “Man” was 
determined according to biological sciences and racializing discourses” (Gordon, 2006, p. 
11). Man was a privileged classification whose distinction from Human spread along 
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with colonial expansion. Mignolo explains that the result of this classification system was 
that  
 From the sixteenth century to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, He 
 who speaks for the human is an actor embodying the Western ideal of being 
 Christian, being man and being human. In other words, “human” in human 
 rights is an invention of Western imperial knowledge rather than the name of 
 an existing entity to which everyone will have access too. Being an invention 
 of Western knowledge means that the idea of man and human is controlled 
 by certain categories of thoughts entrenched in particular, regional history  and 
 experience… Western imperial knowledge controls the concept of  “human”. (p. 
 10) 
 
Mignolo goes on to argue that decolonization requires the separation of Western imperial 
knowledge from the conceptualization of “human” and that we work toward justice and 
equality for the subaltern – the “barbarians, abnormal, and uncivilized” (p. 10). He 
continues by explaining that the development of the concept of “rights” emerged along 
with colonialism and was a necessity of it. He highlights how history demonstrates that 
human rights “continues to be a colonial tool at the same time that it became a sight to 
fight injustices qualified as violations of human rights” (p. 11). Both the ontology of 
“human” and “right” reflect Western imperial thinking, which has been reinforced 
through coloniality. Both concepts are devoid of subaltern realities. Mignolo contends 
that in order to use human rights, specification of the kind of human and the kind of 
rights is required. He insists that the decolonial project does not need to decide upon a 
new definition of human but that decolonization must involve facing the ways in which 
imperial discourses have constructed an epistemic and ontological racism that has 
excluded populations from humanity. The rejection of ontologies that include the 
marginalized and subaltern as part of humanity is problematic for the decolonial project. 
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The controversy that surrounds human rights as a form of re-colonization centers on who 
is human enough to have a reality or a reality that is different from that which stems from 
imperial discourse. Esteva and Prakash (2014), in Grassroots Post-modernism, reflect on 
human rights as the Trojan horse of re-colonization due to the ways in which documents 
like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “continues the cultural imperialism of 
colonialism; operationalizing the belief that “underdeveloped” cultures are too poor or 
primitive to promote the “good” of their people while imposing dominant cultures’ 
notions of human well-being” (p. 145). Let’s consider then, can human rights rise above 
its origins as a concept that excluded from “human” the “barbarians, abnormal, and 
uncivilized”? A decolonial approach to pedagogy requires wrestling with the rejection of 
ontologies that exclude the marginalized and subaltern meanings of human rights and 
how it is taught. 
 If we consider that Western imperial philosophers are the “who” that are doing 
the knowing about what is human and what are rights, then it follows that what we know 
has been situated within Western imperial epistemologies. In Chapter 2, as well as this 
chapter, we have established the argument of decolonial theorists that throughout 
colonialism and, later, through coloniality, non-Eurocentric epistemologies have been 
rejected having been defined as lacking neutrality, objectivity, or universality. This 
dominant Eurocentric epistemology has permeated human rights, regulating the discourse 
of human rights, and producing a two-fold pedagogical challenge to a decolonial 
approach. First, a decolonial approach requires not only recognition and acceptance of 
human rights entrenchment in Eurocentric epistemology but also that one’s own 
understanding of human rights has been influenced by the same epistemology. However, 
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recognizing and accepting this is only one step toward a decolonial approach; another 
step must include critical analysis of and reflection upon what and how one teaches has 
been impacted by Eurocentric ontologies and epistemologies. This is no small task 
because the hierarchies that coloniality perpetuates are hegemonic, and colonial logic is 
multidimensional and opportunistic (De Lissovoy, 2010). It attempts to saturate our 
understanding and normalize the silencing and oppression of subaltern voices and 
knowledge. But, this human rights knowledge is contested as are the notions of human, 
rights, practice, and pedagogy. Hegemonic ideas are always in need of defense and 
reproduction, yet they are not static nor are they inevitable.  
 In particular, how one teaches is significant. A change to the form of pedagogy is 
just as important as a change to the content.  Rejecting the imperial model of education, 
which Freire refers to as a banking model of education, means that professors must avoid 
simply transferring information to their students. Instead, Freire supports a model of 
education in which professors consider and engage the knowledge that students already 
hold and their ways of knowing (Freire, 2000).  Helena (2016) encourages professors to 
create “anti-hierarchical” space within their classes in which everyone is engaged in 
learning, debating, and analyzing. Second, a decolonial approach requires the 
implementation of course content that addresses the influence of Western imperialism on 
human rights and engages and dialogues with other epistemologies. Beginning the work 
to engage in this step is also tasking and requires diligence and tenacity on the part of the 
professor. 
In order to implement a decolonial pedagogical approach to human rights, 
professors must undergo a change in epistemic cognition, that is “how people acquire, 
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understand, justify, change, and use knowledge in formal and informal contexts22.”  
Brownlee, Ferguson, and Ryan (2017) argue that cognitive conflict, higher order 
thinking, explicit reflection, and reflexivity may help facilitate such a change. According 
to Bendixen and Rule (2004), changes in beliefs generally occur when people experience 
doubt or conflict. This conflict then leads to thoughtful engagement with the new beliefs. 
For professors, being exposed to decolonial theory may trigger doubt or conflicting 
thoughts about human rights, but it is through higher order thinking that professors may 
take steps to engage in positive experiences with a new epistemology. Additionally, 
explicit reflection on epistemic beliefs may facilitate change. Citing Charalambous, 
Panaoura, and Phillippou (2009); Valanides and Angeli (2005); and Tsai (2006), 
Brownlee et al. (2017), explain that metacognitive reflection, in particular, has been 
shown to promote changes to epistemology. Finally, epistemic reflexivity has been 
shown to facilitate epistemic change. Defining reflexivity as “internal dialogue and 
deliberative action following reflective thought”, Brownlee et al. (2017) argue that 
reflexivity culminates in the evaluation of several perspectives based upon the dialogue 
and either maintaining or changing prior beliefs. These new beliefs are then reflected not 
only in the what of teaching but also the how. Ryan and Bourke (2013), contend that 
professors should contemplate their own principles and motivations as well as the social 
and political impact of their and other epistemologies. While each of these activities may 
help lead to epistemic changes, willingness and desire to engage with different beliefs is 
what conditions the possibility of change, and this cannot be forced. It is through repeated 
                                                
22 Brownlee, Ferguson, and Ryan (2017) define epistemic cognitions as “how people 
acquire, understand, justify, change, and use knowledge in formal and informal contexts” 
(para. 1).  
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exposure to decolonial theory, such as this research and thesis, and contact with the 
subaltern and marginalized that we can hope to develop that willingness and desire.  
Professors who do wish to implement a decolonial pedagogical approach in their 
human rights classes may face additional challenges. In Chapter 1, barriers to 
implementing pedagogical change were explored. Those barriers included personal 
obstacles such as the assessment of risk and benefits to the professor and cognitive bias, 
but they also included institutional barriers including deficiency in training, time, and 
enticements. In order to overcome those barriers, researchers have pointed to the need for 
institutions to cultivate an environment in which change is welcome (Tagg, 2012; Le 
Fevre, 2014). In addition, institutions need to encourage and support changes to 
pedagogy (Henderson, n.d.) providing the tools needed (Osborn, 2014), and monetarily 
rewarding professors who implement required pedagogical change (Tagg, 2012).  
 Another challenge to implementation that was addressed in Chapter 1, and to 
which there is little recourse, is the increasing ways that the university is characterized by 
corporate values, where corporate culture and power have been prioritized and become 
enmeshed within the institution of HE, as knowledge producing enterprises. As a result, 
changes perceived as a threat to profit-making, economic efficiency, and subordination to 
the directives of the market are not permissible. In addition, Preston and Aslett (2014) 
explain how neoliberalization has also resulted in the failure of HE to engage in critique 
that would threaten the aims of neoliberalism, including the Eurocentric colonization of 
HE through the universalism of knowledge.   
 The need to overcome the stronghold of neoliberalism and colonialism/coloniality 
within HE is a significant barrier to decolonial pedagogy as it is the antithesis to the 
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success of both. Recently, efforts to decolonize education have taken place in South 
Africa. For two years, students have been protesting at public university campuses and 
calling for the decolonization of the curriculum. Athabile Nonxuba, a student from the 
University of Cape Town, explained in an interview with a South African news 
organization how students define a decolonized education: development of the interests 
of Africans rather than Eurocentric interests, the introduction of new ideas and theories 
by Africans, the inclusion of African epistemologies, freedom to complete classwork in 
African languages, and a new educational system defined by the people it is meant to 
serve (Evans, 2016). The students have also demanded reduction in the cost of tuition, 
which has burdened many (Cherry, 2017; London, 2017). According to Cherry, the 
“Rhodes Must Fall”, calling for the removal of symbols of colonialism, and “Fees Must 
Fall” movements have experienced limited success. She explains that fee increases have 
halted and the National Student Financial Aid Scheme, which had barely covered 
students’ necessities, has been revised. However, efforts to decolonize universities’ 
written curriculum have yet to be seen despite many universities committing to 
transforming the curriculum in 2016 (Cherry, 2017).  
In his article “Decolonizing the University: New Directions”, Mbembe (2016) 
questions whether South African or any university is truly reformable or if it is no longer 
possible. In Mauritius, a new university, the African Leadership University, has foregone 
attempts to decolonize an already established curriculum and has instead opted to create 
their own centralized decolonizing curriculum. The university has adopted seven 
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commitments to “build a canon, knowledge, and way of knowing” that is decolonized.23 
These seven commitments include only using Open Educational Resources (OERs), 
assigning non-English texts every week, keeping student exchange ratios at 1:1, 
incorporating non-textual sources of information each week, including students in 
producing academic work, ensuring that students are producers of knowledge rather than 
just consumers, and operating with high ethical standards (Auerbach, 2017). Though 
starting new decolonial universities across the world would be wonderful as would 
decolonizing existing universities, both are unlikely. Helena (2016) contends that in order 
for decolonization to occur, large numbers of people from within universities and outside 
must demand change, and that the demand will need to include activism, advocacy, 
dissent, disruption, and protest. Social movements of this kind take time, and in the 
meantime, professors need to focus on decolonizing their own curriculum and the spaces 
in which they work. 
Conclusion 
The professors who participated in this research demonstrate heterogeneous 
backgrounds that have had an impact on their feelings of preparedness to teach human 
rights and the pedagogical approaches they utilize in their courses.  Timelines pertaining 
to disciplinary training, the emergence of HRE as a global priority, and decolonial 
theorists’ work being translated into English are all factors that have had an impact on 
their pedagogical approaches. In addition, lack of human rights training and pedagogical 
training are also impacting factors that for some are also challenges to overcome. 
                                                23	I did not use these measurements in my own research as no methodological 
underpinning was provided to explain how these commitments were determined.		
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Although there are many barriers to engaging with and implementing of a decolonial 
pedagogical approach, it is possible. The conditions of possibility for a decolonizing 
human rights course can be created if professors ask questions of themselves such as: Am 
I willing to closely examine my own beliefs and praxis? Am I willing to expend the time 
and energy a decolonial pedagogy will require;? Am I willing to take the risk involved in 
altering the epistemology of human rights I present in my courses? Can I overcome any 
fears I have of challenging neoliberal ideology in the university? In answering these 
questions, professors become more aware of some of the difficulties they may face as 
they move into asking questions about how to decolonize their own pedagogy.  
In the next and final chapter, I’ll provide a conclusion of this research including 
the implications and limitations of the research, and will conclude by offering possible 
next steps for further research. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
 This research project stemmed from the knowledge that although decolonial 
theory addresses the colonization of human rights in modernity, the literature on 
decolonizing human rights education has lacked research on whether and how decolonial 
pedagogy has been adopted within post-secondary human rights courses in the U.S. A 
central supposition underpinning this research has been the importance of and need for a 
decolonial pedagogical approach to human rights education, particularly within higher 
education. This project has demonstrated that decolonial pedagogical approaches are still 
emerging within the human rights courses of the professors interviewed. The interviews 
and the syllabi offered significant insight into the professors’ academic backgrounds, 
curricular choices, and pedagogical practices. In the following sections, I wish to share 
my own interpretation of the research and reflect upon what I have learned from engaging 
in this research from the position of student, teacher, and researcher. I will also provide 
some possibilities for future research into the decolonization of human rights education. 
An Emerging Theory 
 In concluding this research project, I offer my emerging theory, which is an 
interpretation of the meaning of the research (Charmaz, 2014). This project does not and 
cannot make claims of representation of all human rights professors, but does offer some 
emerging ideas from those intervieweed. The interpretation of the meaning of the 
research takes into consideration the historicity and timelines of human rights education, 
and the emergence of anti-/post/de- colonialism theories and movements within which 
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both the research and the professors’ experiences are situated.  It also considers the 
timeframe in which professors received their graduate school training in relation to the 
prior two timelines, as well as their inspirations for teaching HR that were grounded in 
law, activism and experiences in and with human rights. This theory emerges out of a 
relationship between the researchers’ experiences before graduate school, their 
professional training, and the context of what is being researched, which for me is at the 
nexus of my political (pedagogy) and professional life – my life as a student but also a 
researcher and a teacher.  
 The results of this research indicate that the pedagogical approaches these 
particular professors are using in their courses are not yet fully reflective of a decolonial 
pedagogical approach, which I believe can be understood, at least in part, by examining 
several intersecting timelines. First, we need to consider the timeframes in which these 
professors received their disciplinary training. Nine of the professors began teaching 
more than fifteen years ago, and five of them more than twenty years ago. This means 
that close to half of the professors likely attended their graduate programs in the late 
1990s to as far back as the mid- 1970s. These timelines24 must be considered in light of 
the emergence of anti-/post/de/colonial theories. Within the timeline of the 1970s to 
1990s, many theorists were just emerging. For example, in the 1980s, the work of Ashis 
Nandy, Gloria Anzaldua, Gayatri Spivak, and Ranajit Guha was just being published. 
While the work of Mignolo and Grosfoguel was published beginning in the early 1990s 
and early 2000s, respectively. Thus, their writings and theories, especially as applicable 
                                                
24 Please see timeline in Appendix E 
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to human rights, were relatively new for many of these professors when they were in 
graduate school.  
 This timeline must also be considered in light of when the push began for global 
human rights education. In 1974, the UN put forth the Recommendation Concerning 
Education and International Understanding Co-operation and Peace and Education 
relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, but the World Conference on 
Human Rights took place almost twenty years later and the Decade for Human Rights 
Education did not begin until 1995. A little more than half way through the Decade of 
Human Rights is when the first models for human rights education begin to appear 
(Tibbitts, 2002). In examining the intersection of these timelines, a clearer picture 
emerges that demonstrates that professors’ exposure to decolonial theory is likely to have 
been minimal, and that even if they did receive training in teaching human rights, it is not 
likely that their training considered the work of decolonial theorists. Most of the 
professors who began teaching human rights more recently likely received their training 
in the late 1990s to around 2010. In these cases, decolonial theory and human rights 
education had begun establishing roots; however, a remaining factor impacting these 
professors as well as those who began teaching much earlier is the overall lack of any 
pedagogical training in graduate school, much less pedagogical training that would 
address the need for decolonization. This issue is only beginning to be addressed in a 
small number of graduate schools (Alsop, 2018).  It is these intersecting timelines that I 
believe contribute to some extent to the absences this research has revealed; however, 
there are additional possible contributions to this absence.  
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 Human rights have been contested since their inception. These contestations have 
resulted in a number of critiques, for example, cultural relativist and feminist critiques, 
which have been widely recognized, written about, and incorporated within human rights 
discourse. The critique of decolonial theory, too, has gained recognition in recent years, 
and contests the conception of a universal human rights framework. We might then 
reflect on what it means to maintain a belief in the universalism of human rights in light 
of the accumulated contestations of such an assertion. Though the aforementioned 
timelines have relevance, the prominence of contestations within human rights discourse 
means that belief in the universalism of human rights is a choice, as is the political 
decision to present a universal epistemology of human rights. This choice is not 
compatible with a decolonial pedagogical approach as a key criterion for decolonization 
is a pluriversal epistemology of human rights.  
 However, this is not to say that decisions regarding epistemology are made in 
isolation; choices of pedagogy are rarely made without the influence of additional factors, 
including the barriers and challenges discussed in previous chapters. For example, such a 
decision may be greatly influenced, or determined, by fears that stem from the 
neoliberalization of the university, the amount of risk involved in presenting an 
epistemology that does not align with either disciplinary or program norms, or the great 
amount of time and energy that a change to pedagogy necessitates. Even so, I would be 
remiss to not acknowledge that personal decisions regarding the epistemology of human 
rights also contribute to the absence of decolonial pedagogical approaches.  
 Decolonization is a process, as is the implementation of decolonial pedagogy. 
Both involve a political struggle to which one can only be a part of if there is recognition 
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that colonization – whether of place, body, or mind – has occurred. So the question 
becomes what conditions the possibility of recognition? What are the loose threads that 
can be pulled to recognize the colonization of human rights and the need for a decolonial 
pedagogy?  
 One possible loose thread that emerged from the interviews is the lack of 
enforcement of human rights laws. Several professors maintained that lack of 
enforcement is a failure of human rights law but also indicative the ways in which power 
relations influence the effectiveness of human rights. Thus, we might ask, how can a 
universal epistemology of human rights hold true in the light of the absence of 
enforcement? What about the concept of universalism subsidizes the absence of 
enforcement? Where is justice if there is no enforcement? These questions may condition 
the possibility of seeing the very real effects of colonization on human rights, as well as 
reimagine the relationship between pedagogy, HRE and other forms of justice.  
 Another loose thread that emerged is the recognition by all the professors that 
power relations, such as patriarchy, racism, sexism, and capitalism, have shaped human 
rights discourse. This acknowledgment creates a condition in which hierarchies of human 
rights knowledge may be recognized as a consequence of and instructive to the 
maintenance of power relations. Within that space, we might then ask, to what do we 
trace both the maintenance of power relations and hierarchies that shape human rights 
discourse? Decolonial pedagogy traces the impact of power relations and the hierarchies 
of knowledge to colonialism but also to coloniality. How have the parameters of who 
creates knowledge already have an epistemology of knowing embedded in the very 
questions asked? Decolonization was a process of political struggle - an ongoing process 
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that can be related to the process of learning in that it takes time. There are moments of 
breakthrough and of watershed insights, but the process is complex, contested, and often 
contradictory. In other words, the line between the colonial and the de-colonial, the line 
named ‘coloniality’, arguably should not reproduce a binary. A decolonial pedagogy does 
not mean that canonical texts and ideas are ignored, but that the process of canonization 
is interrogated; it is not about reproducing a binary, but understanding the relationships 
that are layered and scaled. This understanding has already been demonstrated through 
the work accomplished by those who have pushed for anti- and de-colonial possibilities 
in Ethnic Studies, Women and Gender Studies, and Queer Studies. The decolonial 
reminds us that binaries do not come from below, only from above. While the decolonial 
represents differences, the willingness to engage those differences, and for difference to 
be the basis of agreement, the colonial comes from above with the intention of 
annihilation of differences. The relationship between the colonial and the decolonial 
produces a space, a third space (Sandoval, 2000), in which dialogue can emerge about 
pedagogy and curriculum and practices. This research reveals that some professors are 
already creating those spaces and allowing for the emergence of a decolonial pedagogy.   
 In pulling these threads and others that emerge, professors may be conditioned to 
recognize the ways in which Eurocentrism has not only been embedded within human 
rights but has also attempted to hide, through claims of universalism, the absence of 
voices and knowledge in an effort to maintain the coloniality of power (Quijano, 2000). 
 The implementation of decolonial pedagogy may also be aided by helping 
professors recognize the ways in which the goals of HRE not only align with but can only 
be fulfilled through decolonial pedagogy. The goals of HRE are no longer linked to only 
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understanding what human rights are and why people are entitled to them. They have 
moved to more complex aspirations such as transformation and social change (Lenhart, 
2002).  Similarly, decolonial pedagogy seeks to achieve solidarity and the transformation 
of society through the conception of a pluriversal epistemology that decolonizes. In order 
to obtain the goals that HRE has set forth, decolonization is necessary. Transformation 
and social change cannot be fully realized without understanding the extent to which 
voices have been silenced, knowledge has been coopted, hierarchies have been 
established, and people have been subjugated and victimized. The colonial wound that 
Anzaldua and Quijano write of cannot be healed through human rights in its current 
iteration. Human rights evolved out of a very Eurocentric and colonizing worldview. 
Human rights education, being constitutive of human rights, also evolved just the same. 
They have been integral to each other, informing each other, creating, reproducing, and 
re/inventing Eurocentric epistemology. Human rights must undergo decolonization in 
order to begin healing the colonial wound thereby allowing for conditions in which 
transformation and social change are possible.  
 To progress toward decolonization, we must also address the barriers that exist to 
implementing a decolonizing pedagogy. Though this paper has addressed several barriers 
and also suggested ways those barriers might be overcome, I wish to address the absence 
of pedagogical training as a barrier that requires significant attention. Many of the 
professors interviewed did not feel that they were adequately trained to teach human 
rights and none of them mentioned any pedagogical training as a part of their graduate 
programs. At the same time, research shows and some of the professors also confirmed 
that students use their professors as models for their own pedagogical approaches 
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(Brownell and Tanner, 2012). As a student and a teacher, I can attest to the importance of 
pedagogical training. Although I have not received any pedagogical training in teaching 
human rights, I have received pedagogical training as an ESL instructor. A large portion 
of my disciplinary training focused on pedagogy and included a practicum in which my 
pedagogy was evaluated for soundness, efficiency, and effectiveness. Having undergone 
such training, I know just how important it is to learn about the theories of teaching and 
learning and how they have changed over the years, the ways in which theories can be 
combined dependent upon your students and the goals and objectives of the course, and 
the curricular content and pedagogical practices that best align with those theories. I also 
recognize that in moving toward content-based human rights ESL instruction my 
pedagogical training is no longer sufficient; these courses cannot be taught like any other 
ESL course, even one that is content-based, because human rights calls for a different 
pedagogy – a decolonial pedagogy – for students to truly understand the epistemologies 
of human rights. My lack of training, even though I have a firm grasp on decolonial 
criteria, becomes a hindrance to the decolonial human rights education I want to provide 
to my students. 
 In the absence of pedagogical training, particularly decolonizing pedagogical 
training, human rights professors must continue to piecemeal their pedagogical approach, 
making assumptions about learning and teaching that may not be true (Brownell and 
Tanner, 2012), which in effect may not result in the achievement of their objectives or 
overall HRE goals. Pedagogical training that incorporates not only curriculum choices 
but also pedagogical practices, such as engaging with the decolonial imaginary and how 
to engage in epistemic disobedience, would be instrumental in working toward the goal 
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of decolonization. This type of pedagogical training, while focusing on alternate 
approaches like collective and rotating facilitation of discussion and topics, and dialogue 
as social engagement, can also create a different type of learning community that is not 
trickle-down, but incorporates pedagogical practices that do not create hierarchies or 
make assumptions about who has the capacity to participate. New graduates who are 
trained in decolonial pedagogies can share through doing, and co-facilitating workshops 
on facilitation, through pedagogical approaches and practices that they implement in the 
classroom. Those practices, in turn, are reflective in the not only the epistemology of 
human rights that students hold but also in the way that teachers and professors approach 
their own work in human rights law, education, grassroots organizing, and other 
experiences that inspire their teaching. Through the decolonization of human rights 
education, new possibilities emerge in how human rights are understood, how they are 
implemented, and how they are enforced. From the work that NGOs engage in to foreign 
policy and the ways in which states and government leaders uphold positive and negative 
rights, decolonization can lead to greater opportunity for solidarity and social 
transformation.  
Reflections of a Student/Teacher/Researcher 
 In approaching this research, I often moved between different positionalities and 
spaces as a result of working through this project as student, teacher, and researcher. I 
think these are three likely positions that any professor wanting to engage in decolonial 
pedagogy might move between as they continue to learn what it means to decolonize, as 
they analyze their own pedagogical choices, and teach their courses. Thus, in reflecting 
   196 
on my own experience of engaging in this research process, I hope to share some insight 
for those who might continue in their process of decolonizing their human rights courses.  
 I didn’t go into graduate school with this research project in mind. In fact, it is 
only tangentially similar in that it addresses human rights education.  Instead, this project 
really only became cemented in my mind after some hardships that led me to really think 
deeply about what I wanted to research and what was important to me. Quite frankly, I 
had some apprehensions as to whether I could do the topic justice as a white Western 
trained woman. In settling on this topic, I knew I had a long road ahead of me. The need 
for decolonization was a topic introduced to me in my first year of my PhD program but 
didn’t resonate as an area of research until much later. I had a lot of catching up to do as a 
student if I wanted to address this issue as a researcher.  
 I also struggled with the idea of decolonization as a student and teacher of human 
rights. I had to have some difficult internal discussions about what it means for human 
rights to be colonized and whether it was even possible to be de-colonized. What would 
decolonization look like in my own classroom? How can I uphold the value of human 
rights while simultaneously emphasizing the need for decolonization? These were 
questions that I wrestled with from the very beginning. I knew that I couldn’t ignore the 
voices, knowledge, and claims of the subaltern authors I was reading, but I couldn’t yet 
envision a decolonized human rights.   
 As I read, studied, and outlined, I began to have more clarity about how the 
process of decolonization might begin by decolonizing our pedagogy. Pedagogy is a topic 
I know well. Within the field of ESL, it is a topic continually researched and best 
practices have changed significantly over the years. My own pedagogy is a topic I often 
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think about because I am not just teaching a language; I am also preparing students for 
their college careers, which will involve not just navigating a new language but new 
cultures, including that of academia. So even though I understood pedagogy, I needed to 
understand what criteria a decolonial pedagogy would encompass. My research ensued, 
criteria were developed, and my research questions created.  
 But now, as a student, I faced the task of asking professors questions that I didn’t 
think the field of human rights had really asked of itself. I would be asking questions that 
would be challenging in two senses: first, the questions I was asking may not be 
questions that professors would readily have answers to, and second, the questions I was 
asking might be seen as trying to undermine the good of a human rights framework. I 
have to admit that I approached each interview with a bit of trepidation and the hope that 
professors would navigate these questions with some openness. I did not know what the 
interviews would reveal. I could not guess based on my slim experience taking law 
classes in two universities.  
 As I analyzed the interviews and the syllabi, I found myself oscillating between 
my three positions. As a teacher, I could appreciate the thoughtfulness that each of the 
professors put into their courses and the pedagogical choices that they made. I recognized 
some of the challenges they addressed in making those pedagogical decisions such as 
time, the uncertainty of students’ background knowledge of human rights, and finding 
materials that reflected their objectives. In addition, I reflected on the amount of work 
involved in taking on a decolonial pedagogy, and I sympathized with the lack of training 
that many of the professors had to teach human rights.  I also took some time to think 
about my own courses and how I would answer each of the questions I asked of the 
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professors, and I found my own pedagogy lacking, especially with regard to the inclusion 
of subaltern epistemologies. But, I recognize that we often learn by doing, and that is a 
pedagogical practice that I must continue to engage in to progress in my own journey.  
 As a student, I considered what it would be like to sit in each of their classrooms, 
what my expectations would have been before this research, and what they would be 
now. I thought about the pedagogical practices that many of the professors included in 
their courses and especially those practices that open the possibility of learning by doing. 
I compared my own experiences to what I could glean of their students’ experiences. I 
contemplated the trajectory of my own academic experience and how it may have been 
similar to or different from their own.  
 As a researcher, I thought about what the research revealed and did not reveal. I 
wrestled with how to present the knowledge professors had shared with me with grace 
recognizing that decolonization is a process – a journey – and how to map where these 
professors were in their own journeys. I also thought a lot about the questions that I might 
ask in a follow up interview such as:  
• Where has your pedagogy derived from? 
• What guides your decisions in the pedagogical practices that you use? 
• If you had received pedagogical training, what do you hope it would have looked 
like? 
• What would be your personal barriers or challenges in implementing a decolonial 
pedagogy? 
• Since our last interview have you made any pedagogical changes to your courses? 
 
As a researcher, I am also looking forward to engaging in further research on the 
decolonization of human rights and, specifically, how to engage professors in efforts to 
   199 
work toward a decolonial pedagogical approach. In the section below, I present some of 
the possibilities for future research that might aid in these efforts.  
Possibilities for Further Research 
 Though theorists have written of the need to decolonize human rights (Mignolo, 
2009; Barreto, 2012; Baxi, 1994; Al-Daraweesh and Snauwaert, 2013; Coysh, 2014), this 
research is among some of the first to address the need for decolonizing pedagogical 
approaches within human rights education, and additional research projects could go a 
long way in furthering our knowledge of what it means to decolonize human rights 
education and how to engage with decolonial pedagogy. Additional research may help 
improve our understanding of the pedagogical approaches professors are using in their 
process to decolonize their courses. It might also be useful for determining the impact 
that professors’ pedagogical approaches have on students’ epistemologies of human 
rights, specifically how that impact differs when using a decolonial approach. Additional 
research might also help pinpoint and respond to the individual and institutional barriers 
that prevent a decolonial approach. To work toward these goals, I propose the following 
recommendations for additional research: 
1. Case study research of human rights courses in higher education, which would 
include in-class observations as well as interviews and focus groups with 
professors and students. This research would allow for greater understanding of 
professors’ pedagogical approaches, the epistemologies of human rights that they 
uphold, and the impact of the presentation of human rights on students’ 
epistemologies of human rights.  
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2. A longitudinal study examining human rights students to understand their 
epistemology of human rights prior to and after enrolling in human rights 
programs particularly focusing on their exposure to non-Eurocentric ways of 
understanding human rights and the impact their epistemologies have on the work 
they do after completing their program.  
3. Follow-up research with the participants of this research study to determine the 
particular barriers they would and do encounter in implementing a fully 
decolonizing approach to human rights in their courses. This research could more 
thoroughly address the theoretical apprehensions of professors toward decolonial 
theory and also further explore any institutional barriers they face in 
implementing such an approach.  
4. Research resulting in the creation of a decolonizing syllabus for an introductory 
human rights course that 1) engages deeply with non-Eurocentric epistemologies; 
2) incorporates discussion of the hierarchical categorization of human rights 
knowledge and the impact of these hierarchies; 3) inclusion of course content on 
power relations and authority within human rights; 4) provides decolonial and 
other critiques of human rights through course materials.  
5. Relational research that would examine how human rights are being taught at 
universities in other countries, particularly programs situated in Africa, Asia, and 
Latin and South America, and how the development of these projects are and are 
not, related to European and American models. 
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Conclusion 
 Decolonial theory offers a strong critique of human rights that examines the ways 
in which Eurocentrism, sustained through colonialism and coloniality, has resulted in an 
epistemology of human rights that ignores and excludes subaltern voices. Both human 
rights discourse and education face important consequences as a result. The 
implementation of decolonial pedagogical approaches to human rights education is 
valuable to beginning the process of decolonization. This study has contributed to 
research into the decolonization of human rights within higher education by interrogating 
the background, course design, and pedagogical approach of human rights professors to 
determine whether they are engaging with any of the tenets of decolonial theory. The 
findings determined that a decolonial pedagogical approach is only just emerging and 
there is a need to address the barriers that impede their further implementation. In 
addition, there is a need for research that will further investigate the pedagogical 
approaches professors are employing, particularly those in alignment with decolonial 
criteria; the impact of decolonial and non-decolonial approaches on students’ 
epistemologies, and how to overcome barriers to advance implementation of a 
decolonizing pedagogical approach.  
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      Background questions: 
 
 
1. How long have you taught human rights courses? 
 
2. What motivated you to teach courses in human rights? 
 
3. Did your educational training prepare you to teach human rights? If so, how? 
If not, do you see that as a limitation? 
 
4. How and why are teaching courses on human rights different than teaching 
courses in other social science fields? 
 
5. How do your training and teaching experiences influence your presentation of 
human rights?  
6. What human rights courses do you or have you taught? 
 
 
Course questions: 
 
 
1. How do you choose which course materials to use in your syllabi? 
 
2. How do you use UN treaties, conventions, and case law in your courses? 
 
3. Some of my research has revealed that many of the commonly assigned texts 
in human rights courses do not contain any non-Western ways of 
understanding human rights.  Why do you believe they are not included? 
 
4. Do you structure your course to engage with critiques of the human rights 
framework? Why or why not? 
 
5. Which of your course materials do you believe demonstrate contributions to 
human rights from outside the Western or liberal tradition?  
 
 
Pedagogical questions: 
 
1. What pedagogical approaches do you use when teaching human rights 
courses? How are these approaches different from those you would utilize 
teaching non-human rights courses? 
2. Do you emphasize a universal or pluriversal epistemology of human rights in 
your courses? Why? 
 
   219 
3. Do you engage students in questions of who produces human rights 
knowledge? How it is produced? Which knowledge is afforded credibility? 
Whose knowledge can be disputed? 
 
4. How do you address the ways that power relations, such as patriarchy, racism, 
sexism, and capitalism shape human rights discourse? 
 
5. Do you believe we can understand human rights knowledge as existing in a 
hierarchy? If so, what are the consequences? 
 
6. What are the general objectives of your human rights courses? How do you 
measure those objectives? What restrictions do you face? 
 
7. Given the opportunity to remove all restrictions to your syllabi designs, how 
would you alter them? 
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
A B C D E F G H I J K L
School graduate law	degree major minor certificate program/institute
Trinity	College x x
University	of	Chicago x
Columbia	University x x x	(1	term	certificatein	CE	4	courses)/	grad	certificate	is	24	credits
UC	Berkeley x
Southern	Methodist	U. x x
University	of	Dayton x x
Bard	College x
University	of	Connecticut x(must	have	additional	major)x x	(graduate-	12	credits	required,	2	core	courses)
Agnes	Scott	College x
University	of	Washington-	Bothell x
Harvard	University
Webster	University x	(offered	in	UK) x x x	(undergraduate-	18	credits,	3	required	courses)
University	of	WA x
Arizona	State	U x x	(undergraduate-	18	credits	required,	2	core	courses)
U	of	Texas	-	Austin x	(undergraduate-	19	credits,1	core	hr	course)x
John	Carroll	U x x x
Duke	University x
University	of	Iowa x	(undergraduate-	18	credits,	all	HR	related)
Emory	University x	(graduate-	9	credits,	1	core)
Kean	University
Prescott	College x
Penn	State	Law	School x-	(4	courses,	no	core)
Sturm	College	of	Law x-		(24	credits,	3	core)
U	of	Connecticut	Law x-	(12	credits,	1	core	course)
Georgetown	Law x	-	(12	credits,	1	core	HR	course)
Drake	Law x	-	(14	credits,	no	core	HR	courses)
Florida	A&M	Law x-	(14	credits,	1	core	hr	course)
University	of	Cincinnati	Law
Boston	College x-	(one	core	HR	course,	no	credits	req)
John	Marshall	Law	School	 x-	(16	credits,	1	core	HR	course)
U	of	South	Florida x	-	(genocide	focus;	12	credits;	1	core	hr/genocide	course)
University	of	Denver x
University	of	MN grad	minor
University	of	Notre	Dame x	(LLM)	5	required	HR	courses
Stanford	University
St.	Thomas	University x	(LLM)	only	one	week	courses
Indiana	U	-	Bloomington x	(phd	minor)
U	of	Nebraska	-	Lincoln	 x	(specialization)
UCLA	Law
University	of	San	Fran x
Northwestern	Law x	(LLM)	5	required	courses	-	3	pertain	to	human	rights
Tufts x
Washington	College	of	Law x
U	of	Virginia	Law x	(program)
U	of	Wisconsin	Law x	(program)
Indiana	U	Purdue	U	Indianapolis x	(LLM)	3	required	courses	-	1	pertains	to	human	rights
Northeastern	Law x	(program)
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Identifier Sex Title Length of 
Time 
Teaching 
PhD 
Discipline/Law 
Professor 
A 
M Assistant Professor 2 years Sociology 
Professor 
B 
F Clinical Professor 
of Law; 
Faculty Director 
14 years Law 
Professor 
C 
M Professor of Law 28 years Law 
Professor 
D 
M Professor 40 years Law 
Professor 
E 
F Associate Professor, 
Director 
8 years Social Science 
Professor 
F 
M Director 
Professor of Law 
and Concurrent 
Professor of 
Political Science 
17 years Law 
Professor 
G 
M Assistant Professor 7 years International 
Studies 
Professor 
H 
F Associate Professor,  
Director 
11 years Political 
Science 
Professor 
I 
F Assistant Professor 20 years Sociology, Law 
   224 
Professor 
J 
M Assistant Professor 11 years Law 
Professor 
K 
M Professor of 
Political Science 
unknown International 
Relations 
Professor 
L 
M Visiting Assistant 
Professor 
5 years Political 
Science 
Professor 
M 
M Professor of 
Anthropology 
18 years Anthropology 
Professor 
N 
M Associate Director, 
Lecturer 
9 years International 
Human Rights 
Law 
Professor 
O 
M Director 28 years Southern US 
History 
Professor 
P 
F Professor 11 years Education in 
Language and 
Literacy 
Professor 
Q 
 
 
M Director,  Assistant 
Professor of Human 
Rights and 
Education 
11 years Cultural Studies 
Professor 
R 
M Professor of 
Political Science 
11 years Political 
Science 
Professor 
S 
M Associate Professor 17 years Political 
Science 
Professor 
T 
F Associate Professor 
of Law 
13 years Law 
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Professor 
U 
F Professor of Law 12 years Law 
Professor 
V 
M Professor of Social 
Work 
23 years Social work 
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CRITIQUES INCLUDED IN COURSES 
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Professor PhD Discipline/Law Critiques Incorporated 
Professor A Sociology Postcolonial, feminist 
Professor B Law Religious – Muslim 
feminists 
Professor C Law  
Professor D Law Liberal; Secular/religious  
 
Professor E Social Science  
Professor F Law Religious; Islamic, 
Confucius; Indigenous; 
Cultural Relativist; Feminist 
 
Professor  G International Studies Post-colonial; Religion; 
Islamic; Asian; Feminist 
Professor H  Political Science Post-colonial; Feminist 
Professor I Sociology, Law Colonialism; Cultural 
Relativism 
Professor J Law Postcolonial  
 
Professor K International Relations  
Professor L Political Science Neocolonialism, Liberal 
Imperialism, Judicial 
Romanticism 
Professor M Anthropology  
   228 
Professor N International Human Rights 
Law 
Cultural Relativism 
Professor O Southern US History  
Professor P Education in Language and 
Literacy 
 
Professor Q Cultural Studies Cultural Relativism; War on 
Terror 
Professor R Political Science International law isn’t law; 
Human rights as imperialist 
Professor S Political Science Post-colonial; Post-modern; 
Post-structuralist;Critical 
Race Theory; Decolonial 
 
Professor T Law Cultural Relativism 
Professor U Law Cultural Relativism  
 
Professor V Social work Cultural Relativism 
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TIMELINE: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
ANTI/POST/DE/COLONIAL THEORY EMERGENCE 
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1945	UN	Charter	
1948	UDHR	
1957	Memmi	
late	1960s	Fanon	(translated)	
1974	Recommendation	Concerning	Education	and	International	Understanding,	Co-operation	and	Peace	and	Education	relating	to	Human	Rights	and	Fundamental	Freedoms	
1978	Said	
1980s	Subaltern	Studies	Group	
1980	Ashis	Nandy		
1981	Anzaldua's	writing	
1985	Spivak	
1988	Ranajit	Guha		
1990	Chela	Sandoval		
early	1990s	Mignolo	
1995	UN	Decade	for	HRE	
1999	Tuhiwai	Smith	
early	2000s	Grosfoguel	
